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Abstract  
 
Bret Easton Ellis’ American Psycho (1991) and Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club (1996) 
demonstrate a strong basis in existential thought. Both novels reference the philosophical 
and literary works of Sartre and Camus—two French intellectuals associated with the mid-
twentieth-century movement existentialism—as well as existentialism’s nineteenth-century 
antecedents Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche. More importantly, American Psycho and Fight Club 
also modify the philosophy and its expression, incorporating postmodern satire, 
graphically violent content, and the Gothic conventions of “the double” and “the 
unspeakable”, in order to update existential thought to suit the contemporary milieu in 
which these texts were produced.  
This new expression of existential thought is interlaced with the social critique 
American Psycho and Fight Club advance, particularly their satirical accounts of the vacuous 
banality of modern consumer culture and their disturbing representations of the repression 
and violent excesses ensuing from the crisis of masculinity. The engagement with 
existentialism in these novels also serves a playful function, as Ellis and Palahniuk 
frequently subvert the philosophy, keeping its idealism secondary to their experiments with 
its implications within the realm of fiction, emphasising the symptoms of existential crisis, 
rather than the resolution of the ontological quest for meaning. While these two novels 
can be considered existential in relation to the tradition of classic existentialist texts, they 
also represent a distinctive development of existential fiction—one that explores the 
existential condition of the postmodern subject at the end of the twentieth century. 
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“…in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a 
stranger…”  
~ Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus 
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Introduction 
 
Thought that is broadly considered existential can be found throughout literary history. 
Notable works which have been analysed as existential fiction range from Sophocles’ 
Oedipus Rex (c.430 B.C.), to Shakespeare’s Hamlet (1600), to Dostoyevsky’s Notes from 
Underground (1864), to Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises (1926) (Brosman 10-11, 212-16). 
Yet, while its fundamental concerns may be universal—comprising reflections on the 
human condition that transcend time and place, existential thought is primarily associated 
with the French philosophical movement, existentialism, which, catalysed by intellectuals 
working within a specific historical context, came to prominence in the mid-twentieth 
century. As Catherine Brosman notes in the introduction to her study Existential Fiction 
(2000), tensions—between philosophy and literature, national and international localities, 
the historic and the timeless, as well as the variety of existential thought in general—
complicate “any attempt to define and understand existential fiction” (1).  
American Psycho (1991) by Bret Easton Ellis and Fight Club (1996) by Chuck Palahniuk, 
two novels written by American authors near the end of the twentieth century, both 
demonstrate a strong basis in existential thought and frequently reference the philosophical 
and literary works of the mid-century existentialists and their nineteenth-century 
antecedents. American Psycho and Fight Club also modify the philosophy and its expression, 
introducing postmodern satire, graphically violent content, and elements of the Gothic 
tradition, in order to adapt existential thought to suit the historical and artistic milieu in 
which these texts were produced. These two novels can therefore be considered existential 
in relation to the tradition of classic existential texts, as well as representing a distinctive 
development of existential fiction in their own right.  
American Psycho and Fight Club derive from a similar concern, which questions how the 
individual can lead a meaningful existence within a societal milieu that seems to deny the 
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possibility of any kind of transcendence. In both novels biting social satire critiques the 
dehumanising effects of rampant postwar commercialism and consumerism. Both depict 
the vacuous lives of young adults who are financially and socially comfortable, or even 
privileged, yet find themselves spiritually and emotionally impoverished. Within a milieu 
characterised by apathy, banality, and indifference, disenfranchised characters search for 
authentic feeling. In an article on the loss of authentic experience in Palahniuk’s fiction, 
Andrew Ng writes: “In American Psycho and Fight Club, the pointlessness of experience 
renders the subjects adrift in a capitalist sea of floating signifiers, where humans have only 
equal worth to, or even lesser than, things” (Reading Chuck Palahniuk 25). Both authors 
graphically engage with content typically deemed “taboo” or “transgressive” in literature, 
such as unmediated moral depravity and the depiction of explicit outbursts of violence as 
their protagonists investigate the last remnants of their fragmented human identities.  
In the introduction to their book Shopping in Space, Elizabeth Young and Graham 
Caveney use the term “Blank Generation” to describe a group of writers, including Ellis, 
“who wrote flat affectless prose which dealt with all aspects of contemporary urban life: 
crime, drugs, sexual excess, media overload, consumer madness, inner-city decay and 
fashion-crazed nightlife” (ii). Other critics have included Palahniuk as one of these “Blank 
Generation” or “Generation X” writers (Göҫ 49; Kuhn and Rubin, Reading Chuck 
Palahniuk 3-4).1 Both Ellis and Palahniuk share a similarly economical style derived from 
modern minimalists like Hemingway (Kuhn and Rubin 4), whom both authors have cited 
as a key influence (Sartain 6; Clarke 70).2 Both authors frequently incorporate “found” 
material into their texts, such as advertising, pornography, billboards, posters, song lyrics, 
as well as numerous pop culture references in general. Both authors have created narrators 
                                               
1 “Palahniuk’s themes and methods can be viewed within the parameters of contemporary literature, 
invoking ‘the social ethos of late capitalism, like cyber-punk sci-fi and the so-called “brat pack” writers like 
Tama Janowitz, Bret Easton Ellis and Jay McInerney’” (Kuhn and Rubin, Reading Chuck Palahniuk 3-4) 
2 Hemingway’s work has also been the subject of academic criticism as existential fiction. For example, see 
Brosman (211-16) and John Killinger’s Hemingway and the Dead Gods: A Study in Existentialism (Kentucky: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1960). 
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with a penchant for list-making or reciting facts, such as the recipes for homemade 
explosives and rendering soap in Fight Club, or Patrick Bateman’s obsessive monologues 
on the latest electronic devices, trendy clothing, and pop music in American Psycho. Both 
authors use black humour and satire as a vehicle for their critiques of American society and 
the loss of authentic meaning in the postmodern world. 
Both novels came under criticism for their graphic content. In the case of American 
Psycho the novel was originally to be published by Simon & Schuster, who had enjoyed the 
success of Ellis’ meteoric rise to fame, having published his first two novels: Less Than Zero 
(1985) and The Rules of Attraction (1987). The publishing house cancelled American Psycho 
because of concerns regarding its content, however, breaching their contract and forfeiting 
the $300,000 advance they had paid Ellis for the book. Excerpts from the most shocking 
parts of the novel were in circulation within the house staff at Simon & Schuster before 
the book was published, and these excerpts, when leaked to the press, created a hysterical 
fervour in the media with attacks on the novel’s supposedly voyeuristic misogyny and 
incendiary violent agenda (Murphet 65-71). Ellis, in an interview published in 1999, 
expressed his surprise that “no one, at least in America, came to any kind of wholehearted 
defence of the book” (Clarke 80), perhaps alluding to the sympathetic treatment the book 
received from Elizabeth Young writing in the U.K. 
Palahniuk gained popular attention with David Fincher’s cinematic adaptation of Fight 
Club in 1999, and thus it is difficult to clearly distinguish the reception of the book from 
the film. The film certainly polarised critics, receiving passionate praise for its humour and 
satire, as well as avid denouncement. Fight Club criticism frequently revolves around the 
question of whether or not its charismatic anti-hero, Tyler Durden, is an appropriate role-
model (Mathews 82). Hence, at one extreme, film critic Alexander Walker accused 
Fincher’s adaption of being “a threatening revival of Nazism” that “uncritically enshrines 
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principles that once underpinned the politics of fascism” (qtd. in Bennett 66), and in a 
similar vein Henry Giroux has described the film as 
morally bankrupt and politically reactionary […] Representations of violence, 
masculinity, and gender in the film seem to mirror the pathology of individual and 
institutional violence that informs the American landscape, extending from all 
manner of hate crimes to the far Right’s celebration of paramilitary and proto-
fascist subcultures. (17) 
In his assessment of Fight Club’s reception, Jesse Kavadlo suggests that the sentiments 
articulated in the aforementioned quotations are understandable when one considers that 
the text “dares its readers to take Tyler—and his reactionary politics—at face value”, while 
noting the “unsettling” trend that amongst the book and film’s “popular readership” many 
fans have done just that (11).  
When we consider the critical receptions of both Fight Club and American Psycho, it is 
noteworthy that both books were misread and criticised for embodying aspects of society 
that the authors arguably set out to undermine. For, as Kavadlo observes, if “Fight Club 
embodies Giroux’s ‘protofacism,’ it is in order to condemn it” (13), or, as Young writes of 
American Psycho, a “book which no one seemed to bother to read in any detail”: 
Bret Easton Ellis spent three years writing this novel, and it is a novel—not a 
“How-to-manual”, nor true-crime, not a manifesto or a tract—and it seems 
reasonable to give it more than three minutes consideration. (“Beast” 85, 93)  
Just as Kavadlo suggests that beneath Tyler Durden’s political sophistry Palahniuk is 
making a “call to recognise that fascism is the endgame of a capitalist system that would 
reduce workers to drones and all personal identification to brand names and commercial 
transactions” (13), so too does Young point out that Patrick Bateman “functions as a 
rhetorical device, the Devil’s Advocate whose consumer manifesto merely highlights what 
Ellis has referred to as the ‘spiritual’ malaise and ugliness of the eighties” (“Beast” 120). 
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For both texts, then, there lies a danger in ignoring, as several critics have, the division 
between the views the characters express as first person narration and an implied narrative 
critique. There is also the danger of reacting to such misreading by compensating with a 
reductive counter reading of one’s own, for it is clear that these texts are more complex 
than straightforward satires.   
It is interesting to consider the brief references Palahniuk and Ellis have made to each 
other in interviews. In a 2005 interview with Matt Kavanagh, Palahniuk describes both 
Fight Club and American Psycho as “‘transgressional’ fiction […] where characters act out in 
order to gain a sense of personal power” (179). Later in the interview, Kavanagh remarks: 
Fight Club reminds me of Bret Easton Ellis’ American Psycho. Certainly, both novels 
share a fascination with violence, dark humour, and adversarial relation to 
consumer culture. (187) 
He goes on to mention the controversial receptions of both books, and notes the 
significant difference in that most readers arrive at Fight Club through Fincher’s film. 
Palahniuk agrees with the idea of Fincher as “matchmaker” between author and reader, 
before commenting: 
Ellis was already famous when his book American Psycho debuted, and it dealt with 
non-consensual violence, where villains victimized others. The most important 
aspect of Fight Club was the consensual nature of the violence. […] It was a very 
old-fashioned, socially responsible novel. All the social contracts were fulfilled. 
(187-88) 
This seems a strange way for Palahniuk to distance his book from Ellis’ (in terms of their 
shared “fascination with violence”) considering he previously acknowledges their 
similarities as transgressive fiction. Firstly, he ignores the numerous occasions in Fight Club 
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where the violence is not consensual,3 and secondly, by describing his book as “very old-
fashioned [and] socially responsible”, he is, in a way, implying that Ellis’ is not because it 
depicts “villains victimiz[ing] others.” Granted, an interview is perhaps not the place to 
expect comprehensive analysis, but Palahniuk’s response here smacks of misreading and 
defensiveness.  
Interestingly, Ellis behaves similarly in a 2005 interview with Dave Weich. When 
Weich suggests to Ellis that he deliberately seeks risqué subjects, Ellis responds: 
But that suggests a calculation on getting a response, and that’s not generally why 
I’m writing a book. If I wanted to do that I would go into even more hardcore 
areas. I don’t think I’m anywhere near the stuff Chuck Palahniuk writes, for 
instance. He writes some of the most upsetting things I’ve ever come across, and 
yet he’s not nearly as reviled. 
Here Ellis implies Palahniuk’s writing “calculat[es] on getting a response”, such as the 
infamous opening chapter of Haunted (2005) which Ellis has described in an interview with 
Peter Murphy as “the most horrible thing I’ve ever read”.4 However, in that same 
interview he also praises Fight Club as not “so much a horror book as a commentary on 
masculinity and being male”, and in an advertisement for Fight Club in Palahniuk’s second 
novel Survivor (1999), Ellis is quoted as saying that: “Fight Club achieves something only 
terrifying books do—it tells us: this is how we live now. Maybe our generation has found 
its Don DeLillo”. This is praise indeed from someone who has “always read Don DeLillo” 
(Clarke 71), but the qualifier here is significant: maybe. Furthermore, it is impossible not to 
read Ellis’ comment on “terrifying books” without thinking of his book American Psycho, 
perhaps the most terrifying book in contemporary literature. In a way then, Ellis subtly 
                                               
3 Examples include: the self-harm the narrator inflicts on himself because of Tyler Durden; the narrator’s 
terrorisation of Raymond in chapter 20; Bob’s death at the hands of the police in chapter 24; the murder of 
the narrator’s boss in chapter 26; in chapter 27 it appears that Tyler has hit Marla and given her a “black eye” 
(194), and that he has also murdered Patrick Madden, “the mayor’s special envoy on recycling” (196). 
4 This is perhaps not an unreasonable thing to say at all, considering Palahniuk himself boasts that forty 
people have fainted during his public readings of the story (Glaister). 
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asserts American Psycho’s status as precursor to Fight Club, as parent-text. From these 
comments by both authors we can discern a respect for the other’s work and perhaps an 
acknowledgement of similarity, but there is also an attempt at distancing, a tone which 
borders on defensive criticism without becoming too explicit. Perhaps these comments 
demonstrate not so much Harold Bloom’s theory of the “anxiety of influence” as the 
anxiety of contagion by perceived similarity,5 in that Ellis and Palahniuk discern, on some 
level, that American Psycho and Fight Club have more in common than they wish to 
acknowledge.  
 
This thesis explores one particularly significant similarity between American Psycho and Fight 
Club: the treatment of existential thought, a subject that literary criticism has already 
discussed, to varying degrees, in relation to the works of Ellis and Palahniuk. Ellis’ first 
novel, Less Than Zero, is examined as an existential text by Nicki Sahlin in her article “‘But 
This Road Doesn’t Go Anywhere’: The Existential Dilemma in Less Than Zero”. Sahlin 
suggests that Los Angeles has long served as an apt setting for stories of deception and 
“disillusionment”, of “corruption lurking” beneath glamour, evoking the “absurdist 
tradition” (23). Hence Sahlin sees Less Than Zero as a descendent of Joan Didion’s tale of 
Hollywood hedonism, Play It As It Lays (1970), which has itself been treated as an 
existential text.6 Sahlin describes Less Than Zero as “consistently existential in its outlook”, 
containing a “mixture of [elements of existentialism] stemming from Camus and Sartre” 
(25). She traces the common existential themes of alienation, the void or nothingness, a 
preoccupation with death, the burden of responsibility, and the absurd throughout the 
novel, and ultimately concludes that by its end, Clay, the novel’s young narrator, 
has become aware of his own anxiety and alienation, as well as the meaninglessness 
around him; and though he has found no solution, he has found the courage to 
                                               
5 See Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (1973). 
6 Geherin, David J. “Nothingness and Beyond: Joan Didion’s Play It As It Lays.” Critique 16 (1974): 64-78. 
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continue to live. In having faced the absurd as he finds it, Clay takes on the 
proportions of an existential hero. (41) 
It may be exaggerating the implications of Clay’s supposed “epiphany” to call him a “hero” 
(40, 41), but whether or not the outcome is as positive as she suggests, Sahlin’s analysis of 
Clay’s deepening sense of existential crisis is accurate. 
American Psycho has not previously been fully considered in terms of its basis in 
existential thought. Alex Blazer’s article “American Psycho, Hamlet, and Existential 
Psychosis” notes that Ellis “populates his novels with one fundamental character type […] 
the existentialist alienated by the vapidity and sameness of commercial culture” (39), but 
Blazer focuses his study on Patrick Bateman’s Oedipal complex rather than the existential 
condition underlying his psychosis. Similarly, Blazer’s 2002 article on American Psycho 
makes passing reference to “existential chasms”, the “world’s nothingness”, and Bateman’s 
preoccupation with a “nameless dread”, while predominantly discussing the novel in terms 
of its postmodern hyper-reality (“Chasms”). Considering the novel’s numerous direct and 
indirect references to classic works of existential fiction, it is strange that this aspect of 
Ellis’ most famous work has been neglected by literary criticism. 
Fight Club, by contrast, has had much more attention as a work of existential fiction. 
Stirrings Still: The International Journal of Existential Literature devoted a whole edition to 
Palahniuk in 2005, containing several articles on Fight Club’s treatment of existential 
themes. Jesse Kavadlo’s article, “The Fiction of Self-Destruction: Chuck Palahniuk, Closet 
Moralist”, picks up on Palahniuk’s comment: 
I’m not a nihilist. I’m a romantic. All of my books are basically romances; they’re 
stories about reconnecting with community. (5-6) 
Kavadlo then presents what he thinks is the book’s moral purpose, basically, a warning 
against Tyler’s philosophy of self-destruction, suggesting Tyler is a nihilist, but not 
Palahniuk, whose novels are actually “old fashioned romances” (22). Kavadlo’s 
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understanding of existentialism is highly problematic, however; he introduces the 
“textbook existentialist tendencies” by quoting from the entry for “Literature of the 
Absurd” in M. H. Abrams’ Glossary of Literary Terms (Kavadlo 7, Abrams 1), and later he 
criticises Abrams for “characteris[ing] existentialism through the lens of Camus’ Myth of 
Sisyphus” (21). Kavadlo’s suspiciously reductive reading of Sisyphus leads him to the dubious 
claim that “Unlike Camus, Chuck Palahniuk is generous” (21), and his assertion that 
Palahniuk is “too romantic to be an existentialist” reads as a rhetorical flourish without 
solid grounding (21). Camus’ ideas of revolt, confrontation, and perseverance in the face 
of the absurd are not dissimilar to Fight Club’s emphasis on direct, unmediated experience, 
as Camus argues that “what counts is not the best living but the most living” (Sisyphus 58). 
Robert Bennett’s astute article in the same edition of Stirrings Still argues that the 
narrator of Fight Club is a “postmodern existentialist who wants to deconstruct the meta-
narratives of modernity until he can reach some deeper level of existence that precedes 
essence” (75). Furthermore, Bennett draws an insightful distinction between character and 
author, suggesting that Palahniuk’s use of existential themes often verges on ambivalence 
or even parody, that he “engage[es with] existentialism without either taking it too 
seriously or dismissing it altogether” (78). Bennett notes that Fight Club would suffer, as 
entertaining fiction, if it were to follow too closely the abstract ideals of philosophical 
discourse rather than the author’s distinctive gritty realism, concluding that Palahniuk was 
careful not to let any one discourse compromise the quality of the novel. This is a valid 
and useful point to make; however, we must consider that Palahniuk does, to a degree, 
integrate philosophy with his fiction. In an interview with Tasha Robinson, Palahniuk is 
questioned about his use of philosophy, including that of those considered existentialists 
like Camus and Kierkegaard. When asked “Do you consciously write to meet philosophical 
theories you’ve read?” he responds “Totally consciously”. 
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In order to demonstrate how American Psycho and Fight Club engage with the philosophical 
thought and attitudes of existentialism it is first necessary to outline what is meant by the 
term. Historically, existentialism can be understood as an intellectual movement that 
flourished in Europe in the 1940s and 50s. In 1945 the term was adopted as a self-
description by Jean-Paul Sartre, who became the philosophy’s most well known figure. 
The term was also applied to others, such as Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers—two 
German thinkers who had had profoundly influenced Sartre—as well as Sartre’s French 
contemporaries Simone de Beauvoir and Albert Camus. The roots of the movement were 
traced back into the nineteenth century, and thus the label was posthumously applied to 
Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Partly because of the public profiles of Sartre 
and Camus, existentialism grew to become not just a philosophy, but a cultural movement 
as well (Cooper 1-2). 
In relation to my thesis, it is important to note the significance of existentialism as a 
literary phenomenon. In the popular imagination, it is not surprising that the ideas of 
Sartre and Camus were better known through their fictional works—novels such as 
Sartre’s Nausea (1938) and Camus’ The Outsider (1942)—than through their strictly 
philosophical tomes. In the postwar period a number of writers thought to deal with 
existential themes were linked under the term, such as Samuel Beckett, as well as those 
linked retrospectively, such as Kafka and Dostoyevsky. David Cooper, in one of the more 
recent book-length accounts of existentialism, Existentialism: A Reconstruction (1990), is at 
pains to clarify the philosophy from its image in the popular imagination—the 
characterisation which “many people associate with the existentialist picture of the human 
being” (3)—and to emphasise the subtleties and diversities, as well as the underlying 
coherence, of existentialist thought. He identifies an “over-reliance on existentialist 
fiction” as one source of the widespread “misconceptions” that surround the philosophy 
(12). 
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In contrast, this thesis is concerned with existentialism as a legacy in the popular 
imagination, with the literary inheritance that Cooper dismissively calls “terms of art” (4). 
My concern is more with existentialist aesthetics in literature, with the artistic expression of 
the ideas, than with the philosophical resolution of the ideas themselves. Thus, the 
following introduction to existentialism is intentionally brief, a survey of the terrain, as a 
thorough account of the complexities of the philosophical movement is well beyond the 
scope and function of this thesis. For this reason I draw heavily on Sartre and Camus—
“the two main voices of postwar French intellectual life” (Aronson 2), no doubt at the 
expense of other important thinkers. I have also chosen to focus on the atheistic vein of 
the philosophy, instead of the less prominent theistic existentialism argued by those such 
as Gabriel Marcel and Kierkegaard, as, in Sartre’s thinking, “the notion of a religious 
existentialist” becomes a “virtual self-contradiction” (Cooper 2). In summarising the 
popular conception of existentialism he so valiantly tries to surpass, Cooper provides a tidy 
synopsis of the ideas I hope to elucidate: 
Existence […] is a constant striving, a perpetual choice; it is marked by a radical 
freedom and responsibility; and it is always prey to a sense of Angst which reveals that, 
for the most part, it is lived inauthentically and in bad faith. And because the character 
of a human life is never given, existence is without foundation; hence it is abandoned, or 
absurd even. (3-4) 
The special sense of the word “existence” from which existentialism derives refers to 
“the kind of existence enjoyed by human beings”, and those aspects of human being which 
are distinct from other kinds of being, such as that of animals or objects (Cooper 2). Of 
these aspects, existentialism focuses primarily on the human capacity for self-reflection and 
the ability to alter one’s existence based on that awareness. Furthermore, a human 
existence is always a process of becoming: at any given time, our intentions for the future 
are a vital aspect of our present selves (Cooper 3). This idea is summarised by Sartre’s 
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famous slogan “existence precedes essence” (“Existentialism Is a Humanism” 22); a 
human being is not a fixed entity, like a stone, because one’s “essence”, what one is, is 
always tied to what one is becoming: a pursuit of projects resulting from reflection on 
“existence”, that one is (Crowell 2). Thus, Sartre states: “existentialism will never consider 
man as an end, because man is constantly in the making” (“Existentialism” 52). This 
process of becoming raises the question of what to become, as, for the existentialist, there 
is no fixed human essence (Cooper 2-3). Because there is no inherent meaning in life or in 
the world itself, Sartre states that “man is condemned to be free” (“Existentialism” 29). 
Freedom gives the individual the responsibility to choose what to be, to choose the values 
one wishes to hold, and, in a sense, to engage in creating one’s own meaning in the world 
(Crowell 2.3). However this freedom can also be a source of angst, or anxiety. 
An important distinction is necessary between angst and fear, in that while both 
register a threat to which the self feels vulnerable, fear has an object—some entity of the 
world that is threatening, whereas angst has no direct object. Instead, the phenomenon of 
angst registers a “metaphysical fear”, and as such, can have numerous sources, such as the 
awareness of freedom, nothingness, alienation, and death (Cooper 127-29). In realising one 
is responsible for one’s identity and meaning in the world, that very freedom can lead to a 
sense of vertigo in that, in the absence of any supporting ground, there is an abyss or void, 
a “nothingness”, underlying existence. This aspect of existential freedom can be 
understood by imagining oneself on the edge of a cliff and realising that one fears not only 
the possibility of falling, but also the possibility of throwing oneself off; there is, 
essentially, nothing holding one back, no predetermined course of action (Cooper 129-30). 
As such, vertigo serves the existentialists as a favourite metaphor for angst, a feeling that 
Kierkegaard called the “dizziness of freedom” (qtd. in Cooper 130). 
A recurrent existential theme is that of the alienated self, estranged from the world and 
even from its own identity. This experience is in contrast with the ancient concept of the 
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cosmos, “in which human beings have a well-ordered place” (Crowell 2.2); instead, “in a 
universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. […] This 
divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of 
absurdity” (Camus, Sisyphus 4-5). The absurd nature of existence is also to be found in 
freedom, for freedom leads us to choose values in order to engage with the world, as 
without values nothing would appear more worth doing than anything else and one would 
be “paralysed” (Cooper 143). However, the act of choosing indicates there are other 
choices as possibilities, and is an act made without a universal basis of support or 
justification. It is within this tension, between our solemn commitment to our values in the 
absence of solid justification, that absurdity is also to be found (Cooper 142-43).  
Sartre used the term “bad faith” to describe the condition in which an individual 
attempts to deny or evade the anxiety of freedom (Being and Nothingness 70-71). Bad faith 
can be understood as self-deception, in the sense that the individual fails to take stock of 
the ambiguity and multi-faceted nature of human existence, and instead, for example, 
attempts to identify himself solely with the view others have of him, or lives in the past, 
taking refuge in a past self while ignoring his responsibility for the future (Cooper 117-19). 
The existential notion of authenticity refers to the individual’s capacity to recognise that 
one is a being who can be responsible for who one is (Crowell 2.3). It is in this sense that 
Sartre asserts, in his lecture “Existentialism Is a Humanism” (1946), that existentialism is a 
philosophy of hope and a “doctrine of action” (54), and not intended, as some critics of 
the movement suggested, “to plunge mankind into despair” (53). For existentialism asserts 
that, in choosing “freedom as the foundation of all values” (48), man can create a 
meaningful life, assert himself as an individual, and find the strength to carry on in the face 
of life’s difficulties and contradictions. Thus, Sartre asserts: “what people reproach us for is 
not essentially our pessimism, but the sternness of our optimism” (38). 
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The following two chapters of this thesis are dedicated to the analysis of American Psycho 
and Fight Club as existential texts by making frequent reference to the classic existentialist 
texts that inform these two novels, as well as the modifying effects of the influence of the 
postmodern milieu on the symptoms of existential crisis. The final two chapters are 
devoted to elucidating two distinguishing features of the existential aesthetic of these two 
novels: the depiction of violence within an existential framework, and the use of Gothic 
conventions to represent the existential condition. This project points us toward the nature 
of existential expression at the end of the twentieth century, how it differs from the past, 
why it is so violent, and why it has taken a Gothic turn. 
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Chapter One 
 
Existential Thought in American Psycho 
 
American Psycho is an account of one man’s confrontation with the absurd, the awareness of 
which places him in the grip of a profound existential crisis that often appears to take the 
form of psychosis. Bret Easton Ellis’ novel, which draws inspiration from Sartre’s 
exploration of the existentialist point of view in his classic novel Nausea, engages with a 
range of existential themes, such as the absurd, artificiality, bad faith, nothingness, and the 
burden of freedom. American Psycho’s narrator, Patrick Bateman, is an embodiment of the 
archetypal existential hero, an alienated outsider with a profound detachment from others 
and even from his self. Like Nausea’s Roquentin, he lives alone and his engagement with 
other people is superficial and tainted by misanthropy. A sense of the absurd seems to 
encroach on nearly all aspects of American Psycho, providing the main source for the novel’s 
dark satiric humour. Ellis integrates the existential tradition with the social satire of his 
critique of modern consumer culture to evoke the bad faith of an existence neurotically 
obsessed with greed, conformity, and excess. The novel’s preoccupation with surface 
serves to accentuate the existential void gaping beneath the veneer of prosperity and 
success. His portrait of Patrick Bateman’s individual existential crisis forms a potent 
metaphor for the callous hypocrisy and psychological incarceration Ellis finds in “free” 
American society.  
Before the novel proper begins, Ellis presents an epigram taken from Dostoyevsky’s 
Notes from Underground. Largely due to his disturbingly compelling depictions of human 
irrationalism in his fictive works, Dostoyevsky was adopted as a forerunner of modern 
existentialism by the existentialist philosophers in the 1950s (Scanlan 5). In particular, Notes 
from Underground—which tackles themes of freedom, human essence, heightened 
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consciousness, and egotism—has been viewed as a proto-existentialist novel (Scanlan 69). 
In quoting Dostoyevsky, Ellis indicates a parallel between Patrick and the narrator of 
Notes, the painfully isolated and excessively self-conscious Underground Man. The first line 
of American Psycho, “ABANDON HOPE ALL YE WHO ENTER HERE” (1), alludes to 
Dante’s inscription above the gates of hell in his Inferno, and, as Elizabeth Young points 
out, the reader, on entering the novel, is sent into a “circle of hell”, complete with 
“imprisoning, claustrophobic qualities” from which they cannot escape (“Beast” 93). The 
allusion to Dante is satiric, for the world of Patrick and his acquaintances is hellish in its 
absurdity. This becomes clear when we consider that the opening inscription forms a loop 
with the last line of the novel “THIS IS NOT AN EXIT”, an allusion to Sartre’s play No 
Exit (Huis Clos) (Giles 169), an absurdist work in which three people are damned to hell, 
where they are kept in a room together, ultimately realising that “Hell is—other people!” 
(47). Patrick eventually comes to a similar realisation himself, twice remarking “my life is a 
living hell” during the novel’s typically inane dinner conversations (136, 333), and his 
existential psychosis is, in part, a reaction to his awareness of the absurdity of his existence.  
Ellis describes himself as a “non-narrative writer”, evident in American Psycho in that the 
monotony and repetitions of Patrick’s life are reflected in the novel’s structure: sequences 
of seemingly “random” scenes in which the “effect is a cumulative one” rather than “plot-
driven” (Clarke 76). As such, the form of the novel reproduces Roquentin’s despairing 
perception of life’s meaningless tedium: “nothing happens. The settings change, people 
come in and go out, that’s all. There are never any beginnings. Days are tacked on to days 
without rhyme or reason, it is an endless, monotonous addition” (61). Nausea is structured 
as a first person diary account sorted under chapters which plainly state details of time, day 
of the week, and location. This effect is reproduced in Ellis’ novel where, as Young notes, 
the “monotone” of Patrick’s “robotic” existence is conveyed through generally short 
chapters with “blandly factual headings” (“Beast” 101).  
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There are numerous scenes in American Psycho which demonstrate the absurdity of 
Patrick’s existence. Consider the second chapter, a mind-numbing five page paragraph of 
detail describing Patrick’s apartment and morning toilet routine (23-28). Or the chapter 
“Christmas Party” where midgets dressed as Santa’s elves serve refreshments, and during 
which characters constantly mistake each other’s identities because everyone looks more or 
less the same—a reoccurring motif throughout the novel which emphasises an overall 
concern in Ellis’ oeuvre with de-individualisation. During a dinner with Armstrong, a man 
who “drones on” like a tourist brochure about the benefits of holidaying in the Bahamas, 
Patrick participates in the banal conversation “almost involuntarily”, while imagining 
“slicing a wrist, one of mine, aiming the spurting vein at Armstrong’s head or better yet his 
suit, wondering if he would still continue to talk” (134, 135). This scene recalls Roquentin’s 
dinner with the Autodidact, who “babbles on and his voice buzzes gently in my ears. But I 
don’t know what he’s talking about any more. I nod my head mechanically” (Nausea 176). 
During this dinner Roquentin thinks: “I can feel that I could do anything. For example 
plunge this cheese-knife into the Autodidact’s eye” (177), a passing fancy that Patrick 
echoes when, during a dinner with Evelyn, he thinks:  
Dimly aware that if it weren’t for the people in the restaurant I would take the jade 
chopsticks sitting on the table and push them deep into Evelyn’s eyes and snap 
them in two, I nod, pretending to listen, but I’ve already phased out and I don’t do 
the chopsticks thing. (American Psycho 321-22)  
In the absence of any real meaningful connection with other people, normal human 
interaction becomes a painful chore for these existential protagonists, with violent 
undercurrents lying latent beneath the surface.  
 This vapidity takes on an overtly existential dimension in the absurd babble of the 
chapter “Another Night”, during which Patrick and his acquaintances hold a conference 
call to try to decide where to go for dinner. Here, during fifteen or so pages of nada, 
22 
 
Patrick experiences “mindless delirium” (304), his friend McDermott comments “the void 
is actually widening” (308), and, when asked why he doesn’t want to go to a particular 
restaurant, Patrick replies:  “Because I'm gripped by an existential panic” (309). Although 
he claims this self-diagnosis is a “lie”, just another joke in the endless immature jousting of 
the conversation, it can alternatively be read as a moment of lucidity, a fleeting awareness 
of the void gaping beneath his life, a reading strengthened by further moments of self-
reflection later in the novel during the chapter “End of the 1980s”.  
One way of describing the absurd in existential literature is to evoke a sense of 
artificiality in the surrounding world. In The Myth of Sisyphus Camus writes of a moment of 
awakening in which “the stage-sets collapse” so that “one day the ‘why’ arises and 
everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement” (11). He suggests that 
sometimes the “stage-scenery masked by habit” can cease to confer a sense of normality 
(13), and in this interruption we can perceive the world from a detached distance as 
something “foreign and irreducible to us” (12). He elaborates:  
At the heart of all beauty lies something inhuman, and these hills, the softness of 
the sky, the outline of these trees at this very minute lose the illusory meaning with 
which we had clothed them, henceforth more remote than a lost paradise. (12-13)  
For Camus, the “hostility” and “strangeness” of the world constitutes the absurd in that 
humans are incapable of finding the inherent meaning they so desperately seek (13). 
In Nausea, Roquentin describes his perception of the “unsubstantiality of things” prior 
to an attack of “Nausea” in similar terms to Camus: “Nothing looked real; I felt 
surrounded by cardboard scenery which could suddenly be removed” (112, 113). Later, 
during his encounter with the chestnut tree root, he experiences a “revelation”, in that he 
makes the leap from perceiving things as “stage-scenery” without “thinking that they 
existed” (182-83), to transcending the “surface” and grasping existence: “[the] veneer had 
melted” (183). However, this epiphany also brings with it the realisation that while 
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existence can be “encountered […] you can never deduce it” (188) as “the world of 
explanations and reasons is not that of existence” (185). Hence Roquentin deems the 
world to be absurd as “there was no reason for it to exist” yet “it was not possible for it not to 
exist” (192). Thus, for both Sartre and Camus, an awareness of the surface artificiality of 
the world precedes the “revelation” of recognising the absurdity of existence—a necessary 
step towards accepting one’s freedom and responsibility.  
In Nausea, Sartre uses the literary simulation of film technique to evoke Roquentin’s 
perception of the world’s absurdity and represent his state of existential crisis, an aspect of 
the novel examined in Patricia Johnson’s article “Art against Art: The Cinema and Sartre’s 
La Nausée” (1984). She notes that Sartre “frequently adopts angles and distances in his 
narrative that parallel the changing positions of a camera” (72), such as the satirical scenes 
in which Roquentin looks down as he criticises the bourgeoisie, or his use of “close-ups 
and long shots to modify his fictional universe” (73). Swift changes of lighting and focus 
are used to represent the visual deformation of Roquentin’s perception during his bouts of 
Nausea, alterations which undermine the “fixed, solid nature of objects […] by cinematic 
means” (73). Sudden changes of perspective are used to unsettle the idea of a rational 
universe and instead create a feeling of contingency, such as the shift to a fly’s point of 
view in the moments before it is squashed: “It doesn’t see this gigantic index-finger 
looming up with the gold hairs shining in the sun” (Nausea, 150). Johnson suggests Sartre’s 
use of “unexplained juxtapositions” (74)—such as Roquentin’s imperceptible transition 
from consciousness to surrealist nightmare after he has sex with the “patronne” (88-89)—is 
akin to that of a director juxtaposing scenes in a film, in that both supply the audience with 
only the “raw material” from which to deduce the artistic intention (75). 
It is pertinent then, to examine Ellis’ use of cinematic technique in American Psycho as a 
way of recreating the atmosphere of existential artificiality described by Camus and Sartre. 
As a figure whose existence lies somewhere in between conventional distinctions of reality 
24 
 
and fantasy, Patrick’s perception of life through a cinematic lens is particularly apt. Critics 
have discussed the degree to which Patrick’s “identity” is conveyed through the various 
discourses of consumer culture, such as “brochure-speak, ad-speak […] the mindless 
soporific commentary of the catwalk or the soapy soft-sell of the market place” (Young, 
“Beast” 101). Mark Storey, in his discussion of the film’s notoriously violent sequences, 
concludes that these scenes “are so over the top, so filmic, even comic book in the details 
we are given […] that it seems like something taken from a book or a film” (60). He notes 
that Patrick’s favourite movie, the hyper-violent Body Double (1984), and his extensive 
reading in the true-crime genre provide him with the narrative precedents of fictional and 
real-life killers with which to construct violent fantasies in which he can reassert the 
patriarchal dominance he fails to achieve elsewhere. Similarly the “cool, uninflected prose” 
with which Patrick describes his “real” sexual encounters reflects his engagement with 
pornographic films and literature (61), such as the sequence from “Inside Lydia’s Ass” he 
describes on page 94 which is conveyed in the same tone as his sexual encounter with 
Courtney three pages later. During the sex murder sequence with Elizabeth and Christie, 
Patrick notes that events play out like “like in a movie” (277), and in a later sequence with 
the same trajectory “sex happens—a hard core montage” (291): a series of visualised sex 
scenes rather than an actual physical act.  
In an interview with Jaime Clarke, Ellis makes a comment with regard to his novel 
Glamorama (1998) that is relevant to American Psycho: “Since it’s such a consumer good and 
because the book is so full of consumer goods, why not throw in some porn amidst all the 
clothes and all that useless hipness?” (93). Pornography is used in American Psycho to 
highlight the connection between consumerism—the manufacturing of a product to suit a 
consumer demand, in this case sexual desire—and Patrick’s existential crisis resulting from 
concerns such as artificiality and the absurd.  When Patrick says “Last night I had dreams 
that were lit like pornography and in them I fucked girls made of cardboard” (186), he is 
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extending Roquentin’s  “cardboard scenery” to women (Nausea 113), who become not just 
sex objects in Patrick’s imagination, but actual objects, suggesting that even in his 
imagination he cannot conceive of, or aspire towards, authenticity. The substitute for sex 
has superseded the actual act, because, for the individual like Patrick who has become 
alienated to the extreme by consumer discourses, “pornography is so much less 
complicated than actual sex, and because of this lack of complication, so much more 
pleasurable” (American Psycho 247). 
The cinematic lens extends beyond the sex murder scenes to permeate almost all 
aspects of Patrick’s reality. The phrase “like in a movie” appears on the first page of the 
novel and variations occur throughout. Camera techniques are described so as to create the 
fragmentary and detached perception Patrick has of his existence—his sense, like that 
described by Camus and Sartre, that the world around him is unreal. These references 
further disorientate and disrupt our expectations of realist narrative, such as the “smash 
cut” which instantly transports him from the lounge to the kitchen in the opening chapter 
(10), or the detective sleuth parody with which Luis Caruthers approaches while stalking 
Patrick in a shopping mall: “Like a smash cut from a horror movie—a jump zoom—Luis 
Carruthers appears, suddenly, without warning, from behind his column, slinking and 
jumping at the same time, if that’s possible” (281). What is “possible” in the narrative has 
become somewhat irrelevant; this chapter begins with Patrick’s loading a video hoping to 
watch a torture scene he recorded “last spring”, but instead he finds a repeat of his 
favourite talk show with the topic “Tips on How Your Pet Can Become a Movie Star” 
(280), a contrast of the extreme and the banal that prompts the reader to consider which 
filmic layer is more bizarre and disturbing.  
During an earlier scene in which he tries to murder Luis, Patrick’s actions appear to 
play out in “slow motion”, a hesitancy that leads Luis to misconstrue his homicidal 
intentions as a romantic advance. Hence, when he first sees Luis in the mall, Patrick’s 
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perception lapses into fantasy as a distancing mechanism, describing a cinematic pastiche 
that encompasses all the clichés of stereotypical homosexuality:   
suddenly I imagine Luis at some horrible party, drinking a nice dry rosé, fags 
clustered around a baby grand, show tunes, now he’s holding a flower, now he has 
a feather boa draped around his neck, now the pianist bangs out something from 
Les Miz, darling. (280-81) 
In this chapter the threat Luis poses to the homophobic Patrick seems to trigger these 
retreats into movie world illusion, just as the “smash cut” in the first chapter allows him to 
escape the frightening bohemian otherness of Evelyn’s arty dinner guests (10). A similar 
pattern plays out when Patrick has lunch with his ex-girlfriend Bethany, a woman who 
threatens him on multiple levels, having attained a level of financial success that 
undermines his patriarchal hegemony, as well as being romantically involved with the 
head-chef of Dorsia, an exclusive restaurant Patrick is never able to secure reservations at. 
This revelation prompts “a spastic, acidic, gastric reaction; stars and planets, whole galaxies 
made up entirely of little white chef hats, race over the film of my vision” (229). This 
“film” continues later on in a horrific murder scene where “As if in slow motion, like in a 
movie, she turns around” (230) and Patrick is able to violently reassert, probably in fantasy, 
the supremacy he lost in reality. 
Further conflations of life and movie are evident when Patrick uses cinematic 
terminology to describe his experience of temporal transitions: the dusk “fades […] in 
what seems like time-lapse photography but in slow motion, like a movie” (109); he lingers 
at the “scene” of an incapacitated victim, which becomes an amusing “tableau” (127); 
lunch with Bethany moves into “Scene Two” (227). During the penultimate chapter, 
introduced as “Another broken scene in what passes for my life” (374), Patrick says “I’m 
in a movie” and “I’m an actor” to explain why he seems familiar to the taxi driver who has 
taken him hostage (376), a lie which contains an element of psychological truth. Indeed, 
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Patrick wishes several times he was an actor, imagining himself “on television, in a 
commercial for a new product” (357), his commodity fetishism such that he becomes the 
advertisement. When he is embraced by his secretary Jean, he feels her warmth and 
comments: 
I am so used to imagining everything happening the way it occurs in movies, 
visualizing things falling somehow into the shape of events on a screen, that I 
almost hear the swelling of an orchestra, can almost hallucinate the camera panning 
low around us, fireworks bursting in slow motion overhead, the seventy-millimeter 
image of her lips parting and the subsequent murmur of “I want you” in Dolby 
sound. (254-55) 
Here cinematic stylisation intervenes to embellish reality into an exaggerated cliché, a 
fantasy substitute that allows Patrick to avoid meaningful human interaction.  
This passage contains a definite echo of Dostoyevsky’s Underground Man, who says 
“I was so used to thinking and imagining things as they happened in books and picturing 
everything in the world as I myself had previously created it in my dreams” (111). 
Consequently, it is pointed out several times that the Underground Man can only express 
himself in a bookish way: Liza remarks “you […] sound just like a book” (89), since he 
lacks meaningful engagement with the real world. Roquentin also comments “It seems to 
me as if everything I know about life I have learnt from books” (Nausea 95). Patrick is akin 
to the Underground Man, who uses his imagination to escape his worldly insignificance, 
admitting “I invented a life, so that I could at least exist somehow” (Notes 15); however, 
Patrick lacks the Underground Man’s lucid self-reflection, such that the grip of his 
delusions appears to be stronger. 
Artificiality compromises the existential ideal of authenticity, while causing the 
individual to feel alienated. In her discussion of Less than Zero, Elizabeth Young comments: 
“in the postwar consumer boom people had become alienated not only from labour but 
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from their own lives, from their own desires and pleasures. These were re-packaged and 
sold back to them as part of the ‘leisure’ industry” (“Vacant Possession” 32). This 
“repackaging” of desires and pleasures is evident in the way Patrick experiences everything 
vicariously through the mediation of consumer culture, so that his reality becomes “a 
second-hand one” (32). Cinematic interventions become a filter through which Patrick can 
experience life at a distance, giving him the ability to manipulate his perception to his liking 
via solipsism, but also giving him a sense of existential crisis in that he cannot engage life 
meaningfully. This impulse renders his life “a blank canvas, a cliché, a soap opera” and the 
conversations around him, inanely repetitive and hollow, become “Just words, and like in a 
movie, but one that has been transcribed improperly, most of it overlaps” (American Psycho 
268, 380).  
 
I wish to return now to Roquentin’s experience of Nausea, from which Ellis draws 
inspiration for Patrick’s own existential psychosis in American Psycho. In Sartre’s novel the 
feeling of Nausea is a by-product of “the recognition by consciousness of its embodiment, 
the realization that its existence is dependent on body”, and an awareness of the 
“contingence of all existents”, including the self (Barnes 23). This awareness causes 
Roquentin to experience an anxiety akin to feeling nauseous, a sensation which he 
describes as “a sort of sweet disgust. How unpleasant it was!” (22). Under the influence of 
Nausea the surrounding world takes on a frightening quality as Roquentin’s awareness of 
the contingency of objects makes them appear to come alive: “they touch me, it’s 
unbearable. I am afraid of entering into contact with them, just as if they were living 
animals” (22). The passages where Roquentin experiences Nausea often descend into 
parataxis and surrealist imagery as a way of evoking his heightened imagination—which 
borders on hallucination, madness, and fantasy, a stylistic aesthetic Ellis appropriates in his 
depiction of Patrick’s own form of existential psychosis. 
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Anxieties over status play a significant role in Patrick’s predicament, and objects—
especially expensive clothes and electronic gadgets—are significant status symbols in the 
obsessively materialistic yuppie circles he moves in. Consider the effects of the business 
card comparisons in the chapter “Pastels”, which causes Patrick to feel a “spasm of 
jealousy”, “Dizzy”, and “unexpectedly depressed” (42, 43). The objects have a symbolic 
power that induces effects similar to Nausea. During the chapter “Shopping”, in which 
Patrick becomes increasingly unhinged as he shops for Christmas presents, the action is 
punctuated by paragraphs of parataxis that list the objects he sees, creating a sense of the 
overwhelming superfluity of contemporary consumer culture. By the third of these 
paragraphs all punctuation has disappeared and been replaced by “and”, and, immediately 
after it trails off into ellipsis—denying us the finality of a full stop for a mire that never 
ends—Patrick comments: “Some kind of existential chasm opens before me while I’m 
browsing in Bloomingdale’s” (172). Roquentin also feels the superfluity of existence. 
During his crucial encounter with the chestnut tree he comments that everything around 
him seems “arbitrary”, “isolated” and yet “overflowing”, an excess that extends to his self 
and all humanity: 
We were a heap of existents inconvenienced, embarrassed by ourselves, we hadn’t 
the slightest reason for being there, any of us, each existent […] felt superfluous in 
relation to the others  
[…]  
I—weak, languid, obscene, digesting, tossing about dismal thoughts—I too was 
superfluous. (184) 
Ellis appropriates and updates Roquentin’s feelings of disgust for the contingency of an 
overabundant mass of meaningless existents for his own purpose of satirizing the excess of 
consumer culture by presenting us, with a whiff of sardonic absurdity, the “existential 
chasm” of the shopping mall. 
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Just as Patrick tends to see other people as objects to be consumed, so too does he 
objectify his own body, neurotically working out at the gym and spending hours in front of 
the mirror keeping his appearance perfect. Patrick frequently checks his reflection in 
whatever reflective surface is to hand, and when he visits his mother in some sort of 
retirement residence he tells us he has spent the last hour “studying my hair in the mirror 
I’ve insisted the hospital keep in my mother’s room” (351). This level of narcissistic 
concern with one’s reflection seems to hint at a deeper disturbance, and recalls the 
comments of Estelle, a character in Sartre’s play No Exit, who says “When I can’t see 
myself I begin to wonder if I truly exist […] When I talked to people I always made  sure 
there was [a mirror] nearby” (19-20). His appearance is something Patrick is especially 
proud of, but at the same time it is a source of intense self-consciousness. When he has 
lunch with Bethany, Patrick is “extremely nervous” (221), partly because he is anxious 
about a new brand of mousse he is wearing. Suddenly, he senses the “shape” of his hair 
has been “somehow altered”, prompting him to note: “A pang of nausea that I’m unable 
to stifle washes warmly over me” (222). Appearance is obsessively linked to wealth and 
status throughout the novel, and here a heightened perception of the contingency of his 
hair causes a rupture in Patrick’s reality reminiscent of Roquentin’s own experience of 
Nausea.  
The passages in Nausea where Roquentin feels the weight of his existence and lurches 
out into the streets in a psychotic haze bear a striking stylistic resemblance to Patrick’s own 
mental breakdowns. In one such passage Roquentin buys a newspaper, experiencing a 
sensory overload as he notes the “smell of ink” and the feel of the paper crumpling 
between his fingers, exclaiming “God, how strongly things exist today” (146). He reads an 
article about a girl called Lucienne who has been raped and killed, and the story seems to 
seep into his reality, his consciousness of violence and the contrast of life and death 
invigorating his perception further, so that everything becomes contingent and threatening: 
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the pavement, the houses which “close in on [him]” (146), and his “ears” which “race 
along behind” him (147). The story of Lucienne becomes a vacillating hallucination in 
which he visualises her (“the fingers of the little girl who was being strangled […] 
scratching the mud” (147)) while also seeming to experience her pain (“I…raped” (146)) as 
well as becoming her attacker: “I flee, I am a criminal with bruised flesh” (148). The 
monologue slips in and out of the third person (“am I mad? He says he is afraid of being 
mad” (148)) and runs on for four pages in an extraordinary cacophony of frenzied 
parataxis, stream of consciousness, repetitions, and gibberish. 
Compare this to Patrick’s disintegration in the chapter “Chase, Manhattan”, where the 
inanity of the dinner conversation, and his supposedly irrepressible bloodlust, cause him to 
“become unglued, plummeting into a state of near vertigo that forces me to excuse 
myself” (334). Once out on the street the text does away with full stops altogether, 
entering into breathless paragraphs of parataxis ushered in and out by ellipsis rather than 
proper sentences with definite beginnings and ends. The content reads like a parody 
pastiche of an action movie chase; Patrick, in a state of what Julian Murphet calls 
“existential free fall” (61), kills a saxophonist, is chased by the police, steals a cab and 
crashes it into a fruit stand, kills a policeman in hand-to-hand combat, shoots the gas tank 
of a police car causing it to explode, and so on. Like Roquentin and the newspaper article, 
Patrick’s dream-like fantasy here is constructed from an external source, the cinema: “guns 
flashing like in a movie and this makes Patrick realise he’s involved in an actual gunfight of 
sorts […] the dream threatens to break” (336). This detachment from reality is registered 
by the prose, which drifts into the third person and back. A disconnection is also 
suggested between Patrick’s mind and his body, which “feels infected, like gasoline is 
coursing through his veins instead of blood” (336), articulating a sense of strange revulsion 
for the corporeal, akin to Roquentin’s description of his “flesh which swarms […] the 
sweet sugary water of my flesh, the blood of my hand, it hurts” (Nausea 148). Elizabeth 
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Young sees this chapter of American Psycho as blatant evidence of Patrick’s unreliability as a 
narrator, “the final nail in the coffin of Patrick’s credibility” (“Beast” 115), one of the 
numerous indicators in the text that call into question the authority of his narrative.  
Sartre uses surrealist imagery in hallucinations and dreams to evoke Roquentin’s 
perception of the threatening strangeness of a world in which: “I am in the midst of 
Things, which can not be given names. Alone, wordless, defenceless, they surround me” 
(180). During the famous sequence with the chestnut tree the “diversity of things, their 
individuality,” disappears, but the true nature of existence is perceived as upsettingly 
surreal: “soft, monstrous masses, in disorder—naked, with a frightening obscene 
nakedness” (183). In the nightmare he slips into after having sex with the patronne, her 
body becomes a garden swarming with insects and “horrible animals” (89). At the end of 
the novel he wonders if the other people in the town of Bouville will start to see things as 
he has seen them, imagining a stream of terrifying surrealist images, such as a pimple that 
splits open to reveal an eye; a man whose tongue becomes a centipede; or someone who 
wakes to find their bed has turned into a “forest of rustling pricks” oozing sperm and 
blood (226). 
While Patrick’s imagination encroaches on similarly surrealist territory, the reader is left 
uncertain how seriously to take these stylistic references, which can be read as an ironic 
parody of the aesthetic of novels like Nausea. During a business meeting, Patrick recalls 
how he “lost it completely in a stall at Nell’s—my mouth foaming, all I could think about 
were insects, lots of insects”, and a few sentences later he looks over at Luis Carruthers, 
imagining that “in one brief, flashing moment his head looks like a talking vagina and it 
scares the bejesus out of me” (104). These images manifest themselves during moments of 
heightened strain and anxiety, for example, after the departure of the detective—who is 
investigating the disappearance of Paul Owen, a business rival who Patrick claims to have 
killed—“the door closing sounds to me like a billion insects screaming, pounds of bacon 
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sizzling, a vast emptiness” (266). Some of these images tempt a symbolic reading as an 
insight into Patrick’s psychology, such as the “footage in the film in my head” which 
shows “blood pouring from automated tellers, women giving birth through their assholes, 
embryos frozen or scrambled” (330), a disturbing combination of several of the themes of 
the novel: degradation, detachment from reality, the association of money and violence. By 
the end of the novel, objects appear to have taken on a life of their own, similar to 
Roquentin’s experience of Nausea; Patrick tells us: “my automated teller has started 
speaking to me, sometimes actually leaving weird messages on the screen […] like […] 
‘Feed Me a Stray Cat,’ and I was freaked out by the park bench that followed me for six 
blocks last Monday evening and it too spoke to me. Disintegration—I’m taking it in 
stride” (380). Patrick tries to appear sincere when he explains to Jean: “Sometimes […] the 
lines separating appearance—what you see—and reality—what you don’t—become, well, 
blurred” (363); however, within the postmodern satire of the novel, it is clear that Ellis’ 
updating of Sartre’s surrealism also has a comic intention.  
 
In Notes from Underground, the Underground Man goes to absurd lengths to defend “what is 
most precious and important […] and that is our personality and individuality” (26). When 
an army officer moves him out of his way “as if he hadn’t even seen [him]” (44), the 
Underground Man spends years brooding over a way to avenge this snub to his human 
existence, eventually deciding to physically bump into the officer in the street. Patrick finds 
himself in similar situations, such as when he attempts to get the doorman of his building 
complex to take an interest in helping him to get a crack in his apartment ceiling fixed, but 
is instead “greeted by the expressionless mask of the doorman’s heavy, stupid face. I am a 
ghost to this man, I’m thinking. I am something unreal, something not quite tangible” (68). 
The doorman subsequently ignores him, and in the elevator up to his apartment, Patrick 
finds Tom Cruise, who also spurns his attempts to engage in conversation. The 
34 
 
Underground Man argues that a man will deliberately do what is against his reason and 
own best interest in order to preserve his “personality and individuality” as it is a 
fundamental aspect of human identity and existence. This is because “to have the right to 
desire what is even extremely stupid and not to be duty bound to desire only what is 
intelligent” is a manifestation of free will and therefore of existential freedom (26).  
Patrick’s free will is frequently compromised by the dominance of materialism and 
conformity in his lifestyle. His violent outbursts can be understood as a way of coping with 
his ineffectiveness and insecurity in human interactions, a means of claiming back his 
autonomy in a twisted exacerbation of “the right to desire what is even extremely stupid”, a 
way he can try to reassert control. However, this attempt is not always convincing. When 
Patrick decides not to murder Patricia, his date for the evening, he muses: 
She’s lucky, even though there is no real reasoning behind the luck. It could be that 
she's safe because her wealth, her family’s wealth, protects her tonight, or it could be 
that it’s simply my choice. (74) 
He really isn’t sure if the decision is his or not because he cannot make it independently of 
the discourses that dictate his actions, such as, in this case, the power of wealth and status. 
When he is at the video store trying to choose a film to rent he is suddenly “seized by a 
minor anxiety attack. There are too many fucking movies to choose from […] almost by rote, as if 
I’ve been programmed, I reach for Body Double—a movie I have rented thirty-seven 
times” (108). Elizabeth Young reads this passage as part of Ellis’ critique of “consumer 
capitalism”, a system in which “we are offered a surfeit of commodities, an abundance of 
commodity choices, but this image of plenty is illusory” (“Beast” 104). From an 
existentialist point of view, here Patrick denies the anxiety of freedom over something as 
trivial as a movie rental. In another incident in which his acquaintances are listing all the 
different brands of bottled water they know, he becomes aware of the “silence I’m causing 
filling me with a nameless dread” and responds “numbly, by rote” (238). It is as if he is 
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aware of the absurdity that surrounds him, but is unable to assert his free will to 
acknowledge and confront it fully. Thus the absurdity of the situation is repressed along 
with his “personality and individuality” (Dostoyevsky 26), the humanity which is so 
important to the Underground Man.  
The fragility of personal identity is a source of great pain for the existentialist 
protagonist. Roquentin “know[s] perfectly well that [he] exists”, but 
when I say ‘I’, it seems hollow to me. I can no longer manage to feel myself, I am 
so forgotten […] And exactly what is Antoine Roquentin? An abstraction. A pale 
little memory of myself wavers in my consciousness. Antoine Roquentin…And 
suddenly the I pales, pales and finally goes out. (Nausea 241)  
The crux of the problem is that he is grappling with the fact that his existence might have 
no inherent meaning. This finds its echo in Patrick’s: “…there is an idea of a Patrick 
Bateman, some kind of abstraction, but there is no real me, only an entity, something 
illusory […] I simply am not there” (362). This line forms part of a series of interesting 
existential monologues that occur while Patrick is having lunch with his secretary Jean in 
the chapter “End of the 1980s”. Scattered throughout the chapter, these passages can be 
read as a focalisation of the novel’s existential themes. 
As Patrick is a highly unreliable narrator, we have to be cautious as to what degree we 
can take these soliloquies as truthful revelations of his inner self; it is entirely possible they 
function as self-deception or ironic self-parody. The first of these monologues describes a 
“desert landscape” that is “devoid of reason and light and spirit” (360). In this image—a 
symbolic depiction of Patrick’s perception of the real world—all idealism, humanity and 
emotion is utterly negated because 
the world is senseless. Evil is its only permanence. God is not alive. Love cannot 
be trusted. Surface, surface, surface was all anyone found meaning in…this was 
civilisation as I saw it, colossal and jagged… (360) 
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A “senseless” world evokes Camus’ absurd “universe suddenly divested of illusions and 
lights” where “man feels an alien, a stranger” (Sisyphus 4). Patrick’s reference to a “desert 
landscape” recalls Camus’ terminology in Sisyphus where he too refers to the barren 
emptiness of contemplating the world’s meaninglessness as the “waterless deserts where 
thought reaches its confines”, before asserting that one must “examine closely the odd 
vegetation of those distant regions”  rather than shy from the truth to  be found there (8). 
This appears to be exactly what Patrick is doing in these monologues, but as we shall see 
his existential development—what he learns from his self-reflection—proves problematic. 
Nietzsche’s famous maxim “God is dead” is reworded by Patrick so that the finitude 
and certainty of the word “dead” is discarded (The Gay Science 109). Nietzsche intended the 
phrase to indicate not just his atheism, but that the death of God meant, by implication, 
“the loss of grounding for the entire Western value system” (Brosman 46-47). Patrick’s 
phrase “God is not alive” introduces an ambiguity to the state of divine presence in the 
world; if God is neither alive nor dead perhaps the suggestion is that he was never there at 
all, that Western values have never been “grounded”. Sartre attributed to Dostoyevsky the 
assertion that “If God does not exist, everything is permissible”, calling this attitude “the 
starting point of existentialism” because of its implications for human freedom 
(“Existentialism” 28-29). Patrick’s allusion to this philosophical discourse—updated to the 
postmodern moment—is expressed with a weary irony that lacks the conviction or gravitas 
of its source material. 
The reference to “surface” encapsulates the novel’s critique of superficial materialism 
and consumerism, but if we again refer to Nietzsche it can also be applied to 
consciousness. Nietzsche posits that consciousness arose from the human need to 
communicate with others, thus consciousness is defined in the terms of the herd and not 
the individual: 
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the world of which we can become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world, a 
world turned into generalities and thereby debased to its lowest common 
denominator, - that everything which enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, 
thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming conscious 
involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialisation, and 
generalisation. (The Gay Science 213-14) 
Because of these limitations of consciousness, the individual can never really know himself 
on his own terms, only through the discourses of the herd: through collective 
consciousness. In her article “From Turgenev to Bitov: Superfluous Men and Postmodern 
Selves”, Anna Schur examines Notes from Underground for the proto-postmodern “malaise” 
of the “self’s derealisation—the dissolution of the autonomous, essential self that exists 
independently of language” (562-63), for example the Underground Man’s “bookishness” 
which alienates him from originality, real life, and his authentic self (570). This effect is 
heightened in the hyper-postmodernism of American Psycho where Patrick’s whole identity 
and experience of consciousness seems comprised of various snippets of consumer 
culture, such as his perception of life as a movie or an advertisement. Both Patrick and the 
Underground Man end up simulating “reality”, as well as simulating “the self” (571), 
without meaningfully engaging with either, hence Patrick’s realisation that he is “an 
abstraction […] something illusory” (American Psycho 362). This is a problem for Roquentin 
too, who wonders “My existence was beginning to cause me serious concern. Was I a mere 
figment of the imagination?” (Nausea 127). 
In the second passage Patrick vacillates, at first asserting that he is “noncontingent 
human being” without a conscience, an evil monster with “no more barriers left to cross” 
(362). But then doubt creeps in and he wonders “Is evil something you are? Or is it 
something you do?” (362), questioning the distinctions of essence and existence while 
undermining his certainty that his essence is evil. Throughout the novel he tries to prove to 
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the reader and himself that he has such an essence, but his efforts are unconvincing, as 
demonstrated by the readings of the novel by Young and Murphet who both emphasise 
Patrick’s unreliability as a narrator. In his article “Reconciling Remorse in Thérèse Raquin 
and American Psycho”, Steven Schneider argues that there is a discrepancy between what 
Patrick tells us—that “there is nothing inside this mass serial killer capable of feeling 
anything vaguely resembling remorse” (429), a view which many early reviewers of the 
novel accepted—and the evidence of his guilt, conscience, madness, and desire for 
confession and catharsis, all of which, Schneider argues, is “indicative of a manic 
depressive and possibly suicidal young man rather than a soulless, inhuman monster” 
(431). In a way, the psycho-killer discourse Patrick identifies himself with is yet another 
appropriation from contemporary culture which leads him further into what Sartre called 
“bad faith”, and away from his authentic self. 
The second passage ends “This confession has meant nothing…” (362). “Nothing” is a 
significant word for the existentialists, and for Camus, the word “symbolises that odd state 
of soul in which the void becomes eloquent” (Sisyphus 11). If we ascribe this degree of 
meaning to the word, it starts to stand out from the rest of the text of American Psycho. 
Patrick realises he has “nothing of value” he can offer Jean, and that their relationship, if it 
did develop, would still “probably lead to nothing” (364). Earlier in the novel Patrick 
seems to almost grasp the emptiness within: “I laugh manically, then take a deep breath 
and touch my chest—expecting a heart to be thumping quickly, impatiently, but there’s 
nothing, not even a beat” (112). For a moment, it seems that here at the end of the novel 
he is becoming aware of the emptiness of his life, of his identity, and of the world around 
him. He seems poised, like Roquentin or Meursault, for a crucial moment of awakening or 
existential revelation. 
The third and final monologue in “End of the 1980s” depicts “thousands upon 
thousands” of starving and dying people moving across “the southern deserts of Sudan” 
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(365). The language is heightened here, poetic in a way that stands out from the rest of the 
text. The “desert landscape” that Patrick had imagined at the start of the chapter becomes 
realised and strangely familiar; it is an image of suffering in Africa that the West is used to 
seeing on television. This connects to the images of the dispossessed people starving on 
the streets of New York who are taunted by Patrick and his associates throughout the 
novel. The focus moves in on one child who lies dying in the sand as others move past 
him, and the passage ends: “a spirit rises, a door opens, it asks “Why?”—a home for the 
dead, an infinity, it hangs in the void, time limps by, love and sadness rush through the 
boy…” (365). It seems Patrick’s consciousness is moving beneath the “surface” of his 
world—the capitalist system that has made him rich while so many others endure in dire 
poverty—to the void beneath the “success” of the West: the suffering of the developing 
world. 
These passages are inter-cut with Jean’s telling Patrick that she loves him, a scene of 
heightened emotional impact in which repentance and salvation seems possible through 
the acceptance of love, a situation which can also be found in the Underground Man’s 
interactions with Liza or in Roquentin and Anny’s reunion in Nausea, both cases in which 
love fails or is rejected.  For a moment it seems possible that Ellis will use this rather 
soppy device to somehow redeem Patrick, who wonders if he “might have the capacity to 
accept, through not return, her love” (364).7 This is tempting to the reader, as it is a 
convention that might somehow make sense of the novel and justify the trauma the reader 
has endured to get through the challenges posed by the text. Although Ellis concludes this 
chapter with the optimistic remark, “anything is possible” (366), this is a foil, and, like 
Dostoyevsky and Sartre, Ellis withholds the sentimental closure of redemption through 
                                               
7 The restaurant in which these monologues occur is called “Nowheres” (357), and when considered 
alongside some of the other venues in the novel—such as “No Man’s Land” (333) and “Tunnel” (50), as well 
as the clubs in Less Than Zero like “Nowhere Club”, “The Edge” and “Land’s End” (95)—it seems that Ellis 
is making a running joke about the existential emptiness of these venues where people ostensibly go to come 
together (see Sahlin 32). 
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love, leaving Patrick in a state of stasis, unable to break free from his torment of himself 
and others. In his article “Dostoevsky’s Hell on Earth: Examining the Inner Torment of 
the Underground Man”, Christopher Garrett comments that “Dostoevsky shows 
characters who, being unable to love, experience […] inner torment during mortality. He 
typically portrays their condition as an illness; some may even consider them mad or 
insane” (52). In the same way, Ellis leaves Patrick in his own “inner hell” on earth (333), 
an inferno with “NO EXIT”. 
 
While Patrick might be aware of the artificiality of the world and, at times, the absurdity 
that surrounds him, he does not move, as Roquentin does, beyond this to realise that, 
because of the absence of any inherent meaning in an absurd world indifferent to man’s 
aspirations, he has the opportunity to make freedom the basis of his own project of 
attempting to make his life meaningful. He does not even take up the struggle of Camus’ 
Sisyphus who resolutely continues the effort of living as an act taken in open defiance of 
the absurd. Instead, Patrick turns away from the existential insights he displays, and the 
end of the novel suggests he will remain in the bad faith and ennui of his life of conformity 
and consumerism. In this sense, Patrick is more like the Underground Man, who remains 
underground, embittered, misanthropic, and alone, but without the clarity of the 
Underground Man’s insights into the paradoxical nature of his situation, whereby he 
effectively rejects a normal life in the outside world while also desiring such a life, and 
rejects other people while also feeling the contradictory impulse to overcome his loneliness 
and engage other people.  
Patrick also experiences these conflicts, engaging in bizarre psychotic behaviour while 
at the same time 
sobbing “I just want to be loved,” cursing the earth and everything I have been 
taught: principles, distinctions, choices, morals, compromises, knowledge, unity, 
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prayer—all of it was wrong, without any final purpose. All it came down to was: 
die or adapt. I imagine my own vacant face, the disembodied voice coming from 
its mouth: These are terrible times. (332) 
This quotation displays Patrick’s awareness of the absence or loss of inherent meaning, as 
well as registering the pain and confusion that this entails, but not the subsequent desire to 
find a “purpose” beyond the dead end of his psychotic fantasizing. Thus, the existentialist 
element of American Psycho focuses on the symptoms of existential crisis rather than the 
resolution of those symptoms through the Sartrean quest for meaning.  The quotation can 
also be read as a sardonic self-parody of existential angst, by which Patrick employs an 
ironic twist  to maneuver away from the gravitas of actually confronting the sources of this 
melodramatic despair.  
Patrick’s crisis is based on universal existential concerns, fundamentally comprising the 
angst arising from the variety of sources discussed in the introduction to existentialism in 
chapter one, such as the awareness of the absurd, freedom, nothingness, alienation, and 
death (Cooper 127-29). However, some of these sources find heightened or hyperbolic 
expression in conditions particular to the contemporary milieu of Ellis’ novel, which 
emphasises the crippling effects of a society obsessed with wealth and status. Thus, 
existentialism is used to evoke what Young calls the “boring, mundane heart of postwar 
capitalism” (“Beast” 104), exposing the conformity and bad faith of becoming enslaved to 
the discourses of a way of life dictated by greed, excess and commercial interests. In this 
way the existential framework of the novel complements the social satire of Ellis’ critique 
of the vacant hypocrisy of American society, with its insidious politics and economic 
policies that widen the gulf between those who have, represented by the grotesque excess 
of Patrick’s circle of cronies, and those who have not, signified by the poverty of the 
homeless people who haunt the background of the novel, shuffling through its pages just 
as the specter of domestic inequality agitates the edges of American consciousness.  
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These contemporary sources of existential crisis may seem obvious to the reader, but 
Patrick never becomes sufficiently lucid to identify them as a serious problem for himself; 
he is incapable of rejecting or questioning the consumer culture that, in turn, is consuming 
him. Freedom evades Patrick, and if Patrick is a “metaphor” for what Ellis finds wrong 
about “the 80s”, as he has stated in one interview (Amerika), then perhaps his point—in 
leaving Patrick trapped in his existential hell—is that freedom is evading the American 
people. In another interview Ellis states: “even though I might be writing about a specific 
time and a specific place, hopefully it’s in such a way that a reader can connect it to a larger 
metaphor—alienation, pain, America, the overall tone of the culture” (Clarke 87), a 
comment that evokes the novel’s engagement with the tension between the universal 
nature of existential crisis and the simultaneous specificity of its expression, catalysed and 
shaped by the historical moment and situation of the subject experiencing it. In American 
Psycho, the contemporary milieu emphasises the existential themes of artificiality, alienation, 
the loss of free will, and the denial of freedom entailed by bad faith, rather than following 
the existential quest paradigm to its conclusion by moving beyond these symptoms 
towards the redemptive potential of the philosophy: the “doctrine of action” and 
“optimism” described by Sartre in “Existentialism Is a Humanism” (54, 38). It seems such 
confidence in man’s powers of redemption is not in keeping with the cynical and 
pessimistic tone Ellis employs in the satire of American Psycho, which registers the author’s 
anger and frustration with the banality of contemporary American culture. 
An inconspicuous but symbolically significant incident within the novel illustrates this 
argument. On the streets of New York Patrick spots a “young, pretty homeless girl” 
sitting, “her head bowed down, staring dumbly into her empty lap”, a “Styrofoam coffee 
cup resting on the step below her feet”, and, in a rare moment of sympathy, probably 
prompted by the attractiveness of the girl, Patrick drops a dollar into her cup. However, he 
has completely misread the situation: the cup contains coffee, and the girl is not slumped 
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over in resignation at her poverty; instead, she is actually reading a “book—Sartre” (82). 
“[W]hat’s your goddam problem?” she shouts at him, asking the question he is incapable 
of asking himself, to which he responds: 
cringing, I stutter, “I didn’t… I didn’t know it was… full,” and shaken, I walk away 
[…] I hallucinate the buildings into mountains, into volcanoes, the streets become 
jungles, the sky freezes into a backdrop […] I have to cross my eyes in order to 
clear my vision. Lunch at Hubert’s becomes a permanent hallucination in which I 
find myself dreaming while still awake. (83) 
Here Patrick tries to fill a void the only way he knows how: with money. But the girl 
possesses something (other than coffee) that he does not: the philosophical worldview 
which perhaps holds the key to his condition. As Patrick does not notice the title, we do 
not know which of Sartre’s texts she is holding; but the girl knows what book it is, and she 
is in the process of finding out what it says. In a moment that is reminiscent of an event 
later in the novel when Patrick’s ex-girlfriend Bethany asserts her cultural superiority to 
him by pointing out that he has hung his expensive David Onica painting upside down 
(234-35), here Patrick reacts to the threat imposed by the abrupt empowerment of the 
girl—the instantaneous shift in his perception of her from a victim whom he can 
patronisingly humble to someone who is threatening him—by retreating into his own 
mind, his solipsism distorting the world around him to the extent that he cannot even tell 
if he is conscious or not. In “Existentialism Is a Humanism” Sartre states: “I cannot 
discover any truth whatsoever about myself except through the mediation of another” 
(41). But here Patrick, highly embarrassed at his mistake, attempts to escape the angst 
posed by the disruption of his hegemonic outlook on the world. The burden of freedom 
proves to be too heavy for him to shoulder. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Existential Thought in Fight Club 
 
Just as American Psycho contains a strong basis in existential thought, so too does Chuck 
Palahniuk’s Fight Club. The existential journey undertaken by the narrator in Fight Club 
begins with his sense of the absurdity of the world and life’s apparent meaninglessness. 
Initially, the narrator is a lonely, unhappy, young urban professional, who hates his soul-
sapping job and appears to suffer from insomnia. This insomnia heightens his alienation 
from other people and everyday reality, his existence becoming an “out-of-body 
experience” in which “Everything is so far away, a copy of a copy of a copy […] you can’t 
touch anything and nothing can touch you” (19, 21). The narrator’s doctor tells him 
“Insomnia is just a symptom of something larger. Find out what’s actually wrong” (19). 
This “something larger” is the narrator’s existential crisis and subsequent desire for a 
meaningful existence. His insomnia is an amplified form of Camus’ “weariness”, a feeling 
which—like Sartre’s Nausea—is “sickening”, but also a vital part of the process of 
existential awakening. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus writes:  
one day the ‘why’ arises and everything begins in that weariness tinged with 
amazement. […] Weariness comes at the end of the acts of a mechanical life, but at 
the same time it inaugurates the impulse of consciousness. […] What follows is the 
gradual return into the chain or it is the definitive awakening. At the end of the 
awakening comes, in time, the consequence: suicide or recovery. In itself weariness 
has something sickening about it. Here, I must conclude that it is good. For 
everything begins with consciousness and nothing is worth anything except 
through it. (11-12) 
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This summary of existential quest encapsulates the basic philosophical movement of 
the narrator of Fight Club, who, sick and weary with his “mechanical life”, begins to search 
for meaning, embarking on a process of awakening to consciousness through his 
interaction with Tyler Durden, and eventually facing the consequent outcomes of “suicide 
or recovery” in the novel’s final chapters. His friend Bob mirrors the narrator’s initial 
desire for meaning and reason amidst what seems to be the futility of existence when he 
says “All my life […] Why I do anything, I don’t know” (18), in effect posing the 
“fundamental question” that motivates Camus’ Myth of Sisyphus: why exist? (1). However, 
Camus’ framework is deployed by Palahniuk in a playfully ironic, almost derisive, manner 
which complicates the narrator’s journey to the extent that we are left unsure how 
seriously to take the novel’s engagement with existential thought.  
The narrator finds that by participating in support meetings for people with chronic 
illnesses and pretending that he is similarly afflicted, he is able to simulate feelings of 
anguish in order to give him the release necessary to sleep. Conveyed in an ironic tone that 
recalls Patrick Bateman’s melodramatic expressions of angst in American Psycho, the 
narrator’s despair revels in nihilism and the absurdity of existence: “It’s easy to cry when 
you realize that everyone you love will reject you or die” (17). Surrounded by dying people, 
the narrator attempts to grasp mortality, saying “On a long enough time line, the survival 
rate for everyone will drop to zero” (17), a phrase which echoes the process of awakening 
which Camus describes as a man admitting “that he stands at a certain point on a curve 
that he acknowledges having to travel to its end. He belongs to time, and by the horror 
that seizes him, he recognizes his worst enemy” (12).  For the narrator, the support groups 
are the beginning of this process. Camus suggests this awareness of mortality causes a 
“revolt of the flesh” which “is the absurd” (12), an outlook expressed in Palahniuk’s novel 
through frequent graphic references to bodily corruption, disease, and the grotesque. The 
characters in the novel all seem to revel in this morbidity and Marla could easily speak for 
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all three of the principals when she says “I embrace my own festering diseased corruption” 
(65). 
As a way of coping with the onset of death, the support groups use guided meditation 
as a way of transcending pain, suffering, and fear, entering a state akin to that which Sartre 
uses as an example of the individual of bad faith who “realises herself as not being her own 
body, and […] contemplates it as though from above as a passive object to which events 
can happen but which can neither provoke them nor avoid them because all its possibilities 
are outside of it” (Being and Nothingness 79). The philosophy of Tyler’s fight club—
established later in the novel—is in direct opposition to this mystic escapism, but the 
narrator relapses into transcendental distancing techniques at several points during the 
novel as a way of avoiding reality and the pain of the flesh. At the start of the novel the 
narrator is living in bad faith on multiple levels: firstly, as a participant in support groups 
which attempt to soften and escape reality, gatherings which “all have vague, upbeat 
names” (18) where he “never [gives his] real name” (19); and secondly, as a physically 
healthy person the vampiric voyeurism of his indulgence in the suffering of the support 
group members, and his simulation of their despair in order to sleep, adds a further layer 
of bad faith to his existence.  
It takes the gaze of Marla, another “faker” or “tourist”, to instigate a rupture in the 
delusion that the support groups are “the one real thing in [his] life” (24), leading the 
narrator to conclude that “Marla’s lie reflects my lie, and all I can see are lies. In the middle 
of all their truth […] all of a sudden even death and dying rank right down there with 
plastic flowers on video as a non-event” (23). This “truth” is an illusion because the 
narrator is not experiencing death authentically, for as Camus says “in reality there is no 
experience of death. Properly speaking, nothing has been experienced but what has been 
lived and made conscious. […] It is a substitute, an illusion, and it never quite convinces 
us” (Sisyphus 14). The narrator is aware of the inevitability of death, however, aware of 
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what Camus calls the “horror” of the “mathematical aspect of the event” (14), and in this 
certainty he also finds the absurd. 
The “mathematical aspect of the event” is given hyperbolic expression in the nature of 
the narrator’s job, which is to apply a mathematical formula, on behalf of the car company 
he is employed by, in order to determine whether it is profitable to recall faulty vehicles. 
This effectively reduces the value of human life to monetary figures and statistics, thus 
feeding the narrator’s nihilistic impulses. His job requires him to fly around the country 
going to “meetings [his] boss doesn’t want to attend” and visiting fatal car crash sites (30). 
As he changes his watch back and forth as he crosses time zones, the narrator realises that 
the adjustments are futile; time is passing regardless, and this causes him to feel a sense of 
waste: “This is your life, and it’s ending one minute at a time” (29). On these flights he 
forms “tiny friendships” with “single-serving” friends (31), ultimately superficial and 
disposable. The narrator’s frustration is such that he enjoys the moments when the plane 
has trouble landing, the possibility of a crash removing all his other worries and leading 
him to think “Nothing matters” (31). 
 
It is important to remember that Tyler and the narrator are the same person, and not 
entirely separate characters. However, as we read the novel through the point of view of 
the narrator—and he perceives Tyler as a character distinct from himself until right near 
the end of the novel (chapters 21 and 22)—we must keep both distinctions in mind when 
analysing the text. The narrator creates Tyler as a way of dealing with the absurdity of his 
existence:  
I was tired and crazy and rushed, and every time I boarded a plane, I wanted the 
plane to crash. I envied people dying of cancer. I hated my life. I was tired and 
bored with my job and my furniture, and I couldn’t see any way to change things. 
(172) 
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Tyler, on the other hand, does know how to change things; he is “funny and charming and 
forceful and independent, and men look up to him and expect him to change their world. 
Tyler is capable and free, and I am not” (174). The narrator’s fight for his human freedom, 
its gradual emergence and expression, is the central conflict of the novel. At first, Tyler is 
an aide in this process, but he steadily becomes an obstacle. Tyler allows the expression of 
the narrator’s repressed desires, the first being a liberation from property and the clutch of 
consumerism. 
Like Ellis, Palahniuk deploys satire to critique the materialism of American society and 
popular culture. In a robotic tone reminiscent of Bateman’s monologues on the latest 
consumer necessities, Palahniuk’s narrator, a self confessed “slave to the nesting instinct” 
(43), parodies the discourse of the culture he is attempting to undermine, listing his 
purchases and suggesting the “IKEA furniture catalogue” has taken the place of 
pornography for his generation (43). Ironically the marketing of these products make them 
seem as if they are creating individuality, when in fact they entrench conformity, the 
narrator admitting that he and his peers “all have the same” distinctive designer items (43). 
As Elizabeth Young says in her discussion of American Psycho:  
Within consumer capitalism we are offered a surfeit of commodities, an abundance 
of commodity choices, but this image of plenty is illusory. Our desires are 
mediated by ideas about roles and lifestyles which are themselves constructed by 
commodities and our “choices” are propelled by these constructs. (“Beast” 104) 
The narrator’s obsession with objects is a coping mechanism for his encroaching sense 
of absurdity at the transience of life and the inevitability of death, creating a false sense of 
permanence, security, and resolution: “You tell yourself, this is the last sofa I will ever need 
in my life […] then for a couple of years you’re satisfied that no matter what goes wrong, 
at least you’ve got that sofa issue handled” (44). But in reality they are no defence against 
the truths the narrator is beginning to grapple with, that “Nothing is static” and “Even the 
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Mona Lisa is falling apart” (49). Objects cannot protect him against his own mortality, the 
fact that “Someday I’d be dead without a scar and there would be a really nice condo […] 
until the dust settled” (49). The discourses of commodification influence the narrator such 
that he sees himself as an object at times, saying “It’s nothing anymore to have a beautiful 
stock body […] those cars that are completely stock cherry, right out of a dealer’s 
showroom in 1955, I always think, what a waste” (48), and he describes Marla as having 
“Italian dark leather sofa lips” (36). When he understands that “the things you used to 
own, now they own you” (44), he is giving Tyler—as a manifestation of repressed desire—
license to destroy his apartment, a liberation which allows him to continue on the path 
towards confronting the void by “hitting the bottom” (70), and thus existential 
enlightenment. This is the first of many acts of self-destruction, as the hold the objects had 
over the narrator causes him to realise in retrospect that “It was me that blew up” (111).  
In addition to parodying the discourses of consumerism Fight Club, like American Psycho, 
also advances a postmodern concern with the ubiquity of television and film as a mediating 
discourse between consciousness and reality. In Survivor, Palahniuk’s second novel, a 
character comments:  
We all grew up with the same television shows. It’s like we all have the same 
artificial memory implants. We remember almost none of our real childhoods, but 
we remember everything that happened to sitcom families. (111-10)  
This idea can be detected in Fight Club in that characters use fictional mediums to explain 
reality, such as the references to the movies Psycho and Sybil (173, 196), or when Tyler saves 
Marla and thus, “according to the ancient Chinese custom we all learned from television” 
(60), assumes responsibility for her. Fight Club uses the discourses of television and film to 
explore questions of existential authenticity and artificiality in much the same way that 
American Psycho does, but with far less intensity; the influence of pop culture over the 
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narrator of Fight Club is nowhere near as exaggerated as the crippling distortion it 
impresses upon the mind of Patrick Bateman.  
Like Ellis, Palahniuk also uses elements of cinematic technique in his style, such as 
when the narrator is working with Tyler as “guerrilla terrorists of the service industry” and 
he looks out through the window of an elevator as it pauses between floors, viewing the 
world from “cockroach level” (81, 80). The guests they are serving become “gigantic” 
“titans” who view him as “just a cockroach” (80, 81). This moment is reminiscent of 
Sartre’s use of a fly’s point of view in Nausea (149-50), or the Underground Man’s 
description of himself as a mouse plotting revenge from “behind the stove” (Dostoyevsky 
11), both instances of metaphorical imagery intended to heighten the alienation and 
insignificance of existence. Palahniuk’s appropriation of cinematic technique is also used to 
create textual ambiguity and narrative unreliability, such as the narrator’s use of a “fast-
forward” at several points in the novel to create a literary jump cut in the narrative (22, 
169, 171). And just as time can be manipulated so that it leaps forward like a videotape, so 
too can it be wound backwards; the story begins, after all, at the end, the narrative being 
related as a flashback in the minutes before the narrator expects to die. When describing 
Tyler’s hobby of splicing single frames of pornography into family films while working as a 
projectionist, the narrator comments: 
Changeover. 
The movie goes on. 
Nobody in the audience has any idea. (28) 
Here Palahniuk is making a sly reference to his own manipulation of two different reels in 
the text, the narrator and Tyler, and his role as author making changeovers between two 
characters in the same body while the reader often does not have “any idea” until the twist 
is revealed.  
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The formation of fight club allows the narrator to react against the absurdity and 
meaninglessness of popular culture and society by embracing self-destruction in order to 
facilitate the creation of authenticity, another version of the Underground Man’s emphasis 
on the importance of the freedom to desire that which is “even extremely stupid and not 
be duty bound to desire only what is intelligent” (Dostoyevsky 26). This logic is 
rearticulated when the narrator of Fight Club says “my life just seemed too complete, and 
maybe we have to break everything to make something better out of ourselves” (52). The 
violent fight club gatherings, where men engage in one-on-one fist fights until either man 
submits, can be understood as a hyper-masculinised version of the “therapeutic physical 
contact” of the support groups (20). The benefits of the support groups, which had made 
the narrator feel “more alive than I’d ever felt” (22), are superseded by fight club: “You 
aren’t alive anywhere like you’re alive at fight club” (51). He has moved from finding life 
by simulating death, to reincarnation through brutalising the flesh in order to “feel saved” 
(51). 
Fight club is about embracing nothingness, a cathartic emptying of the self by 
submitting to the primitive urge for violence: “Nothing was solved when the fight was 
over, but nothing mattered” (53). Fight club “isn’t about looking good” (51), instead it 
attempts to cultivate physical prowess and self confidence outside the constructs of 
society, such as the demanding ethos prevalent in gyms “crowded with guys trying to look 
like men, as if being a man means looking the way a sculptor or an art director says” (50). 
It is therapeutic in that it allows the expression of repressed anger and a way to deal with 
fear: “Most guys are at fight club because of something they’re too scared to fight. After a 
few fights, you’re afraid a lot less” (54). Tyler instigates the first fight because he wants “to 
know more about himself” (52), embarking on an existential quest of self-discovery and 
engagement in creating one’s own meaning in the world. Tyler’s philosophy acknowledges 
the historical moment of the men of his generation who are without a “great war” or a 
52 
 
“great depression”, a battle or masculine challenge with which to provide them with 
meaning; instead, they have a “great war of the spirit” (149), an existential onus to create 
meaning amidst the apparent futility of the modern world.  
Fight club seeks to remedy the feelings of emasculation its members feel in their 
society. Castration is a recurring motif in Fight Club, indicative of a wider theme concerning 
the crisis of masculinity. The narrator attends a support group for men with testicular 
cancer called “Remaining Men Together” (18), and there his therapy partner, Bob, has 
gone from a hyper-masculine body builder to an emasculated emotional wreck with “bitch 
tits” (17). Later in the novel Project Mayhem uses the threat of castration as a terrorist 
tactic against its opponents, including, eventually, the narrator himself, who says: “Picture 
the best part of yourself frozen in a sandwich bag” (188). Fight club is a reaction against 
consumerism in general, but particularly the feminisation of consumer culture. Tyler 
attacks the narrator’s materialist “nesting instinct” with its maternal qualities (43), and 
Tyler’s club counters what he perceives as the emasculation of men by society, particularly 
those wallowing in the meaninglessness of the service industry: “I see the strongest and the 
smartest men who have ever lived […] and these men are pumping gas and waiting tables” 
(149). This phrase echoes the opening line of Allen Ginsberg’s “Howl”, published in 
1956—”I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness”, as well as the line 
“all the stars that never were are parking cars and pumping gas”, from Dionne Warwick’s 
song “Do You Know the Way to San Jose?” (1968). In connecting Ginsberg’s passionate 
cry against America to the mild complaint of the pop song, Palahniuk imparts added irony 
to Tyler’s attempt to rally against the wilting of masculinity. 
Nietzsche’s concept of the “will to power” suggests that the aim of life is not mere 
survival, but the increase of one’s power: “the will to appropriate, dominate, increase, grow 
stronger” (Spinks 137). Nietzsche gives numerous examples from human history to 
demonstrate that life often risks death to increase its power, such as the Homeric warrior-
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hero who performs dangerous feats in battle to win glory. Nietzsche sees the “will to 
power”—the harnessing of aggressive and ambitious drives—as necessary to living a 
passionate life, finding “a vision of life that burns brilliantly” preferable to simply “being a 
good person” (Solomon 85-87). In his essay “Homer’s Contest” (1872), Nietzsche 
discusses the importance of the contest (agon), the “finest Hellenic principle”, in the 
ancient world (100). In contrast to what he calls the “emasculated concept of modern 
humanity” which separates man from nature, Nietzsche admires the ancient Greeks for 
their acceptance of the inextricability of “natural” and “human” characteristics (95). Thus, 
while they are “the most humane people of ancient time”, the Greeks still possess “a trait 
of cruelty, of tiger-like pleasure in destruction” (95). He suggests that, in the Hellenic 
world, it is in the course of the contest—through the controlled expression of jealousy, 
envy, and competitive ambition—that cruelty and the desire for victory can be channelled 
into creation rather than destruction.  He concludes that “every talent must develop 
through a struggle” and once that state of struggle is surpassed, and a man is without 
competition, the gods “entice him into an act of hubris, and he collapses under it” (98, 99).  
This is one way of understanding the violence of fight club, as a revival of a contest in 
which the men can test themselves authentically rather than vicariously: 
Fight club is not football on television. You aren’t watching a bunch of men you 
don’t know halfway around the world beating on each other […] After you’ve been 
to fight club, watching football on television is watching pornography when you 
could be having great sex. (50) 
Fight club allows the powerless to simulate the “will to power”; the narrator is able to “get 
[his] hands on everything in the world that didn’t work” (53). The primitive crucible of 
violence is a hyper-masculine reaction to modernity’s repression and denial of the natural 
instincts of anger and the physical will to dominate. When the narrator runs into him in 
the church basement where “Remaining Men Together” used to be held, Bob tells him 
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that the old therapy group has disbanded and that he has found a “new group”. Even he is 
rehabilitated by fight club; the narrator notices that Bob’s arms are “quilted with muscle 
and so hard they shine” (100). Instead of abusing steroids to look like a man, Bob’s 
muscles are now real. 
Fight club allows the simulation of Oedipal conflict as a way of dealing with paternal 
abandonment. Tyler tells the narrator that he had been fighting his father in his mind 
during their first fight, a man he “never knew” (49). Tyler’s Oedipal impulse expresses the 
repressed resentment of the narrator, whose father abandoned his family to start several 
new ones, an action sardonically described by the narrator through the discourse of 
commodification as “set[ing] up a franchise” (50). The narrator dismisses his father’s 
advice to get married, thinking “I’m a thirty-year-old boy, and I’m wondering if another 
woman is really the answer I need” (51). At fight club the narrator perceives an 
atmosphere of bitterness that feeds off paternal indifference. Surveying the club’s 
members, he sees others like himself: “a generation of men raised by women” (50). 
However, if a mother substitute is not “the answer”, neither, apparently, is another father 
figure; the narrator wonders whether “Maybe we didn’t need a father to complete 
ourselves” (54).  
Paul Kennett notes in his article “Fight Club and the Dangers of Oedipal Obsession” 
that the narrator “continually reaches out to the narrative of patriarchy, rooted in the 
Oedipal complex, to provide him with a meaningful existence” (48). He does this through 
Tyler, who is paradoxically both father-killer and father-figure, the rebellious son who 
eventually “succumbs to his nostalgic symptom for the patriarchy of old” by developing 
fight club into the neo-fascist Project Mayhem, an organisation which attempts to reverse 
the “decay” of the patriarchal past and overturn the “subjective deterioration” of 
masculinity in the historical moment of the novel’s milieu (55, 62). The narrator’s eventual 
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conflict with Tyler and Project Mayhem is both an Oedipal rejection of a paternal authority 
and an implicit condemnation of patriarchy as “a dangerous, fascist throwback” (48).  
Throughout Fight Club Palahniuk appropriates Christian imagery as a way of 
underscoring Nietzsche’s “God is dead” maxim. Early in the novel the narrator parodies 
the Lord’s Prayer by appealing to Tyler as a saviour who will rescue him from the 
trappings of materialism:  “Oh, Tyler, please deliver me […] Deliver me from Swedish 
furniture […] deliver me, Tyler, from being perfect and complete” (46). Tyler also 
functions as a father-figure to him, and when he is caught in the middle of Marla and 
Tyler’s relationship, he is reminded of his parents’ animosity for one another: “The 
moment Marla is out the door, Tyler appears back in the room. Fast as a magic trick. My 
parents did this magic act for five years” (71). Later in the novel, the sense of rejection the 
narrator feels when Tyler leaves him reminds him of his father’s abandonment of him as a 
child, as well as symbolising the modern spiritual malaise of living without faith in God. 
This absence of paternal and spiritual guidance motivates the narrator in his quest to find 
meaning. While Tyler tries to replace God with himself in his role as the fascist leader of 
Project Mayhem—“Tyler Durden the Great and Powerful […] God and father” (199), the 
narrator becomes increasingly wary of this approach to filling the void.  
These ideas are clarified in a scene where the narrator is taken for a ride in a car by 
some of Tyler’s Project Mayhem members, referred to as “space monkeys” because of 
their blind obedience to Tyler’s cause (138). A fight club member referred to as “the 
mechanic”—who acts as a mouthpiece for “Tyler Durden dogma”—tells the narrator that 
“If you’re male and you’re Christian and living in America, your father is your model for 
God” (141). By implication, Tyler and the narrator, who, like many of the novel’s 
characters, never knew their fathers, spend their lives “searching for a father and God” 
(141). The mechanic elaborates: 
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“What you have to consider […] is the possibility that God doesn’t like you. Could 
be, God hates us. This is not the worst thing that can happen.” 
How Tyler saw it was that getting God’s attention for being bad was better than 
getting no attention at all. Maybe because God’s hate is better than His 
indifference.  
If you could be either God’s worst enemy or nothing, which would you choose? 
We are God’s middle children, according to Tyler Durden, with no special place in 
history and no special attention. 
Unless we get God’s attention, we have no hope of damnation or redemption. 
Which is worse, hell or nothing? 
Only if we’re caught and punished can we be saved. 
[…] 
The lower you fall, the higher you’ll fly. The farther you run, the more God wants 
you back. 
“If the prodigal son had never left home,” the mechanic says, “the fatted calf 
would still be alive.” 
It’s not enough to be numbered with the grains of sand on the beach and the stars 
in the sky. (141) 
Here, paternal desertion is conflated with the divine abandonment of Nietzsche’s “God is 
dead” theory; both involve a loss of faith and meaning in a higher authority. Tyler 
advocates rebellion as a solution to this existential crisis, the active pursuit of “hell” and 
punishment rather than the abyss of “nothing”. This rebellion is a development of the 
logic of the fight clubs, where the pain of physical punishment is preferred to the 
meaningless banality of consumer culture. The reference to “God’s worst enemy” creates a 
parallel with the rebellion of Satan in Paradise Lost, who also chose hell in preference to 
servitude and blind obedience to God, saying “Farthest from him is best” (I.247). 
57 
 
However, Tyler’s assertion that “The lower you fall, the higher you’ll fly” deviates from the 
story of the war in heaven, as, try as he might, Satan never reclaims heaven or salvation. 
Alternatively, the reference to the parable of the prodigal son demonstrates the possibility 
of salvation for the fallen; the father in the story does not punish his wayward son but 
extends to him his mercy and joy: “be glad, for this thy brother was dead, and is alive 
again: and was lost, and is found” (Luke 15.32). But this salvation is gained through 
repentance and humility, elements absent from Tyler’s theory. Hence, the dissonance 
registered by these religious allusions causes us to question the soundness of Tyler’s 
reasoning, creating a sense of unease and doubt as to where his philosophy is taking the 
narrator.  
The assertion that “It’s not enough to be numbered with the grains of sand on the 
beach and the stars in the sky” reveals a desire for meaning beyond the absurdity and 
indifference of the world. Several times throughout the novel the narrator expresses 
variations of the phrase “Look up into the stars and you’re gone” (22, 31, 143, 192), 
echoing the conclusion of Camus’ The Outsider, where Meursault looks up “at the mass of 
signs and stars in the night sky and [lays himself] open for the first time to the benign 
indifference of the world” (117). At this point Meursault has accepted the absurdity of life 
and realises he “is still happy”, even on the eve of his execution (117). The narrator desires 
the resolution of Meursault’s acceptance of the absurd, death, and the burden of freedom, 
but for Tyler—as the site of all the Homeric qualities society has repressed in the 
narrator—peaceful resolution is “not enough” and he chooses rebellion and destruction as 
the path to a authentic meaningful existence (Fight Club 141). During the gradual transition 
of fight club into Project Mayhem the more or less parallel philosophical paths Tyler and 
the narrator have been travelling begins to diverge and, eventually, come into direct 
conflict. This split is best understood in relation to Sartre’s theory of the “project-of-being-
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God” in Being and Nothingness (1943) and Camus’ theory of revolution and “man in revolt” 
in The Rebel (1951), but first we must examine the motivation behind Project Mayhem.  
 
A central existential theme deployed throughout Fight Club is authenticity. The binaries of 
the authentic and the inauthentic are principally expressed in relation to death, and 
repeated confrontation with the reality of pain, suffering, and mortality, is integral to the 
narrator’s journey. As Camus states, death is “an illusion” that “never quite convinces us” 
(Sisyphus 14), a fundamental fact that will nevertheless always be intangible to the living. In 
contrast to the guided meditation and transcendence practised by the support groups, fight 
club rejects the reduction of the body to a passive object. Instead, the fights become a way 
of embracing pain in order to grasp reality and wake up to the present, an attempt to 
escape bad faith.  
This contrast is evident in the scene in which Tyler kisses the narrator’s hand before 
pouring lye onto the saliva, causing a chemical reaction which burns his hand “worse than 
[he has] ever been burned” (73). The narrator lapses into guided meditation to distance 
himself from his body and the experience of pain, but Tyler tells him that “this is the 
greatest moment of your life […] and you’re off somewhere missing it” (77), forcing him 
to accept that he is “stupid” and that he “will die” (76). By the end of the scene, Tyler 
concludes that the narrator is “a step closer to hitting bottom” (78), and thus nearer to 
enlightenment via confrontation with the void. The same purpose is to be found in the 
scene with the mechanic, where the narrator is taken on a car ride with the intention of 
crashing, an experience which leads him to realise the immediacy of the present, the 
inevitability of death, and his own insignificance:  
Now. The amazing miracle of death, when one second you’re walking and talking, 
and the next second, you’re an object.  
I am nothing, and not even that. (146) 
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These realisations can be likened to the epiphany of Roquentin in Nausea when he reads 
the article about the rape and murder of Lucienne and comments: “Her body still exists, 
her bruised flesh. She no longer exists” (146). The narrator adopts Tyler’s philosophy when 
he uses the threat of death to force a young man called Raymond to leave his job at the 
“all-night Korner mart” in order to return to veterinary school and become what he 
originally wanted to be (151). After he has been terrified and enlightened to death, the 
narrator concludes that Raymond will be much more appreciative of his existence and 
prepared to live authentically: “tomorrow will be the most beautiful day of your entire life” 
(155). Perhaps the extremity of this act leads the narrator to question what he is becoming 
and realise, in the following chapter, the terrifying truth that he and Tyler are the same 
person. 
By this point in the novel, Tyler’s Project Mayhem is becoming increasingly disturbing. 
To begin with, Tyler’s attempts to subvert the discourses of mainstream society had 
seemed mischievously comic and reasonably harmless to the narrator. These include the 
splicing of pornography into family feature films, the manufacture of soap from 
liposuctioned human fat, and the hospitality terrorism, all of which, though grotesque and 
provocative, never endanger anyone’s life. Similarly, the violence of fight club is 
consensual. However, Project Mayhem moves into territory which pushes the boundaries 
of Palahniuk’s combination of the comic and the disturbing even further. 
Tyler’s intentions for the project are far from coherent, and draw from numerous 
contradictory sources. Project Mayhem is described as a “great war of the spirit” and a 
“great revolution against the culture” for a generation of men without a “great war” or a 
“great depression” in which to define themselves (149). This generation is characterised as 
enslaved to advertising and the discourses of consumer culture; hence they work “in jobs 
they hate, just so they can buy what they don’t really need” (149). Tyler senses that this 
generation “want[s] to give their lives to something” (149). As a cultural revolution, the 
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Project advances a pseudo-Marxist critique of capitalism that intends to “call a strike and 
everyone refuses to work until we redistribute the wealth of the world” (149). Tyler’s 
rhetoric recalls the doomed idealism surrounding numerous totalitarian historical 
movements of the twentieth century, to the extent that his claims—which evoke language 
that once held great power and commanded self-sacrifice—are undercut by the irony 
produced by their familiarity and naivety.  As an extension of the hyper-masculinity of 
fight club, Tyler advocates a return to a primitive society without currency or technology, a 
tribal hunter-gatherer existence among the re-appropriated relics of the late twentieth 
century urban landscape: 
You’ll hunt elk through the damp canyon forests around the ruins of Rockefeller 
Center […] We’ll paint the skyscrapers with huge totem faces and goblin tikis, and 
every evening what’s left of mankind will retreat to empty zoos and lock itself in 
cages as protection against bears and big cats and wolves that pace and watch us 
from outside the cage bars at night. (124) 
Tyler feels this would be a more authentic existence for the men of his generation than one 
in the service industry or trapped in an office job.  
Tyler’s philosophy is too idealistic and unfocused, however, and it swiftly produces a 
fascist organisation which ends up negating many of its initial goals. For example, the 
project initially intended to free individuals from the conformist grip of capitalist discourse 
and teach “each man in the project that he had the power to control history” (122), but, in 
an Orwellian twist, then ends up “enslaving” its members to show them “freedom”, and 
using fear to “show them courage” (149). The members are required to wear black and not 
ask questions; they are turned into “space monkeys” who perform instructions with 
robotic obedience (12). When the narrator chooses to work against Tyler—after the death 
of Bob at the hands of the police during a botched Project Mayhem mission—he is 
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obviously acting from a different philosophical point of view. Sartre’s theory of the 
“project of being-God” underpins this split in ideological motivation.  
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre posits that existing authentically means overcoming bad 
faith and choosing a life with a project which “has freedom for its foundation and its 
goal”, rather than the futile “project of being-God” (602). Although Sartre was an atheist, 
he recognised that theism, as a human construction, told a truth about humanity: that the 
longing for God signifies a state which man wishes to attain but cannot (Detmer 130). 
Sartre suggests that man longs for “the ideal of a consciousness which would be the 
foundation of its own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it would have of 
itself” (Being and Nothingness 587). This is a desire for completion and arrival, to become 
something that is what it is: something justified and necessary. Yet this desire is 
paradoxical and doomed to failure, an ambition reflected in the contradictory nature of 
God, because “being free is incompatible with having a fixed essence of any kind, let alone 
that of perfection” (Detmer 130). To seek to become God is to live inauthentically in bad 
faith. To overcome this flaw of the human condition, to find salvation so to speak, 
requires “a self-recovery of being” towards “authenticity” by making freedom the basis of 
one’s project instead of trying to be God (Being and Nothingness 94, n.9). 
As previously stated, Tyler is directly likened, at several points in the novel, to God and 
Christ. He begins the novel as a saviour figure, but ends up becoming a patriarchal 
megalomaniac. In the opening chapter Tyler is holding the narrator hostage in a building 
about to explode. The narrator is positioned as an evangelist: “Where would Jesus be if no 
one had written the gospels? […] you want to be a legend, Tyler, man, I’ll make you a 
legend” (15), while Tyler states: “We won’t really die […] This isn’t really death […] We’ll 
be legend. We won’t grow old” (11). These fanatical delusions of grandeur, immortality, 
and martyrdom, emphasise how far Tyler has deviated from his initial philosophy; he has 
moved from drawing inspiration from the pain and transience of a mortal existence to 
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trying to conquer and overcome death itself. Such delusion is enforced by the reference to 
“Ozymandias, king of kings” just before the novel’s climax (201), alluding to Percy Shelly’s 
1818 sonnet which describes a decaying monument to emphasise the inevitable decline of 
even the mightiest rulers and their kingdoms.  
A scene early in the novel illustrates Tyler’s awareness of this transience. When the 
narrator first meets him on a nudist beach, Tyler has created a sculpture out of driftwood 
which casts a “shadow of a giant hand” that is “perfect” only when the sun is at a certain 
point, demonstrating that “A moment was the most you could ever expect from 
perfection” (33). In contrast to Ozymandias’ monument in Shelley’s sonnet— which is 
inscribed with the words “Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!” (line 11), Tyler’s 
sculpture is created in full awareness of the fact that “Nothing is static” (49). Furthermore, 
Tyler’s actions on the beach enact the ideas of Roquentin and Anny’s discussion of 
“perfect moments” near the end of Nausea. Anny explains to Roquentin that “perfect 
moments” are created out of “privileged situations”, but it is the individual’s responsibility 
or “duty” to complete the transformation as the situation provides only “the raw material” 
which still “has to be treated” (Nausea 212). Tyler’s use of the “raw material” of the beach 
to construct his own “perfect moment” demonstrates the logic of the conversation of 
Sartre’s characters. 
Why is it then, that, despite his awareness of the transience of perfection and life itself, 
Tyler ends up chasing the futile “project of being-God”, aspiring to become “Tyler 
Durden the Great and Powerful” (199), an Ozymandias in his own right? Camus’ 1951 
book-length essay The Rebel elucidates the existential motivation behind Tyler’s Project 
Mayhem, as well as its eventual failure. The ideas in this essay were first drafted in 1943-
1944 when Camus was under the inspiration of having read Sartre’s Being and Nothingness 
(Aronson 118). Camus’ essay presents an account of several different ideological and 
historical approaches to revolt and revolution, such as that of the Marquis de Sade, 
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Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, the Nazis, and the Bolsheviks. The essay critiques the 
revolutionary mindset, which Camus sees as too overreaching in its desire to transform the 
world, as well as an approach prone to embrace violence and murder as a means to achieve 
such a transformation: “Revolution […] is only a limitless metaphysical crusade” (79). 
Instead, Camus presents the “man in revolt” as a preferable way to challenge injustice by 
continually contesting power without losing sight of values such as solidarity and the 
sanctity of human life. In the Cold War context in which it was published, The Rebel 
functioned as a critique of communism as a revolutionary force, and the novel acted as a 
catalyst for the irreparable rupture in the relationship between Camus and Sartre, who 
declared himself an intellectual politically committed to the communist cause in 1952 
(Aronson 117). 
As a postwar attempt to understand, in part, the destructive excesses of fascism, 
Camus’ exploration of how “an act of rebellion […] forgets its purpose and plunges into a 
mire of tyranny and servitude” (28) is equally applicable to the failure of the neo-fascist 
Project Mayhem. Camus suggests that all rebellion is, at its metaphysical core, a revolt 
against the absurdity of the world and the human condition, an attempt to supplant God 
and overcome absurdity by wielding power brutally in an attempt to stamp control on the 
world. Camus suggests the metaphysical rebel is not an atheist; instead, he “defies more 
than he denies” (31) and attempts to talk to God as an equal. Tyler demonstrates this in his 
attempt to get “God’s attention for being bad” (141), and yet he succumbs to the desire to 
deify man by creating a naturalistic, post-historic utopia. Thus, if we apply Camus’ angle, 
Fight Club’s numerous appropriations and perversions of Christian material demonstrate a 
blasphemy which “is reverent, since every blasphemy is a participation in holiness” (The 
Rebel 50). Tyler starts out as a liberator and ends up becoming the oppressor, for, as Camus 
states, “The slave starts by begging for justice and ends up wanting to wear the crown” 
(31).  
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Camus’ analysis of de Sade in The Rebel bears some striking similarities to Palahniuk’s 
characterisation of Tyler Durden. Camus suggests that, as a prisoner disillusioned with the 
violence of the state, de Sade repudiated “man and his morality, because God repudiates 
them both” (34), and, as a proponent of “absolute liberty”, de Sade felt that: “nature has 
need of crime, that it must destroy in order to create, and that thus we help it to create 
from the moment that we embark on self-destruction” (34). These qualities are also 
embraced and advocated by Tyler, who declares “self-destruction is the answer” and “the 
lower you fall, the higher you’ll fly” (Fight Club 49, 141). Camus concludes that de Sade’s  
contestable merit lies in having demonstrated, with the unhappy perspicacity of 
accumulated rage, the extreme consequences of a rebel’s logic—at least when it 
forgets its true origins. These consequences are a hermetic totalitarianism, universal 
crime, an aristocracy of cynicism, and the desire for an apocalypse. (42) 
These are also the intended consequences of Tyler’s logic: his desire to use mayhem and 
anarchy to “take control of the world” and “blast the world free of history” (122, 124). 
When Tyler’s philosophy changes from an existential quest into fascism and nihilism, it is 
because he has forgotten his “true origins”, that which “Camus regarded as the sole saving 
insight: that life is absurd, and even though we must rebel, nothing can create order or 
remove death’s sting” (Aronson 120).  
 
The narrator, on the other hand, is still searching for freedom, a pursuit in which Tyler has 
become an obstacle, as well as a threat to Marla, who has developed into a love interest for 
the narrator. Kavadlo suggests that “fight club never saves the narrator, as he says it does 
early in the novel; instead, Marla does” (8). In chapter 27 the narrator contemplates killing 
himself, but decides not to as he must “save” Marla (193). Thus, his own life is saved by 
the desire to save the life of another, indicating a move towards community and human 
affection. Similarly, in the penultimate chapter the realisation that Marla and the support 
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group members are willing to risk their lives trying to save him causes the narrator to 
experience an “epiphany moment”  (204). Palahniuk himself has asserted: “all my books 
are about a lonely person looking for some way to connect with other people”, as well as 
stating “I’m not a nihilist. I’m a romantic” (qtd. in Kavadlo 6, 5). 
Palahniuk does not, however, follow the “romantic” convention of concluding his 
novel with an amorous union between Marla and the narrator. Instead, the narrator shoots 
himself in the head in order to commit suicide and get rid of Tyler. The bullet misses his 
brain and tears through his cheek, however, and in the final chapter he wakes up in a 
hospital, which is characterised as “heaven” (206). Palahniuk leaves it ambiguous as to 
whether the narrator has succeeded in banishing Tyler from his mind. Although he 
expresses a desire to reconnect with Marla, the narrator is hesitant to leave the hospital as 
some members of the staff still refer to him as “Mr. Durden” and tell him: “We look 
forward to getting you back” (208). Camus’ framework of the existential quest in the Myth 
of Sisyphus, which states “At the end of the awakening comes, in time, the consequence: 
suicide or recovery” (11), is subverted by Palahniuk so that the narrator experiences both 
consequences to the extent that each negates the other: he does not really commit suicide 
and die, and neither does he properly recover within the timeframe of the novel.  
The narrator has, however, come to some conclusions about existence, expressed in a 
conversation with “God”, who is probably a doctor in the hospital (207). This scene 
parallels the discussion between Meursault and the prison chaplain at the end of Camus’ 
The Outsider. The chaplain, as a representative of faith, tries to persuade Meursault to 
repent his sins and accept divine salvation, which Meursault rejects outright. Instead, he 
declares his acceptance of the world with its meaningless absurdity and “benign 
indifference” (117), telling the prison chaplain: “I’d done this and I hadn’t done that. I 
hadn’t done one thing whereas I had done another. So what?” (115). Correspondingly, in 
Fight Club God tries to tell the narrator that “each of us is a sacred, unique snowflake of 
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special unique specialness”, to which the narrator says “God’s got this all wrong”. Instead, 
he articulates the same acquiescence as Meursault to the lack of inherent meaning behind 
existence, asserting that “we just are and what happens just happens” (207).  
The narrator’s rejection of divine sentimentality closely mirrors a comment by Patrick 
Bateman during his conversation with Jean in the chapter “End of the 80s”, where he says 
“You know how they say no two snowflakes are ever alike? […] Well I don’t think that’s 
true. I think a lot of snowflakes are alike…and I think a lot of people are alike too” 
(American Psycho 363). Bateman later thinks, while considering “the question Why not end up 
with [Jean]?”  (364), “everyone is interchangeable anyway […] it doesn’t really matter” (365). 
The interchangeability of people—a reoccurring theme in American Psycho—is also 
expressed by Meursault at the end of The Outsider when he tells the chaplain: 
what did his God or the lives people chose or the destinies they selected matter to 
me, when one and the same destiny was to select me and thousands of millions of 
other privileged people […] What did it matter that Raymond was just as much my 
mate as Celeste who was worth more than him? What did it matter that Marie now 
had a new Meursault to kiss? (115-16) 
All three protagonists express an atheistic rejection of the notion that their individual 
selves possess inherent meaning or “unique specialness”, and for the narrator of Fight Club 
this interchangeability has taken a Gothic twist in that he is potentially still transposable 
with Tyler Durden—another identity buried within his psyche. The possibility of 
redemption through the Other remains, however, because Marla “know[s] the difference” 
between the narrator and Tyler (205). Hence, while Patrick is seemingly left in a state of 
“NO EXIT”, the ending of Fight Club is slightly more optimistic. This optimism is 
consistent with Camus’ ideal of the need for acceptance of the absurd; however, both Ellis 
and Palahniuk destabilise Sartre’s ideal of the individual with a project which “has freedom 
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for its foundation and its goal” (Being and Nothingness 602). Within the postmodern satire of 
American Psycho and Fight Club, such a project appears problematic and somewhat naive. 
Robert Bennett comments that Fight Club engages “existential themes […] with a sense 
of postmodern ironic detachment that veers dangerously close to existentialist self-parody” 
(77-78), an astute observation equally applicable to American Psycho. In the conclusion of 
this thesis we will return to the question of how seriously the reader is to take the 
engagement of American Psycho and Fight Club with existential thought, and to what extent 
the satirical and postmodern style of these novels undermines or destabilises the 
seriousness of their philosophical content. But first, I will demonstrate the necessity of an 
existential framework for understanding two aspects of these contemporary texts that 
constitute a significant departure from Nausea and The Outsider, their graphic violence and 
use of Gothic conventions. The violent content of these novels has been a source of 
controversy and a thorny component for critics to explain. In the next chapter I argue that 
the existential agenda underlying the violence of American Psycho and Fight Club suggests the 
engagement of these texts with existential philosophy amounts to more than mere “self-
parody”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Violence 
 
Violence serves a variety of existential functions in Nausea and The Outsider. Roquentin’s 
perception of the world—particularly when it is distorted by the influence of Nausea—has 
an atmosphere of menace in which existence itself becomes threatening. Violence bubbles 
latently beneath the surface of human freedom in Nausea; for example, Roquentin 
considers how easy it would be for him to “plunge [his] cheese-knife into the Autodidact’s 
eye”, an action that would cause the people around him to “trample on [him] and kick [his] 
teeth in” (Nausea 177). On another occasion he deliberately cuts the palm of his hand to 
illustrate his freedom and superfluity (145). Roquentin’s feverish imagination is often 
visited by disturbing surrealist images, such as those caused by the rape and murder of a 
little girl he reads about in the newspaper (146), or his “vision” of a “bleeding” dead body 
lying amid the window display of a butcher’s shop (111). Catherine Brosman suggests that 
“many readers” find Nausea “morbid and disgusting” (127), yet, as these examples attest, 
the violence of the novel is often hallucinatory or marginal to the action depicted, and is 
included by Sartre to evoke an atmosphere of danger that rarely manifests itself in a strictly 
concrete sense. 
In The Outsider, the turning point of the plot is Meursault’s murder of an Arab man. 
This event is dramatic—Camus’ vividly describes Meursault’s perception and psychological 
state as he commits the act, but the violence itself is understated; the Arab man’s death is 
immediate after the first gunshot, there is no screaming or blood, and the bullets that 
follow sink into the “lifeless body […] without leaving a mark” (60). This event has a 
violent build-up beginning with Raymond’s rough treatment of his mistress, leading to the 
fight with the Arabs on the beach in which Raymond is cut by a knife (55). Camus uses 
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violence to highlight the absurd rather than to criticise violence in itself; Brosman observes 
that “Meursault had no murderous intentions whatsoever and did not wish to be involved 
in Raymond’s quarrel with the Arabs, but, small incidents leading to others, finally a man 
dies, and the chain of consequences is irreversible” (154). The second half of the novel 
concerns the violence of the state toward Meursault, who is sentenced to death for the 
murder of the Arab; in keeping with his absurdist agenda, however, “Camus makes it clear 
that it is Meursault’s attitude, not the act itself, that entails the maximum sentence” (154). 
Like Sartre’s use of violent content in Nausea, Camus includes bloodshed to illustrate 
existential ideas.  
Graphic and brutal violence features far more prominently in American Psycho and Fight 
Club than in Nausea and The Outsider, and this content has given each of these 
contemporary texts a degree of notoriety. In his discussion of Fincher’s cinematic 
adaptation of Palahniuk’s novel, Henry Giroux says “Fight Club functions less as a critique 
of capitalism than as a defence of authoritarian masculinity wedded to the immediacy of 
pleasure sustained through violence and abuse” (15), a sentiment similar to the National 
Organisation for Women’s verdict on Ellis’ novel: “the publication of American Psycho is 
socially irresponsible and legitimises inhuman and savage violence masquerading as 
sexuality” (qtd. in Freccero 50). These responses, which, admittedly, are among the most 
unsympathetic, draw on a subjective moral standard to judge whether the violence of each 
book is “socially responsible”, and not surprisingly, given the narrowness of this critical 
approach, find them lacking. Alternatively, I argue that this controversial component arises 
necessarily from the existential framework of each novel. I have already suggested that 
Ellis and Palahniuk link violence, thematically, with authenticity, the eruption of repressed 
primal instincts, and a fascination with the contrast of life and death, and these ideas are 
clarified by engaging the texts through the framework of Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir’s 
theories of existential sadism. I argue that the existential implications of the violent content 
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of these texts reflect the concerns of the historical and social context in which they were 
written, such as the gender politics of the crisis of masculinity and the desensitisation of 
violence within a culture of excess. In this way the existential crisis of individual characters 
is extended to wider American society, deepening the social satire that animates each 
novel. 
 
In his article “Muscular Existentialism in Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club”, Andrew Ng 
touches briefly on Sartre’s theory of sadism as a way of understanding the narrator’s 
engagement with violence as “existential sadism” (119). Sartre discusses sadism within a 
section of Being and Nothingness regarding the difficulty of knowing and, in turn, being 
recognised by “the Other”. He suggests this alienation affects human sexuality, because “I 
desire him (or her) as he is” but just as “he is an Other for me” so “I am an Other for 
him” (406).  Sartre views sadism as “an effort to incarnate the Other through violence”, 
and the sadist as someone who “wants to make [the Other’s consciousness] present by 
treating the Other as an instrument [so that] he makes it present in pain” (421). This is an 
attempt, by the sadist, to appropriate the Other’s freedom through the flesh. This attempt 
is ultimately a “blind alley”, however, doomed to fail, as the sadist refuses his own flesh by 
reducing himself to “an instrument for giving pain”, and thus his grasp of the Other’s 
freedom is but an “illusion” (421). The sadist does not therefore obtain transcendence; 
instead, Sartre concludes, the body of the Other “is there, and it is there for nothing” (426).  
Ng relates sadism to the narrator’s appropriation of the suffering of the flesh he 
relishes during his time as a “tourist” in the support groups (Fight Club 24), though a 
number of other incidents in the novel also suggest a form of “existential sadism” (Ng 
119). Sartre maintains that the sadist enjoys mounting resistance on the freedom of the 
Other, forcing “this freedom freely to identify itself with the tortured flesh” (Being and 
Nothingness 425). Thus, the sadist feels pleasure and empowerment by positioning himself 
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as “the cause” of the moment when the Other determines that the pain has become 
unbearable by crying out or begging for mercy (425). This moment of abjection is “a 
spontaneous production, a response to a situation; it manifests human-reality” (425). This 
logic is apparent in fight club, where the “third rule” is that “when someone says stop, or 
goes limp, even if he’s just faking it, the fight is over” (Fight Club 49). In the passage where 
the narrator fights a young man with an “angel’s face” he is “in the mood to destroy 
something beautiful” (122). He attempts to bludgeon the man’s flesh and freedom as a way 
of releasing his anger at the world and simulating empowerment, but the next day he still 
feels “like crap and not relaxed at all. I didn’t get any kind of buzz” (123). He has reached 
the end of the “blind alley” of fight club, having become “an instrument for giving pain”. 
In brutalising the Other until “the skin was pounded thin across his cheekbones and 
turned black” the narrator reaches a point where he realises that the abject body before 
him is “there for nothing” (Fight Club 124; Being and Nothingness 426).  
Robert Taylor’s article “The SEXpressive S” (1953) comparing the treatment of sex in 
the works of Sartre and de Sade states that “Sartre expresses the unity of torturer and 
tortured throughout his works” (21). Taylor draws attention to a segment of Sartre’s essay 
Baudelaire (1947)—a discussion of the nineteenth century French poet—to elucidate this 
idea. There, reacting to a poem from The Flowers of Evil (1857) titled 
“L’Héautontimorouménos”, Sartre writes: 
Thus the tortures which he inflicted on himself simulated possession. They tended 
to make flesh—his own flesh—grow beneath his fingers so that in the very throes 
of its sufferings it would recognise that it was his flesh. To cause suffering was just 
as much a form of possession and creation as destruction. (26) 
This logic finds a clear echo in Fight Club where incarnation through violence, or the 
recognition of the flesh through pain, is likened to being “saved” (51). Palahniuk’s novel 
repackages this logic into pithy catchphrases, such as “Maybe self-destruction is the 
72 
 
answer” or “only through destroying myself can I discover the greater power of my spirit” 
(49, 110), and enacts it through symbolic scenes like the acid burn kiss in chapter nine 
which awakens the narrator to the present and mortality through pain. Baudelaire’s poem 
uses a Greek word as its title, which translates to “that which punishes itself” (Flowers of 
Evil 368), and contains the lines “I am the cheek, I am the slap / I am the limbs, I am the 
rack, / The prisoner, the torturer!” (lines 22-24). Similarly, Fight Club contains numerous 
incidents of self-harm, both overt, such as the narrator punching himself in the face to 
extort money from his boss, and those we realise retrospectively once we know Tyler and 
the narrator are the same person, such as the kiss scene, which has to have been self-
administered. Taylor sees the wielding of man’s powers of creation and destruction as an 
existential assertion that “Feeble as he is, man can thus work a personal effect upon the 
universe, and so in part rise to the station of a god” (22), an idea from Being and Nothingness 
that I have already discussed in relation to Fight Club. 
Patrick Bateman’s violence in American Psycho is overtly sadistic and far more disturbing 
than that of Fight Club because none of it is consensual. His attacks are initially directed 
against those who are radically Other to him, beginning with the homeless black man, Al, 
whose mutilation is described in a vacant monotone. Prior to the attack Patrick takes out 
some money from an automated teller, as it makes him feel “better having an even five 
hundred in my wallet” (123), and before he finds Al he is whistled at by “a couple of 
skinny faggots” and offered “crack” by some “Black guys” (123). These details suggest that 
Patrick’s attack on Al stems from anxieties over his own status, as well as a fear of 
contamination by the Other. Despite being destitute and black, and thus both a class and 
racial Other, Al is given another layer of Otherness when Patrick tells him to “stop crying 
like some sort of faggot ”  (125-26), foreshadowing the next attack on an “old queer” 
walking his dog in the park (157). Sartre states that “As for the type of incarnation which 
sadism would like to realise, this is precisely what is called Obscene”, before convolutedly 
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defining “the obscene” as a state of being “ungraceful” where the victim’s body “adopts 
postures which entirely strip it of its acts and which reveal the inertia of the flesh” (Being 
and Nothingness 421, 423). This incarnation is evident when Patrick attacks Al’s dog, 
breaking its legs so that they then stick “up in the air at an obscene, satisfying angle” (127). 
After mutilating Al, Patrick feels “heady, ravenous”, more alive, and immerses himself 
further in the Other by going to McDonalds as it is “somewhere Al would go”. This “high 
slowly dissolves’, however, and everything feels “horribly anticlimatic” (127), recalling the 
narrator’s failure to get “any kind of buzz” when he beats “angel face” in Fight Club (123). 
Patrick’s attack on Al reveals his strange mixture of fear and anger towards, fascination 
with, and repulsion for the Other, conflicted feelings also evident in his attacks on women. 
The last of these torture-mutilation-murders is also, perhaps, the most infamous, as it 
contains the appallingly imaginative rat sequence. Sartre’s ideas about the sadist’s 
appropriation of freedom are particularly evident here; Patrick “pretends to let [the girl] 
escape” to increase his pleasure on recapturing her (314), and emphasises that “no matter 
what other choice she might have made […] all this would have happened anyway. I would 
have found her. That is the way the earth works” (315). In this way he tries to make his 
possession of her freedom complete and ascribe himself a God-like omnipotence. 
However, as the death of his victim draws near, Patrick “can already tell it’s going to be a 
characteristically useless, senseless death” (316). Sartre suggests that pursuing the death of 
the Other in hatred  
implies a fundamental resignation; the for-itself abandons its claim to realise any 
union with the Other; it gives up using the Other as an instrument to recover its 
own being-in-itself. It wishes simply to rediscover a freedom without factual limits; 
that is, to get rid of its own inapprehensible being-as-object-for-the-Other and to 
abolish its dimension of alienation. This is equivalent to projecting the realization 
of a world in which the Other does not exist. (Being and Nothingness 386) 
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The suppression, or killing, of an Other, as a representative of all Others, implies an 
“explicit recognition that the Other has existed”, as well as constituting the attacker as an 
“irremediable object” and thus trapping the self in alienation. Consequently, “the triumph 
of hate is in its very upsurge transformed into failure. Hate does not enable us to get out of 
the circle. It simply represents the final attempt, the attempt of despair”, leaving the self 
with only the option of re-entering “the circle” (388). This is the pattern Patrick follows 
throughout American Psycho, a novel which itself forms a circle—what Young calls a 
“closed system” (“Beast” 93)—with its first and last lines, ending “THIS IS NOT AN 
EXIT” (384). Killing cannot help Patrick through his existential crisis. 
The works of the Marquis de Sade, whose name was appropriated to coin the term 
“sadism”, can be considered a textual precedent for the violence of Patrick Bateman, 
although Ellis claimed in 1994 “still [not to have] read much of Sade” (Amerika). The 
aforementioned rat sequence in American Psycho is described by Julian Murphet as “one of 
the more nauseating and despicable images in literature since de Sade, and seems out of 
context merely to indulge in the worst kind of misogynistic voyeurism and disgust for the 
female body” (66). De Sade’s depiction of violent sexuality, libertinism, and the 
transgressing of societal taboos in his works written toward the end of the eighteenth 
century, such as One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom and Justine, earned him an infamy not 
unlike that of Ellis in the wake of the publication of American Psycho. Of particular interest 
to this thesis is Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist treatment of de Sade in her essay “Must 
We Burn Sade?” (1951), a reading which is surprisingly sympathetic considering her 
seminal position in the canon of feminist theory and the empowerment of women and de 
Sade’s in that of purported literary misogyny. Unlike Camus’ account of de Sade, in The 
Rebel, as a precursor to the twentieth century fascist mindset, de Beauvoir’s essay—
published shortly after Camus’—finds de Sade’s merit to be the challenge he poses to his 
readers. 
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There is a strong resonance of Sartre’s theory of existential sadism in de Beauvoir’s 
reading, which finds the root of de Sade’s violent sexuality to be a reaction to his alienation 
from other people and an interest in probing the conflict between consciousness and flesh. 
She proposes that “Cut off from others, [de Sade] was haunted by their inaccessible 
presence” (34), and thus compensated “for separateness by deliberate tyranny” (22). 
Although he renounced the notion of “universal morality” and dismissed law and society 
as mere constructs of the state (48), de Beauvoir finds that de Sade engages, in his own 
extreme or “outrageous” fashion, with the difficulty of the conflicting aspirations of the 
human condition to both universality and individuality (4-5). However, in resigning himself 
to the conclusion that the Other is unknowable, and choosing crime and cruelty as the 
means of engaging, concretely, with his own individual existence, that existence “becomes 
absurd”, and in accordance with Sartre’s theory: “the tyrant who tries to assert himself by 
such violence, merely discovers his own nothingness” (63). De Beauvoir concludes that we 
must not burn de Sade because “his ability to disturb us […] forces us to re-examine 
thoroughly the basic problem which haunts our age in different forms: the true relation of 
man to man” (64).  
Ellis’ novel also disturbs us, and perhaps it does so because Patrick Bateman 
resembles, in a number of ways, the Marquis de Sade. Painfully isolated and ineffectual in 
his public life, Patrick uses graphically described sadism, indiscernible as either textual 
reality or fantasy, as a means of engaging the Other and feeling empowered in his own 
existence. De Beauvoir points out that “in his books [de Sade] invents a lot more than he 
reveals about himself” (19), and in this sense Patrick resembles de Sade the author more 
than his monstrous creations, because as Patrick is such an unreliable narrator, we are 
unable to gauge the “reality” of his testimony, just as it would be an error to conflate de 
Sade, the man, entirely with his words. De Beauvoir feels that “It was not murder that 
fulfilled Sade’s erotic nature: it was literature”, and for de Sade and Patrick the creative 
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outlet of the imagination provides the flight they both crave “from space, time, prison, the 
police, the void of absence, opaque presences, the conflicts of existence, death, life, and all 
contradictions” (33): a temporary remedy to the existential dilemma.  
De Beauvoir criticises de Sade, as an author, for failing “to confront himself” and 
instead being content “with projecting his fantasies” (37), in effect, writing self-indulgently 
rather than for his reader. As such, she describes his work as “having the unreality, the 
false precision, and the monotony of schizophrenic reveries” (37), an effect Ellis 
deliberately evokes to construct the first person account of an unreliable, and probably 
mentally ill, Sadean narrator. Like Ellis, who adopts the discourses of consumer culture to 
undermine them and reveal “the boring, mundane heart of post-war consumer capitalism” 
(Young, “Beast” 104), so too does de Sade utilise the impact of parody, which de Beauvoir 
considers his “favourite form”, in order to criticise what he perceived to be the bourgeois 
hypocrisy of his class and time (35). The following passage from de Beauvoir’s description 
of de Sade’s writing is equally applicable to Ellis’ crafting of Patrick’s monologue: 
His very form tends to disconcert us. He speaks in a monotonous, embarrassed 
tone, and we begin to get bored, when all at once the dull greyness is lit up with the 
glaring brilliance of some bitter, sardonic truth. It is then that Sade’s style, in its 
gaiety, its violence, and its arrogant rawness, proves to be that of a great writer. 
(36) 
Palahniuk’s engagement with sadism and the taboo has also been compared to that of 
de Sade. Andrew Slade notes the reoccurrence in Palahniuk’s fiction of characters who 
gain pleasure “by risking extreme pain”, thereby finding an “authentic pleasure that cannot 
be gained through the daily simulacra of pleasure packaged and sold to us” (65). In this 
way sadism becomes a means of countering the characters’ frustration with the numbing 
banality of consumer culture. Although Slade finds Palahniuk to be “a writer in the model 
of Sade”, he concludes that each author ties up his stories in fundamentally different ways. 
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While de Sade “resolves his search for greater freedom and authenticity through an 
increase of debauchery and crime”, Palahniuk uses romance and humour as a “solution to 
violence” (66). In this sense Ellis is more like de Sade than Palahniuk, for while all three 
authors take their characters to very dark and violent places, Ellis and de Sade usually leave 
them there, whereas Palahniuk endeavours to get them out. This argument can be detected 
in Fight Club in that Tyler Durden, the Sadean character, is denied redemption and 
seemingly destroyed from the narrator’s psyche in order to make way for, we assume, an 
eventual romantic reunion between the narrator and Marla. This symbolic triumph of love 
over hate, virtue over vice, is nevertheless shadowed by doubt because of the ambiguities 
Palahniuk has woven into the novel’s final chapter. 
De Beauvoir reads de Sade’s philosophy of libertinism as a radical expression of his 
individuality in the face of “stupid conformism” and “hypocritical resignation” to the 
“virtue” prescribed by the state (50). For de Sade, because “the concrete conditions under 
which individuals live are not homogenous, no universal morality is possible” (48), and for 
a man to submit to such morality is, in de Beauvoir’s existentialist terminology, to 
“renounce both his authenticity and his freedom” (50). Hence de Sade’s libertinism is a 
way of escaping the bad faith one adopts when one avoids the burden of personal 
responsibility by passively ascribing to the dominant morality of one’s society at a given 
point in time. De Beauvoir also emphasises that de Sade felt the morality of society 
represses “natural instinct, namely, the tyrannical will of the strong” and that “Laws, 
instead of correcting the primitive order of the world, only aggravate its injustice” (46).  
This is a further way of understanding the existential motivation for the violence of 
American Psycho and Fight Club: as a way of asserting oneself as an individual by rebelling 
against the absurdity and conformity necessary to the discourses of consumer capitalism 
that dominate the milieu of both novels. In this way, the characters attempt to obtain 
authenticity and freedom by unleashing the repressed “primitive order” of violence. 
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Hence, the violence becomes a form of creation through destruction as the characters try 
to rehabilitate themselves as individuals and comprehend their humanity. Alex Blazer 
suggests Patrick Bateman feels the “urge to kill” as a way of reasserting control of himself 
in the face of the “existential chasm”, and that he “kills indiscriminately in order to feel for 
himself [and] shock some feeling, any feeling, into the hollow image that constitutes his 
very psychic identity” (“Chasms”). In this way he can “force reality—humanity, the 
traumatic—to usurp, if only for a tentative moment, the reign of the ubiquitous and empty 
imaginary”. In a similar fashion, Robert Bennett responds to Giroux’s criticism of Fight 
Club “as a clarion call for legitimating dehumanising forms of violence” by pointing out 
that the narrator and Tyler Durden both “turn to violence precisely because they find it 
humanising rather than dehumanising” (69). However, as I have already demonstrated, 
with reference to Sartre’s theory of sadism, both novels portray the attempt to obtain 
individuality and humanity through violence as a venture doomed to failure and 
nothingness. 
 
A profound fear of and fascination with death underlies the existential motivation of the 
characters’ violent actions in both novels, and this paradoxical position is manifested in 
numerous instances of the denial and recognition of mortality. Marla, who claims that her 
“philosophy of life” is that “she can die at any moment” but that the “tragedy of her life is 
that she doesn’t” (108), is revealed to be a character who is, in spite of her morbidity and 
nihilistic posturing, deeply troubled by death. At various points in the novel she engages in 
suicidal or self-mutilating behaviour. She has a “collagen trust fund” kept in the freezer for 
future cosmetic operations, such as lip implants, because “As you get older, your lips pull 
inside your mouth” (91). In a scene in which the narrator helps Marla check herself for 
breast cancer, which she is worried she has, it seems that while she fears death, she is also 
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aware that it is a natural and necessary process, and that her fear is a reflection of a culture 
in which death has been made “something wrong”: 
Marla tells me how in the wild you don’t see old animals because as soon as they 
age, animals die. If they get sick or slow down, something stronger kills them. 
Animals aren’t meant to get old […] Old animals should be an unnatural 
exception. (103) 
The narrator’s pursuit of the perfect “nest” complete with all the necessary consumer 
products is his own way of trying to keep his consciousness that “nothing is static” at bay 
(44, 49), and Tyler’s intention to martyr himself (and consequentially the narrator) to the 
Project Mayhem cause is his attempt to overcome death and obtain “eternal life” (11). 
Similarly, Patrick Bateman displays a paranoid obsession with maintaining a youthful 
appearance, a reflection of the discourses of consumer culture which perpetuate a fear of 
aging by positing youthful beauty as an ideal while providing the cosmetic products 
through which the individual can attempt to attain it. Patrick’s excruciatingly detailed toilet 
routine in the chapter “Morning” demonstrates this absurdity in the extreme. Ruth Helyer 
notes that “Even [Patrick’s] shampoo is chosen for its purported ability to make him look 
younger. His fear of aging is all encompassing to the point of delirium” (736). James R. 
Giles, in a chapter devoted to Ellis’ novel in The Spaces of Violence (2006), asserts that 
“American Psycho’s male characters fear death” and that their obsession with the latest 
consumer products “represents a desperate and doomed attempt on their part to believe 
that death cannot touch them” (169). Thus, as a symptom of this fear, Patrick “tries to 
defeat death by killing women and the poor, by attempting to take control of death in 
order to manipulate it to his own ends” (163). Such acts, “rooted in a kind of absurdist 
existentialism”, constitute his attempt to “protect himself from death by killing others” 
(169). 
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For the original existentialists, death was a fundamental truth the existential hero has to 
face and accept, and thus death is symbolically connected to authenticity and reality. 
Meursault begins his narration in The Outsider by saying “Mother died today” (9), and his 
existential quest begins when he visits her dead body and ends when he realises, at the 
novel’s conclusion, that he is happy despite the imminence of his own death by hanging, 
having been sentenced to death by the state for the murder of another man.8 In 
Palahniuk’s novel, fight club provides the disaffected male characters with a medium 
through which they can engage their physicality and confront their bodily decay, 
experiencing the adrenaline rush of touching death and authenticity from a distance. As 
the novel progresses, and the characters go further and further to achieve this buzz—such 
as the deliberate car crash in chapter 18, they tempt danger until, eventually, Bob is killed 
on a Project Mayhem mission, and this intrusion of the finality of death prompts the 
narrator to try to disband the organisation.  
Tyler’s attempt to overcome death by martyring himself and gaining “eternal life” 
constitutes bad faith and the absurd in the same way as Bateman’s attempts to control 
death through murder (11). The violence of Fight Club and American Psycho can thus be read 
as a hyperbolic expression of the existential aspiration to the authenticity of death, but 
because both these endeavours are rooted in an attempt to sidestep death, and experience 
that authenticity vicariously, they are doomed to failure. Within the existentialist quest 
paradigm, the narrator of Fight Club comes close to succeeding when he, like Meursault, 
moves towards an acceptance that “We just are, and what happens just happens” (207), a 
realisation he reaches after the pseudo-death of his suicide attempt. 
 
                                               
8 This punishment is in part due to Meursault’s quiet and unemotional acceptance of his mother’s death at 
the novel’s beginning. This twist adds an extra layer of absurdity, for, as Camus states in the novel’s 1955 
afterword: “In our society any man who doesn’t cry at his mother’s funeral is liable to be condemned to 
death” (118). 
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If the violence of American Psycho and Fight Club breaks through the numbness and inertia 
of their characters’ lives and thus functions as a portal to human feeling, then the extremity 
of the violence in these novels is also a comment on the violence of pop culture in the late 
1980s and early 90s generally. In this way, these texts attempt to inject human feeling into 
our lives via the trauma of reading. In an article published in the New York Times on 
December 2nd 1990—at a time when American Psycho was written but as yet unpublished—
Ellis discusses the desensitisation of his “basically unshockable” generation, “wooed with 
visions of violence, both fictive and real, since childhood” (H1). He elaborates: 
If violence in film, literature and in some heavy-metal and rap music is so extreme 
it verges on the baroque, it may reflect the need to be terrified in a time when the 
sharpness of horror-film tricks seems blunted by repetition on the nightly news. 
But this audience isn’t horrified by the endless slaughter, which is presented within 
the context of fantasy (“Robocop,” “Total recall,” “Die-Hard 2”) and the realm of 
the everyday. (H1, H37) 
Thus, Ellis suggests that real violence and fictive violence anesthetise each other, that the 
public’s ability to distinguish between the intended emotional impact of each form has 
become blurred, and, as a result of this “culture doesn’t play the same role [for my 
generation] that it did for previous generations: to liberate, break boundaries, show the 
unshowable” (H1). In many ways this article anticipates the arrival of American Psycho, the 
extremity of which, Ellis claims, is a “metaphor” for “how desensitized our culture has 
become toward violence” (Cohen C13). The diversity of the range of positive and negative 
reactions to this metaphor, it seems Ellis did not anticipate, yet, as one commentator 
notes: “As for Ellis himself, he is getting what he called for (which is not what he wanted): 
a boundary, a barrier, a point at which people will fight back. But alas for us all that it has 
had to go so far” (Iannone 54). 
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The intertextual layers the violence of American Psycho draws upon are also a curious 
mixture of fictive and factual sources. On a textual level, Bateman’s violence draws on his 
reading of the biographies of actual serial killers, such as Ted Bundy and Son of Sam, as 
well as his knowledge of fictional killers like Leatherface from The Texas Chainsaw Massacre 
(1974) and the power drill sequence from Body Double. On a paratextual level, Ellis has 
stated that because of the difficulty he encountered in actually imagining the murders, he 
drew upon “criminology textbooks from the FBI” to create these hyper detailed sequences 
(Clarke 75). Similarly, Fight Club makes an implicit connection between the violence it 
depicts and the culture it reflects. The first fight between Tyler and the narrator—the 
inception of what will become fight club, is inspired by the westerns and cartoons of 
popular culture; the narrator hits Tyler in a “roundhouse […] like in every cowboy movie 
we’d ever seen” and Tyler responds with a punch “just like a cartoon boxing glove on a 
spring on Saturday morning cartoons” (52-53). They continue the fight because, “like the 
cat and mouse in cartoons, we were still alive and wanted to see how far we could take this 
thing and still be alive” (53). By drawing this seminal moment of violence from media 
tailored to children, Palahniuk alludes to the inherent violence of contemporary popular 
culture and its effect on a generation “raised by television” (166). Both authors use the 
violence as a mirror, and the extremity of the violence is in keeping with each novel’s 
commentary on the excesses of American culture in general. 
 
In de Sade’s libertinism, de Beauvoir sees the desperation of a “declining class” of 
aristocracy which “had once possessed concrete power, but which no longer retained any 
real hold on the world”, trying to “revive symbolically, in the privacy of the bed chamber, 
the status for which they were nostalgic: that of the lone and sovereign feudal despot”. In 
this way, the faded aristocrat could pursue the “illusion of power” through the 
“intoxication of tyranny” (8). This paradigm is mirrored in the violence of American Psycho 
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and Fight Club through Ellis and Palahniuk’s probing of the existential implications of the 
decline of patriarchy and resulting crisis of masculinity. This loss of an inherited identity 
and traditional dominance in society can be seen to fuel, in part, the existential crises of the 
narrator/Tyler Durden, and Patrick Bateman. Hence, the violence of these characters can 
be read as a radical reaction against what the novels present as a modern society in which 
masculinity has become increasingly obsolete and in which culture has become feminised; 
the characters’ hyper-masculinity can be seen as a desperate attempt to reclaim what they 
feel is their lost identity and birthright. Towards the end of their relationship Patrick’s 
exasperated girlfriend asks him what he would like to be called, and he muses, with an 
ironic detachment that, nevertheless, reveals a lot of truth: “I want you to call me King. 
But I don’t say this” (326-27). 
In his article discussing the “Crisis of Postmodern Masculinity” in American Psycho, 
Mark Storey presents Patrick Bateman’s identity as a construction drawn from a variety of 
modes of patriarchal language (“pornography, the media, fashion, commerce”) which, 
when “taken to extremes”, undermine their stability in order to show “the impossibility of 
their attempts to adapt to postmodernity” (59). In fashioning his identity from “clichéd 
masculine language”, Patrick also undermines his own subjectivity, and “the inevitable 
cracks that appear in such an artificial identity allow us to peer into the void beneath” (62). 
Storey argues that Ellis presents normative masculinity in a state of intense fear of 
subjugation, evidenced by the extreme violence Patrick directs toward any group he 
perceives as “other”, such as women, homosexuals, and ethnic minorities. This is because, 
as patriarchy declines, “the rise of the marginalised threatens his central position as 
hegemonic male” and so “to protect that position, he lashes out, attempting to eliminate 
the threat” (64). 
In the context of a modern world characterised by instability and incessant change, 
Storey suggests Patrick’s actions reveal a desperate and paranoid attempt to protect his 
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hegemony and ensure his survival by imagining “a world in which his masculine superiority 
can bring [‘perpetual change’] to a halt” (64). This idea is remarkably similar to Tyler 
Durden’s own reactionary desire to “blast the world free of history” and return society to 
its primitive origins in order to re-empower a regressive masculine identity based on 
physical prowess and violence (124). On an existential level, this fractured masculine self 
based on reactionary fear is a clear embodiment of bad faith. Furthermore, both depictions 
of this postmodern masculinity are complicated by the inclusion of an “unconscious 
feminine” in their protagonists (Storey 65), embodied in Patrick’s narcissistic obsession 
with his appearance and Fight Club’s narrator’s domestic nest building instincts. Both 
novels have also been noted for their implicit homoerotic subtexts.9 This all suggests that 
this reactionary hyper-masculinity is as much about a fear of the Other within oneself as it 
is about an external Other. 
In reaction to the condemnation of American Psycho, Anne Bernays, herself the author 
of several novels, wrote a letter to the New York Times amid the pre-publication 
controversy surrounding the novel to point out that Ellis’ “sickening” depiction of 
violence towards women is an admirable attempt to reflect a disturbing social reality: the 
“continual physical abuse women suffer at the hands of men”. Bernays quotes from FBI 
statistics to give weight to her comment: “What’s all this fuss about violence toward 
women in a novel? It’s worse in real life”. “[T]he obligation of the novelist”, she suggests, 
“is to write the world as it is, not as he or she would like it to be” (A38). Mark Storey also 
perceives a self-reflective critique in Ellis’ novel, concluding “Normative masculinity’s 
objectification and fear of women’s bodies achieves its ultimate expression in Bateman’s 
fantasy of turning women’s bodies into meat” (66). Bernays and Storey both suggest a 
feminist subtext in American Psycho, and such an undercurrent is also detectable in Fight 
                                               
9 For American Psycho see Murphet p. 82, and for Fight Club see “Fight Club’s Queer Representations” by 
Thomas Peele and “Muscular Existentialism” by Ng (120-21). In his afterword to the 2005 edition of Fight 
Club Palahniuk recalls a flight attendant who shared his theory with the author that the book was really 
“about gay men watching one another fuck in public steambaths” (216). 
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Club, a book possessing what Kavadlo describes as: “masculine embodiment but closeted 
feminist critique”. He elaborates: 
Through Palahniuk’s dramatic irony […] readers have the opportunity to feel the 
redemptive powers of feminism, love, cooperation, harmony, and story telling, by 
inhabiting worlds were they are conspicuously, even absurdly, absent. (7) 
The absence of these “redemptive powers” is even more absurd in Ellis’ novel, an aspect 
of his bleak satire that has the latent potential to affirm the reader in such powers via their 
negation. This technique is in contrast to the moral didacticism of pedagogy, a process 
undermined in both novels; consider the absurdity of Bateman’s fashion pep-talks and 
exhorting praise of banal pop music, or the descent of Tyler’s dogma and training camps 
for cultural revolution into cult-like fascism. Amidst so much collective delusion the 
subtext of each novel advocates the free thinking individual. 
This chapter began by quoting critics who responded to the violence of American Psycho 
and Fight Club disapprovingly, having taken a self-righteous position in order to react 
against what they took to be brazen misogyny and the glorification of bloodshed. The 
violent component of these novels is more complicated than that. Peter Mathews, in his 
reading of Fight Club, finds a continual concern in the novel to warn readers “not to lose 
sight of the inevitable disjunction that exists between an ideology and its material effects”, 
and that “fascist mindsets” can operate hidden throughout the political spectrum. In 
explaining the attitudes of Tyler Durden, he elaborates:  
Palahniuk shows how the transformation of a liberatory discourse into an 
ideological doxa ultimately alienates the very people it should be winning over. The 
recurring message of “thou shalt not” from progressive groups has the dangerous 
consequence of giving its opponents an inappropriate (but understandable) 
psychology of rebellion. (100) 
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This internal textual discourse can equally be applied to the condemnation American Psycho 
and Fight Club received from supposedly “progressive” critics. Judith Butler’s reading of 
“Must We Burn Sade?” suggests that de Beauvoir 
makes it clear that feminism and philosophy ought not to participate in anti-
intellectual trends, that it ought to distance itself from inquisitional practices, and 
that its intellectual task is to remain open to the difficulty and range of the human 
condition. (169) 
In addition to “feminism and philosophy” we should also add “literary criticism”, and this 
is helpful advice for the literary critic to bear in mind when engaging with material that is, 
at first, quite morally provocative. 
American Psycho and Fight Club explore the crisis of masculinity and the decline of 
patriarchy in a way that does not nostalgically suggest a return to a traditional model of 
macho male dominance in society as some reviews have suggested. Instead, they depict the 
symptoms that arise when masculinity is repressed, denied, or deemed obsolete—identity 
crisis, violence, and a misogynistic backlash against all that is feminine, prompting the 
reader to consider what the place of masculinity might be in the new millennium and how 
it might find expression. The subtext, then, is an existential quest for a new model of 
masculinity calibrated with the conditions of the modern world. By not resolving this 
quest, or resorting to didactic moralising, Ellis and Palahniuk place the onus on the reader, 
the burden of responsibility as it were, to engage in the quest for him/herself.  
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Chapter Four 
 
 The Gothic 
 
The expression of existentialism at the end of the twentieth century in American Psycho and 
Fight Club represents a significant stylistic shift from that of Sartre’s Nausea and Camus’ The 
Outsider in the mid twentieth century. As detailed in chapters one and two, while these two 
contemporary novels contain numerous close textual parallels with these “classic” 
existential novels, the influence of pop culture, satire, and postmodern twists modifies the 
ideas of the philosophy, shifting the focus towards an exploration of the symptoms of 
existential crisis instead of a linear path towards existential enlightenment or resolution. 
The graphic depiction of Sadean violence, discussed in the previous chapter, induces 
intense horror and trauma in the reader, darkening the tone of the novels as the characters 
attempt to destroy themselves, and others, as a way of redressing their anesthetised 
humanity and fragmented identities. Ellis and Palahniuk heighten these thematic concerns 
through their manipulation of the conventions and aesthetics of the Gothic.  
If we consider that, broadly speaking, the Gothic arose in the eighteenth century as a 
reaction against the Enlightenment ideals of rationalism and neo-classical order—a 
rejection of objective absolutes to instead pursue an interest in immorality, the unknown, 
and the irrational—we find a similar motivation to that of the existential movement, 
which, catalysed by a specific historical context, took subjective experience as its focus in 
order to explore how the individual can find meaning in an absurd and meaningless world 
with no absolutes. Both arose from periods of historical trauma: the terrors and 
instabilities of the French Revolution feeding into the flourishing of the Gothic in the 
Romantic period, and existentialism originating from the uncertainties of European 
fascism in the 1930s and the destruction of the Second World War. Both movements 
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typically present ontological quests that seek answers in that which is typically deemed 
negative and transgressive. 
Only a few previous studies have examined the use of the Gothic to explore 
existential concerns. In his introduction to The Gothic Imagination: Essays in Dark Romanticism 
(1974), G. R. Thompson describes certain “high Gothic” works as embodiments of the 
demonic-quest romance, in which a lonely, self-divided hero embarks on an insane 
pursuit of the Absolute. This self-destructive quest is metaphysical, mythic, 
religious, defining the hero’s dark or equivocal relationship to the universe. (2) 
He goes on to describe the Gothic in existential terms as a genre which “deals with the 
tormented condition of a creature suspended between the extremes of faith and 
scepticism, beatitude and horror, being and nothingness” (3), alluding to Sartre’s 1943 
philosophical treatise. Thompson claims that “dread”, whether “physical, psychological, or 
metaphysical” (3), is the central component of the Gothic romance, a form that attempts 
to “express a complex vision of the existential agony confronting man since the Age of 
Faith”, an “existential terror generated by a schism between a triumphantly secularised 
philosophy of evolving good and an abiding obsession with the Medieval conception of 
guilt-laden sin-ridden man” (5-6). During the Gothic protagonist’s “metaphysical” quest 
through a world which “withholds final revelation and illumination” the wonder of 
mystery and the thrill of terror are used to generate “an awful sense of the sublime in 
which sense of self is swallowed in immensity” (6, 4), a form of transcendence that aspires 
“upward toward God” (4). This reads as a precursor to the existential quest, a journey that 
begins, in Camus’ description in The Myth of Sisyphus, with man—the “alien”, “exile”, and 
“stranger”, who, within a “universe suddenly divested of lights” (4), yearns with “nostalgia 
for unity”, an “appetite for the absolute [that] illustrates the essential impulse for the 
human drama” (16). Similarly, the encounter with the Gothic sublime anticipates the 
existential confrontation with the absurdity of the void; while often presented as quite 
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terrifying experiences, both conventions instigate intimations of revelation and ontological 
meaning by disrupting normative perception.10 
Expanding on Thompson’s piece, Mark Hennelly argues, in his article “Melmoth the 
Wanderer and Gothic Existentialism” (1981), for “Gothicism as a prefiguration of modern 
existentialism” (669). Hennelly sees Charles Maturin’s Melmoth (1820) as a literary precursor 
to the tradition of later novels by Dostoyevsky, Kafka, and Conrad, in that it has a “strong 
basis in existential thought” (665). He emphasises the cathartic effects of the Gothic, its 
function being to induce “a powerful emotional response in the reader (rather than a moral 
or intellectual one)” (666), suggesting that by becoming victims in the Gothic “drama of 
terror”, and by experiencing and accepting their own “animal or emotional” side, readers 
can come closer to becoming “truly and existentially human” (666).  
Barbara Waxman’s article, “Postexistentialism in the Neo-Gothic Mode” (1992), also 
“note[s] the way existentialist themes have characterised Gothic fiction from its 
beginnings” (79), and she briefly comments upon elements of Gothic existentialism in 
Frankenstein (1818) and Dracula (1897). Her reading of Anne Rice’s Interview with the Vampire 
(1976) examines the complications of using a vampire as the protagonist who undertakes 
an existential quest, and the subsequent effects this has on the existential ideals of 
authenticity and moral responsibility. She explains that the novel’s central character, Louis, 
is torn between human ethics and the laws of his nature as a vampire. Having made love 
the project of his hope for redemption, Louis finds that love fails, and resigns himself to 
the “constraints of his nature” as a vampire (88), a position Waxman describes as 
“postextentialist”. She suggests that Rice’s “postexistentialist addendum” emphasises “the 
naiveté of the existentialist assumption that one can obtain supreme comprehension and 
shape his/her own fate” (85).  
                                               
10 Within Thompson’s collection, Robert Hume’s article “Exuberant Gloom, Existential Agony, and Heroic 
Despair: Three Varieties of Negative Romanticism” examines the existential thought of several canonical 
Gothic authors. 
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This is a thought-provoking argument, and one related to my own study, given Ellis 
and Palahniuk’s own modifications of the existential quest paradigm. I find Waxman’s 
notion of “postexistentialism” problematic and irrelevant to my own study, however, 
principally because of her application of a philosophy of human existence to the being of 
vampires. If vampires have a fixed essence, as Rice’s novel and Waxman’s article suggest, 
then, no matter how conflicted Louis may be, Sartre’s idea that “existence precedes 
essence” is inapplicable, and, along with it, a significant portion of existential thought 
which thoroughly relies on this premise; as Sartre says in “Existentialism Is a Humanism”, 
“if it is true that existence precedes essence, we can never explain our actions by reference 
to a given and immutable human nature” (emphasis added, 29). Thus, while a vampire 
might eventually have to “acknowledge [the] irreducible restrictions on his freedom”, such 
as “the compulsion to kill” (Waxman 88), for a human to do the same would, in existential 
terms, be an act of bad faith as “there is no situation that fully commits you, one way or 
the other” (Sartre 39).  
Furthermore, Sartre acknowledges in “Existentialism Is a Humanism” that there are 
always limitations imposed by an individual’s situation and historical moment on his ability 
to freely choose a project, but that within those restrictions there always remains a basis of 
choice no matter how severely limited. Sartre tells the story of the range of choices facing 
one of his students during the Nazi occupation of France to demonstrate that “You are 
free, so choose” (33). Camus also acknowledges the limitations of choice, freedom, and 
responsibility; for example, he chooses Sisyphus as the quintessential absurd hero because 
he perseveres rather than despairs in the monotonous repetition of his existence. Thus, I 
find that neither Sartre nor Camus demonstrates the “naiveté” of what Waxman calls the 
“existentialist assumption that one can obtain supreme comprehension” over fate (85). 
Her article inadvertently highlights the dangers of conflating the fantasy realm of the 
Gothic too closely with existential thought. 
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In her article on existentialism in Ellis’ debut, Less Than Zero, Nicki Sahlin briefly notes 
Ellis’ use of a Gothic aesthetic to give an “air of menace” to his depiction of Los Angeles, 
evoking a sense of “destruction or disaster constantly on the horizon” (26). This 
Gothicised geographic environment contributes a claustrophobic “threat of entrapment” 
and “dread” to Clay’s existential crisis, and she observes the appearance of the “familiar 
Gothic element” of “live burial” in Clay’s nightmares (27). She suggests that the novel’s 
frequent references to “darkness” and “disappearing” derive from Clay’s confrontation 
with nothingness, which is symbolic of his fear of death as a state of absolute nonbeing 
(27). However, while Sahlin concludes that “the real horror for Clay is not Gothic […] but 
existential” (27), she avoids probing further as to why Ellis chose to use the Gothic to 
convey the existential and how this combination works. In this study, my intention is not 
to suggest that the Gothic and existentialism are the same, but to consider why the 
expression of existential thought has taken a Gothic turn in American Psycho and Fight Club. 
The existential crisis suffered by Nausea’s Roquentin pushes him to the brink of mental 
illness and psychosis, distancing him from normative reality and causing his autonomous 
self to come under the threat of dissolution within his experience of Nausea, a state of 
heightened contingency within which Sartre uses a dream-like surrealist aesthetic to evoke 
the somewhat menacing nature of a world overflowing with existents. Nevertheless, 
Roquentin’s subjectivity is not fragmented or divided, and, in lieu of an inherent, essential 
identity, he realises a sense of himself as the originator of meaning, musing “when it comes 
to thought, it is I who continue it […] I exist by what I think” (145), thus embodying 
Sartre’s “existence precedes essence” maxim, an idea clarified in “Existentialism Is a 
Humanism” in which he states “man is nothing other than what he makes of himself” (22). 
In American Psycho and Fight Club this existential quest towards personal responsibility and 
the formation of one’s own “essence” is complicated by the use of the Gothic double 
which adds an extra dimension to the existential ideas of authenticity, bad faith, and moral 
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choice. Despite traces of surrealist imagery reminiscent of Nausea in Ellis’ novel, as two 
contemporary existential novels, American Psycho and Fight Club shift the expression of the 
philosophy towards a Gothic aesthetic in order to evoke the fears and uncertainties of the 
postmodern condition. 
Both American Psycho and Fight Club have already been examined as Gothic texts. Ruth 
Helyer’s article “Parodied to Death: The Postmodern Gothic of American Psycho” aptly 
summaries Ellis’ use of the capabilities of a Gothic “iconography [to give] expression to 
the repressed desires of the unconscious” (727). She examines the novel’s use of Gothic 
motifs and themes, and notes that they are often used in an ironic and self-consciously 
postmodern way that borders on comic melodrama and parody, such as Patrick’s line: “I’m 
running […] screaming like a banshee, my coat open, flying out behind me like some sort 
of cape” (160). Her analysis of Patrick as a character who traverses, either literally or 
imaginatively, the boundaries of acceptable social behaviour emphasises the novel’s 
concern with the fear of the Other (in terms of rich and poor, male and female, hetero- 
and homosexual), in the tradition of nineteenth-century Gothic classics like Dracula, Dr 
Jekyll & Mr. Hyde (1886), and The Picture of Dorian Gray (1881). In her article “I Am Marla’s 
Monstrous Wound: Fight Club and The Gothic”, Cynthia Kuhn asserts that Palahniuk’s 
novel 
offers a veritable catalogue of Gothic conventions: decrepit mansion, mysterious 
stranger, ancestral curse, clandestine behaviour, raging madness, eerie doubling, 
astonishing grotesqueries, and unavoidable monsters. (36) 
Kuhn proposes that Palahniuk uses the Gothic to suggest that “to be a consumer is to be 
consumed” (39), noting the way Project Mayhem recycles human organic material into 
commodities. This raises a striking parallel to the way Patrick’s obsession with consuming 
and possessing that which is scarce or unobtainable leads to his consumption of human 
bodies and the taking of life. 
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The Gothic trope of the double, or doppelgänger, traditionally represents a divide 
between the rational and passionate self, the civilised and the primitive, the human and the 
monstrous. In The Modern Gothic and Literary Doubles (2003), Linda Dryden writes: 
If the traditional tale of Gothic horror tends to explore and expose our fear of 
agents outside ourselves and their capacity to harm us, then the fiction of duality 
usually reverses that anxiety, turning it upon ourselves to explore our horror of 
what we might be capable of. (38) 
This summary, of an inner anxiety without an external object as the source of fear, calls to 
mind the “metaphysical fear” of existential angst, and it is from this fear that the split in 
the subject occurs in American Psycho and Fight Club, two novels in which duality and 
internal struggle are central concerns. 
Consider the name of each novel as an indicator of the duality within. In Palahniuk’s 
title “Fight”, denoting the breakdown of communication and a shift toward hostility and 
violence, is paired with “Club”, evoking a community wherein individuals bond over a 
common interest and support one another; the novel itself shows how such an ostensible 
oxymoron can be reconciled. In Ellis’ title, “American”, which carries a vast array of 
different connotations internationally but for the citizens of the United States conjures 
freedom, patriotism, and the ideals of the  country’s constitution, is paired with “Psycho”, 
which brings to mind Hitchcock’s 1960 film, Psycho, as well as the cultural phenomena of 
pathologically violent psychopaths generally. Patrick Bateman, who as a handsome and 
successful Wall Street banker is outwardly the embodiment of the American Dream, 
demonstrates how this duality can be present in a single individual, as in his private life he 
is, or at least aspires to be, a murderous and sadistic psychopath, his name being a nod to 
Psycho’s villain Norman Bates (Storey 72 n3). This schism between a character’s public and 
private personas is even more overt in Fight Club, where the narrator unwittingly unleashes 
an alter-ego to do the bidding of his repressed desires. In both novels, identity is a 
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fragmented and constantly shifting realm of subjectivity which draws on the Gothic trope 
of the double, and in particular, its use in two modern Gothic works from the late 
nineteenth century: The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde by Robert Louis Stevenson, 
and, to a lesser degree, The Picture of Dorian Gray by Oscar Wilde. 
In contrast to its earlier forms, the modern Gothic moves the geographical location of 
its scenes of horror from remote regions, from the traditional Gothic landscape of the 
isolated castle and ominous wilderness, to the contemporary urban environment: the 
labyrinth of streets and buildings that make up the modern city (Dryden 16). Social 
deprivation is particularly evident in this new setting, and the Gothic city becomes a 
“schismatic space that contains extremes of wealth and poverty, and where the poor are 
exploited by the rich, who are in turn deeply concerned by the anonymous and threatening 
nature of the metropolitan experience” (16). This concern reflects developments in 
literature at the time, such as the move from the general moral optimism of the realist 
movement to the pessimism of the “new” realist style, and the unflinching depictions of 
sordid poverty and precarious survival in the works of naturalists like Emile Zola. 
Naturalism was influenced by the dissemination of Darwinian evolutionary theory and the 
purported moral chaos and spiritual crisis of an increasingly secular world (5-6); the 
movement’s unsentimental portrayal of humanity led critic W. S. Lilley to comment in 
1885 that naturalism “eliminates from man all but the ape and the tiger” (qtd. in Dryden 
7). 
In the public imagination city life was linked with degeneracy and the possibility of 
devolution, a fear that mankind might revert to a primitive state of being. This is evident in 
the naturalists’ interest in man’s “beast within”, the animal nature that underlies the 
ostensibly rational and moral individual (Dryden 9-10). In the prologue to his 
philosophical novel Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-85) Nietzsche suggests that evolution is in 
constant fluctuation, noting  the possibility of a lapse back to man’s bestial origins: “You 
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have made your way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. Once you were 
apes, and even now man is more of an ape than any ape” (256). Gothic depictions of the 
primitive Other embody these fears, such as the unholy vampire in Bram Stoker’s Dracula 
who poses the threat of a corrupting alien force to the civility and moral advancement of 
the Empire. The ominous aesthetic of the modern Gothic’s labyrinthine urban 
environment and representations of social degeneracy resonate throughout American Psycho 
and Fight Club, but of particular interest to this thesis is the genre’s use of Gothic 
conventions to convey the repression and eruption of unrestrained hedonism. Dracula uses 
a Gothic monster to connect the fear of the primitive with sexuality and violence, but in 
the famous novellas Stevenson and Wilde wrote at this time this concern is conveyed using 
the Gothic motif of “the double”. 
In 1885 the Pall Mall Gazette ran a series of articles by W. T. Stead which vividly 
detailed the presence of child prostitution in the East End of London. Titled “The Maiden 
Tribute of Modern Babylon”, the coverage scandalised the public, exposing, as it did, the 
dual nature of the city with its extremes of poverty and wealth and the apparent 
exploitation of the poor by the rich, evident in its claim “that the demand for child 
prostitutes […] was being stimulated by the sadistic tastes of a corrupt and callous class of 
well-to-do Victorian gentlemen” (Clemens 123). Stevenson had been mailed the first three 
of Stead’s articles by a friend, and he wrote Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde in the wake of the moral 
panic that followed their release (Clemens 123). First published in January 1886, 
Stevenson’s novella stresses the duplicity and moral degeneracy of the upper classes by 
relating the story of Dr Jekyll, a reputable gentleman who becomes disillusioned by the 
hypocrisy of his double life as a public figure of charitable benevolence while hiding a 
private life of secret pleasures and forbidden sins. By chemical experimentation, Jekyll 
manages to split his self into two, transforming himself into the brutish Mr Hyde in order 
to indulge his baser desires unfettered by his social standing and moral conscience. Jekyll 
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gradually loses his ability to control Hyde, and the story culminates in suicide, Jekyll ending 
his own life along with that of his doppelgänger. 
The doubling motif is used in Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde to explore the workings of 
repression and the unconscious mind, anticipating, in many ways, the developments in 
modern psychoanalytical theory by Freud and Jung. In her article on Stevenson’s novella in 
her study of Gothic literature, Return of the Repressed (1999), Valdine Clemens states that 
Hyde is not only the “shadow self” of Jekyll, but also of “Victorian society in general” as 
he “embodies and exposes this society’s moral deficiencies” (129), such as the self-
righteous repression of sexuality and the moral hypocrisy of blind faith in man’s upward 
progress amidst the chronic poverty and proliferation of crime and prostitution in the 
slums of industrial Britain. She points out the textual parallels between Stead’s account of 
“the sadistic strain of upper-class male sexuality” in his “Maiden Tribute” articles and 
Jekyll/Hyde’s nocturnal pleasures (136-37); Stevenson’s depiction hints at, but never 
discloses, the true nature of these “undignified” acts (Jekyll 66).  
The spectre of poverty and the duality of East/West London returned to the forefront 
of the public consciousness in 1888, with the Whitechapel murders in London’s East End 
and the subsequent media sensation of “Jack the Ripper”. These events, in which five 
“canonical victims”—all women prostitutes—were murdered and gruesomely mutilated by 
an unknown killer over the course of two months (Warwick xiv-xvi), terrified the public, 
and were frequently reported in the press with reference to Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, a stage 
adaption of which was being performed at the time (Dryden 81-82). Hence, as Linda 
Dryden points out, horrific events in the real city of London were now being framed by 
the fictional narrative and Gothicised urban milieu of Stevenson’s novella, an imagined city 
that was itself inspired by real events and social concerns, such as the “Maiden Tribute” 
scandal (52). Speculation over the identity of the mysterious “Jack the Ripper” raised 
numerous diverse suspects, from Malays and Jews (Dryden 47, 143), to doctors and 
97 
 
butchers, working class thugs and depraved aristocrats (Bloom, “Ripper” 101), the killer’s 
media persona encompassing a duality of its own. 
The depravity, hypocrisy, and vices of the upper classes feature prominently in Oscar 
Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, which was serialised in 1890 before being revised and 
published in its final form in 1891. A number of parallels can be drawn between Dorian 
Gray and American Psycho, such as the fascination with an outer perfection that acts as a 
disguise for inner corruption. The anti-hero protagonists of both novels are gripped by 
narcissism and an intense fear of aging. Patrick Bateman’s tireless and tedious attention to 
material details, such as expensive designer clothes and objects, recalls the interest in 
luxurious possessions, aesthetic perfection, and surface artificiality within the Decadent 
movement, a style which is “infused” throughout Wilde’s novel (Dryden 114). The most 
pertinent aspect of Wilde’s novel to this study, however, is his use of the Gothic double to 
explore the anxieties and dualities of the fin de siècle. 
 
In her article “Parodied to Death”, Ruth Helyer suggests that “Classic Gothic Doubles, 
such as Jekyll and Hyde […] continue in the postmodern Gothic, showing Patrick to be, at 
the same time, both wealthy executive and brutal killer, seemingly ‘charming’ date and 
sexual partner from Hell, one of the boys and rampant homophobic” (740). She suggests 
this duality, along with the novel’s reoccurring motif of mistaken identity—which 
frequently sees Patrick responding “as if he were that person” when he is addressed by the 
wrong name, produces an “unnerving, multifaceted identity” (740). However, Helyer’s 
article fails to take into account the unreliability of Patrick’s narration; she interprets “the 
feeling of Patrick making his own re-make of a film” as evidence that he feels he can 
behave as he likes because he experiences life as an “act” in which he is an actor, and, 
therefore, he is able to suppress his moral conscience in order to carry out despicable 
actions (744). Instead, if we follow Elizabeth Young in remaining open to the possibility 
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that the cinematic imagery in the novel demonstrates not only metaphorical artificiality (the 
narrator’s perception of the world as somehow unreal or surface-like), but also as evidence 
of the literal artifice of the novel itself (fashioned, as it is, from the solipsism of our 
unreliable narrator’s imagination), then we can come to understand that Patrick’s Gothic 
double really lies in the discrepancy between how he views himself and how others view 
him.  
Patrick would have us believe that he is an object of admiration, that several women 
and men desire him or are in love with him, that he has the respect of his peers, and that 
he is a great success, the quintessential embodiment of the American Dream. As well as 
this, Patrick would have us believe that he is a serial killer and a mass murderer (which 
Young points out are two very distinct criminal types which have “never been known to 
co-exist in one person” (“Beast” 115)) who tortures, rapes, mutilates, and murders multiple 
victims. This information does not fit, however, with the view others have of him, or 
indeed with his own narration as a whole, which fundamentally reveals him to be a highly 
unreliable narrator. When Patrick says he is a psychopath, confessing, as he does, on 
numerous occasions, it is almost as if he is begging others to take him seriously; the violent 
fantasies act as a vehicle through which he can simulate himself being assertive, having a 
unified sense of self, and feeling alive: a temporary alleviation of his existential crisis by 
retreating into bad faith. 
The scene which most blatantly illustrates a counter-version to his self-presentation 
occurs near the end of the novel in the chapter “New Club”, where Patrick confronts 
Harold Carnes about a confession he left on Carnes’ answering machine at the end of the 
chapter “Chase, Manhattan”, a message in which he “decides to make public what has 
been, until now, my private dementia”, and claims to have committed “thirty, forty, a 
hundred murders” (338). In “New Club”, Patrick engages Carnes in a conversation about 
the message, but Carnes mistakes him for someone else while continuing to discuss Patrick 
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Bateman, giving the reader a glimpse of Patrick seemingly unmediated, and thus 
undistorted, by his narration. In his guide to American Psycho, Julian Murphet emphasises 
the importance of this scene: “Here, in what for Patrick must be his greatest moment of 
exposure and shame, is what a first person narrator can never normally attain: a moment 
of objective self-knowledge, reached through the mistaken identity of a third person” (48). 
Carnes thinks the message was a joke, one that was “amusing” but for one “fatal flaw”: 
that Patrick is “such a bloody ass-kisser, such a brown-nosing goody-goody, that I couldn’t 
fully appreciate it” (372). When pressed, he goes on to claim that Patrick “could barely pick 
up an escort girl, let alone […] ‘chop her up’” (373). Carnes also says that Evelyn dumped 
Patrick, rather than vice versa as Patrick relates to us in the chapter “At Another New 
Restaurant” (325-29), as well as stating that he has recently had dinner in London with 
Paul Owen—Patrick’s business rival whose murder is described on pages 208-9.  Carnes’ 
claims, which Patrick fails to deny, shatter the vestiges of the self-image as a notorious 
villain that Patrick has been constructing for the reader during the course of the novel. 
Murphet suggests that Patrick’s “virtual concession as narrator of everything Carnes has 
said” results in a “collapse of his entire narrative construction” (49), leaving us with the 
possibility that Patrick has only fantasised about being a Mr Hyde or a Dorian Gray, 
weaving his delusions of grandeur and moral debauchery into the textual fabric of the 
novel. In existential terms, by imaginatively constructing an “essence” at odds with his 
“existence”, Patrick has made his life absurd, and throughout the novel he has been 
shirking the burden of responsibility and freedom by living in bad faith instead of pursuing 
the existential ideal of authenticity. 
The use of the double in Fight Club follows the traditional Gothic convention more 
closely than American Psycho. As we have seen, the use of first person perspective in 
American Psycho complicates the double motif, and it is in moments of “objective self-
knowledge” that the schism between Patrick’s narration and our tenuous grasp of the 
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novel’s reality is revealed (Murphet 48). Marla performs a similar function for the narrator 
of Fight Club as Carnes does for Patrick. Marla is in a sexual relationship with Tyler, but she 
sees Tyler and the narrator as the same person rather than as separate personalities 
inhabiting the same body at different times. Thus, the narrator, who wonders “if Tyler and 
Marla are the same person” because he never sees them together (65), is as puzzled by 
Marla’s attachment to him as she is by his indifference to her. Tyler forbids the narrator to 
talk to Marla about him, a form of the Gothic “unspeakable” or “inexpressible 
predicament” (Kuhn 40), which traps the narrator in this love triangle under the 
oppressive power of his double.  
Tyler Durden enters the narrative, and is first understood by the reader (and the 
narrator) to be a separate person to the narrative voice, just as in Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde the 
reader and the characters engaged in solving the mystery first believe Hyde to be a separate 
person to Jekyll. In Fight Club, the mystery is unravelled as the narrator gradually realises 
that he and Tyler are the same person, culminating in Tyler’s visit to the narrator’s bedside 
to tell him “We’re not two separate men” (167). Tyler’s presence here recalls the traditional 
Gothic incubus as well as the representation of Hyde in Utterson’s nightmare as “a figure 
to whom power was given, and even at that dead hour he must rise and do its bidding” 
(13). Palahniuk’s use of the double actually follows Utterson’s understanding of 
Jekyll/Hyde’s relationship in this dream sequence more than the chemical transformation 
device—which combines, like Shelley’s Frankenstein, the Gothic and modern science—that 
Stevenson uses to explain the uncanny.  
Tyler takes over the narrator’s body when the narrator falls asleep; the body then 
wakes as Tyler who rises to work his mischief. This duality is hinted at early on in the 
novel when the narrator comments: “Because of his nature, Tyler could only work night 
jobs […] Some people are night people. Some people are day people. I could only work a 
day job” (25). The split resulting in the doppelgänger is psychological, rather than chemical 
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as it is in Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde; the narrator attempts to wrestle control back from Tyler by 
engaging his reason, thinking “Oh, this is bullshit. This is a dream. Tyler is a projection. 
He’s a dissociative personality disorder. A psychogenic fugue state. Tyler Durden is my 
hallucination”, to which Tyler responds “Fuck that shit […] Maybe you’re my 
schizophrenic hallucination” (168). Regardless of the medical explanation for the double, 
its source in Fight Club is still the same as it is in Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and American Psycho: 
repression. 
For Jekyll, his double allows him to vicariously indulge his baser instincts free from the 
repression of Victorian civility in the hope that “the unjust might go his way, delivered 
from the aspirations and remorse of his upright twin; and the just could walk steadfastly 
and secure, on his upward path” (61). Jekyll’s folly is to think that he can banish his darker 
side by distancing himself from it, when in fact, this approach only gives “the unjust” 
greater power. The novella’s characters explicitly associate Hyde with evil and the 
primitive; he is described by Utterson as being “hardly human” and “troglodytic”, as well 
as having “Satan’s signature” upon his face (16). Stevenson, frustrated that his novella was 
being interpreted as a warning against the dangers of sexuality itself, clarified that “The 
hypocrite let out the beast Hyde—who is no more sensual than another, but who is the 
essence of cruelty and malice, and selfishness and cowardice: and these are the diabolic in 
man” (qtd. in Clemens 130). Clemens suggests that the reason the story was “so disturbing 
and yet fascinating” for its Victorian readership stemmed from the repression and 
hypocrisy of Victorian society in general (Clemens 130). 
For the narrator of Fight Club, his double has a higher intention; Tyler has a political 
and moral motive for existential awakening, a quest which indulges in amoral behaviour 
along the way, but which does not have depravity or evil as its purpose. Andrew Ng 
understands Tyler as “the Narrator’s desire to surpass his existential limitation and to 
transform his being”; hence, the Gothic convention of the double “effectively captures the 
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existential dilemma experienced by the Narrator, whose symptoms of malaise and 
redundancy necessarily provoke a reconstitution of being in the form of an alter ego” 
(“Muscular Existentialism” 117-18). Ng suggests that by appropriating the Gothic double 
for the expression of existentialism, Palahniuk shifts the split inherent in the internal 
struggle from the traditional good/evil binary towards a division demonstrating Sartre’s 
notions of being-in-itself contending with being-for-itself (124). Put simply, being-in-itself 
is the existence of objects or “things”, the stable existence of unconscious beings, whereas 
being-for-itself is purposive and conscious, exhibiting self-awareness and self-reflection 
(Detmer 64). Sartre suggests that human beings vacillate between these two states, 
sometimes desiring both at the same time (Detmer 128). This contradictory desire for 
being-in-itself-for-itself stems from a yearning for self-contained completion, a fixed 
essence, an absolute state of stability and perfection that Sartre equates to a desire to be 
God (Detmer 128). This desire for being-in-itself-for-itself is rooted in bad faith and 
doomed to failure, however, because the being sought negates the freedom of the seeker 
who pursues a fixed essence. In Fight Club, the narrator’s static existence at the start of the 
novel, characterised by powerless inertia and bad faith as a “tourist” in the support group 
meetings (24), is transformed by the appearance of Tyler, who instigates the project of 
being-for-itself and transcendence. However, as I have already discussed in chapter two, 
Tyler increasingly pursues a project of being-in-itself-for-itself, a doomed enterprise that 
propels the novel towards its violent climax. 
In Stevenson’s novella, atavism is seen as something to be feared, whereas in Tyler’s 
philosophy it is a goal; his desire to return man to his hunter-gatherer roots is intended to 
instigate a more authentic existence amidst the meaningless absurdity of postmodern life. 
Tyler’s hyper-masculine physicality and sexual vitality present traces of the Victorian fear 
of the “beast within”, but in such a way that the beast becomes, at least for a while, 
compelling; Tyler is charming and attractive in contrast to Hyde, whose atavism causes 
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people to feel repelled by him. Nevertheless, Fight Club, like Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, suggests 
that to deny or ignore man’s primitive origins and the remnants of those instincts in 
modern man in the hope that they might go away is to run the risk of blindly stumbling, as 
the narrator/Tyler do, into the extremes of fascism when repressed emotion takes on a life 
of its own. 
American Psycho also contains this warning. Patrick counterbalances his feelings of 
disempowerment by styling himself as a modern day Ripper; his repressed “will to 
power”—to use Nietzsche’s term—finding extreme expression. Patrick’s crimes mirror 
those of Jack the Ripper in several respects, such as his sexually motivated indulgence in 
mutilation and the occasional removal of his victim’s body parts. Like the Ripper, several 
of Patrick’s victims are vulnerable prostitutes, and just as the Ripper was understood as an 
allegory for East/West London duality and the endemic poverty inflicted by the systematic 
exploitation of the poor by the rich, so too have several critics understood Patrick’s 
murderous intentions as symbolic of the wider effects of capitalism and the attacks by the 
State on those vulnerable in American society. Both Julian Murphet and John Conley 
discuss the novel in relation to the historical context of “rampant gentrification” and 
“Class War” occurring in Manhattan during the time Ellis was writing (Murphet 59-60; 
Conley 126-27). Conley, in his article “The Poverty of Bret Easton Ellis” (2009), argues 
that Ellis is “first and foremost a writer of capitalism, which is to say, he is first and 
foremost a writer of poverty” (119). As Murphet suggests, on an “allegorical” level, Patrick 
Bateman’s acts of violence “do happen” because “the new ruling class of Reagan’s America 
was inflicting all kinds of violence on workers, homeless people, ethnic minorities and 
women, in effect much worse than the lurid and rococo violence of Bateman’s discourse” 
(54).  
The existential crisis arising from Patrick’s duality is symbolic of a larger crisis in 
American national identity. In the last chapter of the novel Patrick is drinking and 
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watching television with several of his yuppie pals in a bar called “Harry’s” when “scenes 
from President Bush’s inauguration” are shown along with “a speech from former 
president Reagan”, leading to what Patrick describes as a “tiresome debate” over whether 
Reagan is “lying or not” (381, 382). The mysterious Tim Price, who Patrick describes in 
the first chapter of the novel as “the only interesting person I know” (21), tries to stir up 
some indignation over the discrepancy between Reagan’s appearance and what is “inside” 
him, between rhetoric and reality, saying “How can he lie like that? How can he pull that 
shit? […] I don’t believe it. He looks so…normal. He seems so…out of it. 
So…undangerous”, to which McDermot responds “He is totally harmless […] Was totally 
harmless. Just like you are totally harmless. But he did do all that shit” (381-82).  
Murphet, who describes this scene as “as close as the novel gets to a genuine political 
discussion”, interprets the “shit” being discussed as a reference to Reagan’s involvement in 
the Iran-Contra affair, whereby Reagan becomes like “the ‘psycho’ of the novel’s title, 
selling arms to Iran to back genocide in Nicaragua” (54). While the others are not 
interested in political debate, Price presses his point, saying “I don’t get how someone, 
anyone, can appear that way yet be involved in such total shit […] He presents himself as a 
harmless old codger. But inside…” (382). This creates an interesting parallel with Patrick 
himself, whose external appearance hides a psychotic internal life. Patrick’s interest in the 
conversation “flickers briefly”, but when Price “can’t finish his sentence, can’t find the last 
two words he needs”, Patrick finishes it for him, musing that what is inside “doesn’t matter” 
(382); the façade has taken the place of truth, recalling Patrick’s earlier comment that 
“Surface, surface, surface was all that anyone found meaning in…this was civilization as I 
saw it, colossal and jagged” (360). Patrick does not allow himself to feel the hypocrisy that 
drives Jekyll to suicide; he fails to confront, what Jekyll calls, “the horror of my other self” 
(76). This scene at the end of American Psycho suggests that America itself is also incapable 
of such self-reflection. 
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Whether embodied by Mr Hyde and Jack the Ripper, or Tyler Durden and Patrick 
Bateman in the postmodern moment, the Victorian notion of the “beast within” engages 
with societal fears of the primitive other by personifying atavism in a single figure while 
sub-textually probing the civility of society as a whole. Ellis and Palahniuk use the Gothic 
double to express the duality of the civilised and the barbaric in the postmodern subject. 
Their characters represent both the Gothic hero on an “insane pursuit of the Absolute” 
(Thompson 2) as well as the Gothic monster. The use of the double in American Psycho and 
Fight Club complicates the characters’ existential crisis, presenting another obstacle on the 
path to a unified and authentic sense of self, and another temptation to retreat into bad 
faith. Berthold Schoene writes that “there are no characters in American Psycho who are not 
primarily reflections or imaginary extensions of Patrick’s self”, the novel being populated 
by “a long series of doppelgängers” (382). Thus, he views Patrick’s violence as an attempt 
to murder “the parts of himself that he loathes the most” and  a “desperate battle for the 
self” (383)—a Gothic struggle that recalls the suicides of Dr Jekyll and Dorian Gray, both 
attempts to escape the horrifying monster of their duality through death. This echo is even 
more explicit in Fight Club where the relationship of the narrator and Tyler is initially 
mutually beneficial before deteriorating to the point where the narrator attempts to 
commit suicide in order to destroy Tyler—just as Jekyll and Hyde start off in harmony and 
end up in conflict. In a significant twist on the Gothic convention, the narrator of Fight 
Club somehow manages to survive. In avoiding the finality of death the narrator’s 
existential quest for meaning continues, but it also leaves him in a state of uncertainty as to 
whether his doppelgänger has really been banished from his psyche after all. 
 
In Ellis and Palahniuk’s texts a notable departure from their modern Gothic antecedents is 
the graphic depiction of material that, in Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and Dorian Gray, is mostly 
“unspeakable”. We are never quite sure exactly what nefarious activities Jekyll/Hyde and 
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Dorian have been indulging in under the guise of their doubleness, activating the powers 
of the reader’s imagination to fill these unsettling gaps. Jekyll is a “secret sinner” who 
conceals his “undignified” “pleasures” “with an almost morbid sense of shame” (72, 66, 
60). Once his double has freed him from moral constraints these “pleasures” begin “to 
turn toward the monstrous”, plunging Jekyll “into a kind of wonder at [his] vicarious 
depravity” (66). While he can hint at these actions, such as his disturbing description of 
Hyde “drinking pleasure with bestial avidity from any degree of torture to another; 
relentless like a man of stone”, he will not discuss any particulars: “Into the details of the 
infamy at which I thus connived (for even now I can scarce grant that I committed it) I 
have no design of entering” (66).  
Similarly, when Basil Hallward confronts Dorian about his infamous reputation, saying 
“I think it right that you should know that the most dreadful things are being said against 
you in London” (Wilde 126), he nevertheless cannot bring himself to voice the details. The 
things Hallward has heard but cannot reiterate are tantalisingly alluded to, but not 
disclosed to the reader; we do not know what “horrible” story Lord Staveley tells Hallward 
“before everybody” at a dinner party, prompting Hallward to ask Dorian “Why is your 
friendship so fateful to young men?” (127), and we do not know how Dorian is implicated 
in the death letter of Lord Gloucester’s wife, “the most terrible confession” Hallward has 
ever read (129). The stories of Dorian “creeping at dawn out of dreadful houses and 
slinking in disguise into the foulest dens in London” hint at the sexual nature of his 
depravity, while withholding the final truth (128). By employing the Gothic “unspeakable”, 
Wilde makes Dorian’s corruption universal; when defending his novel against charges of 
indecency in July 1890, Wilde commented: “Each man sees his own sin in Dorian Gray. 
What Dorian Gray’s sins are no one knows. He who finds them has brought them” (qtd. 
in Dryden 3) 
107 
 
In contrast, Patrick Bateman’s “sins” are described in graphic and unrelenting detail, so 
much detail in fact, that the realism of what is being narrated is sometimes undermined. 
Indeed, Murphet comments that Patrick’s description of Paul Owen’s murder “is not the 
prose of someone hacking someone else to death in the heat of the present tense; it is the 
prose of someone lovingly contemplating the thought of hacking someone to death in the 
eternal slow-motion of pure solipsism” (45). In Fight Club, Tyler Durden and the narrator’s 
violent and grotesque behaviour is also given full expression, presenting the reader with 
descriptions of rendering soap from human body fat, ejaculating into food to be served at 
restaurants, as well as descriptions of horrific fights, such as: “the guy gets me in a full 
nelson and rams my face […] into the concrete floor until my teeth inside snap off and 
plant their jagged roots into my tongue” (199). The “unspeakable” remains a potent force 
in these novels, however, although it has been shifted to a new realm of forbidden 
knowledge. 
In The Coherence of Gothic Conventions (1980), Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick examines a variety 
of ways that the “unspeakable” can work in the Gothic novel: as a “theme” and as a device 
that implies “a range of reflections on language” (4). In relation to Melmoth the Wanderer, 
Sedgwick describes a function of the unspeakable as 
an interpersonal barrier where no barrier ought to be—language is properly just the 
medium that should flow between people, mitigating their physical and psychic 
separateness—but once that barrier has come into being, it is breached only at the 
cost of violence and deepened separateness. 
[…] 
Any dire knowledge that is shared but cannot be acknowledged to be shared—that 
is, as it were, shared separately—has the effect of rendering the people, whom it 
ought to bind together, into irrevocable doubleness. (16-17) 
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In American Psycho and Fight Club, this “dire knowledge” is existential crisis: the awareness 
of the absurd, the glimpses of the void, the vertigo of freedom, which the narrator of Fight 
Club and Patrick Bateman experience, but struggle to articulate clearly. The popularity and 
spread of the fight clubs in Palahniuk’s novel implies that the narrator’s existential despair 
with his lifestyle is endemic to his generation, the clubs providing an outlet for that 
frustration in which there is no need to speak as “what happens doesn’t happen in words” 
(199). The fighters breach the verbal boundary of their anguish “at the cost of violence”, 
the “deepened separateness” of the sadomasochistic relationship, and the “irrevocable 
doubleness” of their secret lives at the club, because “Who guys are in fight club is not 
who they are in the real world. Even if you told the kid in the copy centre that he had a 
good fight, you wouldn’t be talking to the same man” (49). The first rule of the club, “you 
don’t talk about fight club” (48), uses the unspeakable to protect the club from the “real 
world” in much the same way that Tyler protects his existence by forbidding the narrator 
from talking about him to Marla. 
Sedgwick suggests that Gothic novels “deal with things that are naturalistically difficult 
to talk about, like guilt”, but “they describe the difficulty, not in terms of resistances that 
may or may not be overcome, but in terms of an absolute, often institutional prohibition 
or imperative” (14). Even more difficult to express than “guilt”, is the idea that one finds 
the world to be meaningless and absurd, and the characters in Ellis and Palahniuk’s novels 
find this particularly difficult because the discourses of consumer culture are constantly 
bombarding them with manufactured meaning in an attempt to sell products. In the milieu 
of the books, this predicament is widely shared, but often unacknowledged. Elizabeth 
Young sees Patrick’s insanity as symptomatic of the unspeakable madness of consumerist 
society: “What drives Patrick crazy is driving us all crazy—why don’t we all just crack up 
and start screaming about brand-names and up-town pizza recipes, like he does? Thus, 
detail by detail, as if bricking up a tomb, Ellis defines Patrick’s insanity and our own place 
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within it” (“Beast” 103). In Fight Club, Tyler’s anti-consumerist message is a response to 
the narrator’s existential despair with his life at the start of the novel, a response the 
narrator unconsciously wants to say but is unable to articulate himself. Thus, his double 
allows him to overcome the unspeakable by allowing him to see its content as distinct 
from himself, repeating several times: “Tyler’s words coming out of my mouth” (98). 
Cynthia Kuhn notes, in her article on Fight Club and the Gothic, “A grip on textuality—a 
meaningful voice—eludes [the narrator]” and because of this he “turns to other speakers 
for authorship” (40). 
Patrick’s existential crisis is amplified by the frustrating and alienating effects of the 
unspeakable. During a conversation with his girlfriend Evelyn, he comments that “she 
doesn’t hear a word; nothing registers. She does not fully grasp a word I’m saying. My 
essence is eluding her” (120), an evaluation that could easily be extended to most of the 
dialogue in the novel which is characterised by its inanity and the absence of any real 
communication. Patrick is also incapable of expressing his psychotic tendencies to anyone, 
and the guilt which he feels but is unable to share fuels his insanity and despair. Patrick’s 
attempts at confession are evident throughout the book, ranging from casual comments 
about how he has “killed […] two black kids”  during a conversation with Evelyn (116), to 
the desperation with which he tries to convince Carnes of the veracity of his answering 
machine confession: “‘Now, Carnes. Listen to me. Listen very, very carefully. I-killed-Paul-
Owen-and-I-liked-it. I can’t make myself any clearer.’ My stress causes me to choke on the 
words” (373). The isolation of the unspeakable is also a contributing factor to Patrick’s 
psychotic behaviour. Sedgwick suggests that in Melmoth the privation of verbal 
communication is treated “as though language were some sort of safety valve between the 
inside and the outside which being closed off, all knowledge, even when held in common, 
becomes solitary, furtive, and explosive” (17). Patrick’s explosively violent outbursts can be 
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interpreted, on one level, as an attempt to overcome his alienation and communicate with 
the Other within the forced and terrifying intimacy of sadistic assault. 
On a metafictional level, Patrick concludes that American Psycho as a whole is a failure 
of communication, of no value to himself as narrator or for us as readers:  
there is no catharsis. I gain no deeper knowledge about myself, no new 
understanding can be extracted from my telling.  There has been no reason for me 
to tell you any of this. This confession has meant nothing …. (362)  
Ellis’  novel—which takes the form of Patrick’s “confession”—intentionally avoids 
conveying a stable sense of “being” or “reality” as a source of meaning, and instead 
attempts to evoke a sense of “nothingness”, a glimpse of the void gaping beneath the 
surface of Patrick’s postmodern existence. The reader’s slippery grasp of the novel’s 
textual reality is itself indicative of a language barrier; Sedgwick comments that “it is 
possible to discern a play of the unspeakable in the narrative structure itself of a novel that 
ostensibly comprises transcriptions of manuscripts that are always illegible at revelatory 
moments” (5). This is particularly applicable to American Psycho—an unreliable narrative 
within which we can be certain of nothing and where an unspeakable “nothingness” is 
perhaps the point, but also within Fight Club. Both novels depict struggles for a 
“meaningful voice” as the characters attempt to articulate existential crisis (Kuhn 40), and 
within the overall Gothic aesthetic of these works the “unspeakable” conveys the 
alienation and dangers of existential quest. 
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Conclusion 
 
In American Psycho and Fight Club, Ellis and Palahniuk repeatedly accentuate the void at the 
centre of a civilisation where culture is bland, community is absent, inequality is accepted, 
morality is bankrupt, and everything is “Surface, surface, surface” (American Psycho 360). 
The rich vein of existential thought in these novels is interlaced with a social critique that 
satirises the illusion that modern consumer capitalism can provide meaning for its 
adherents. The absurdity of this illusion is a central component in driving the existential 
crises of Patrick Bateman and the narrator of Fight Club. This predicament registers what 
Kelton Cobb calls, in Theology and Popular Culture (2005), “a loss of faith”: 
Not the loss of faith in God, or in transcendent reality—that loss was already 
sustained in the early twentieth century, as reported in advance by Nietzsche—but 
a second-stage loss of faith in the very things that compensated us for our loss of 
God. According to this view, our time is suffering from a loss of faith in progress 
[…] in the capacity of modernity to provide our lives with a sense of meaning, 
whether through science, art, democratic institutions, or modern master narratives 
of global harmony. And most recently, there is a gathering disillusionment with the 
promises of material consumption, with the ideology of consumerism itself. (9) 
For the existential protagonist at the end of the twentieth century, this “second-stage 
loss of faith” exacerbates the absence of an adequate extant reason for living, leading to 
the experience of absurdity, nothingness, angst, and the whole plethora of existential crisis 
symptoms evident in the fictional works of existentialism’s original proponents. Coping 
with the loss of inherent meaning was a central concern for the original existentialists, but, 
in American Psycho and Fight Club, the tone with which these continual layers of loss are 
registered is far more cynical and ironic than the inquisitive optimism and resolve to be 
found in Nausea and The Outsider.  The driving purpose of the classics of existential fiction 
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is the ontological quest of the individual; in American Psycho and Fight Club, however, this 
personal journey is destabilised by the satirical function of the existential thought. Instead, 
the individual existential crisis is used to register an unresolved general crisis in the culture 
of the milieu.  
The combination of satire and existentialism extends the social critique beyond mere 
ridicule and comedy, evident in the focus in both novels on the loss of an inherited identity 
evoked by the decline of patriarchy. American Psycho and Fight Club both explore the 
complications that arise within a milieu where traditional notions of masculinity have 
become redundant, repressed, and dangerous. The violence depicted in American Psycho and 
Fight Club is not advocated as a solution to the crisis of masculinity, rather, it is depicted as a 
hyperbolic symptom of existential crisis which demonstrates Sartre’s theory of sadism as a 
doomed attempt to engage “the other”. This violence is consistent with the satire of these 
contemporary texts, which both deride excess; thus, the violence can be understood as an 
observation on the excess of violence in our culture generally, and just as the characters 
use violence to break through their ennui, so too are the texts capable of forcing the reader 
to engage their human emotions and personal morality through the trauma of reading 
within a narrative space where human compassion is often markedly absent (Kavadlo 7). 
As self-reflective critiques of regressive hyper-masculinity, these two novels advance a 
feminist subtext that probes the relevance of masculinity in the modern world.  
The graphic violence of American Psycho and Fight Club represents a shift in the 
representation of existential crisis from that found in Nausea and The Outsider towards a 
grisly visual palette of bruises, blood, and the grotesque that draws upon the brooding 
aesthetic of the modern Gothic. More than a mere visual atmosphere, however, these 
novels use Gothic conventions to develop the existential conditions of their protagonists, 
exploring the workings of repression and duality in the postmodern subject. Ellis and 
Palahniuk complicate the path of existential quest by using the Gothic double to fragment 
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or divide their character’s sense of self, to the extent that the resolution of existential crisis, 
and the subsequent attainment of an authentic existence, is problematic or withheld 
entirely. The Gothic unspeakable is used to designate the forbidden knowledge of 
existential crisis, while amplifying the alienation the characters feel due to the difficulty of 
expressing their condition. The double and the unspeakable are also used to intensify both 
novels’ preoccupations with textual ambiguity and narrative unreliability. 
The existential thought underlying the Gothic elements of these novels also indicates 
a satirical function that, like the violent content, pushes the reader to connect with a larger 
framework of serious societal critique, to read the novels as a commentary on the bad faith 
and dualities of the late-capitalist modern era. At the same time, the introduction of the 
Gothic is concurrent with the playful approach that Ellis and Palahniuk adopt towards 
existentialism, and, as such, the Gothic performs a similar function to the postmodern 
stylistic arsenal of sardonic irony, parody, melodrama, and self-mockery, deployed within 
these texts to subvert the philosophy, mischievously experimenting with its implications 
within the realm of fiction. This helps to keep the idealism of existentialism secondary to 
the primary function of these texts, which is to be inventive works of fictional literature 
and not ontological textbooks. Existential thought is used in such a way that it is conveyed 
but not necessarily advocated to the reader, who is presented with symptoms and 
questions rather than cures and solutions. As such, the existential thought of these novels 
is more closely aligned with the feverish discontent of Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche, with 
Camus’ absurdism, and Sartre’s first foray into existential angst in Nausea, than the fully 
formed ontology of Being and Nothingness. In American Psycho and Fight Club, Ellis and 
Palahniuk repeatedly display a mistrust of discourses that tell us how to live. Instead, these 
texts uncompromisingly probe modern existence to incite free thought so that we might 
consider, for ourselves, how we want to live.  
 
114 
 
Works Cited 
Abrams, M. H. A Glossary of Literary Terms. 7th Ed. Boston, MA.: Heinle and Heinle, 1999. 
Amerika, Mark, and Alexander Laurence. “Interview with Bret Easton Ellis.” The Write 
Stuff. ALTX Online Network. 1994. 15 Apr. 2010. 
<http://www.altx.com/interviews/bret.easton.ellis.html>. 
Aronson, Ronald. Camus and Sartre. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
Barnes, Hazel E. “Sartre’s ontology: The revealing and making of being.” Cambridge 
Companion to Sartre. Ed. Christina Howells. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992. 13-38. 
Baudelaire, Charles. “L’Héautontimorouménos.” The Flowers of Evil. 1857. Trans. James 
McGowen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 154-157. 
de Beauvoir, Simone. “Must We Burn Sade?” 1951. Trans. Annette Michelson. 
Introduction. The 120 Days of Sodom and other writings. By the Marquis de Sade. 
Comp. and trans. Austryn Wainhouse and Richard Seaver. New York: Grove 
Press, 1967. 3-64. 
Bennett, Robert. “The Death of Sisyphus: Existentialist Literature and the Cultural Logic 
of Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club.” Grayson 65-80. 
Bernays, Anne. “The Violence Men Do.” Letter. New York Times 14 Dec. 1990: A38. 
The Bible. Ed. David Norton. London: Penguin Books, 2006. King James Vers. 
Blazer, Alex E. “American Psycho, Hamlet, and Existential Psychosis.” Bret Easton Ellis: 
American Psycho, Glamorama, Lunar Park. Ed. Naomi Mandel. New York: 
Continuum, 2011. 36-49. 
---. “Chasms of Reality, Aberrations of Identity: Defining the Postmodern through Bret 
Easton Ellis’s American Psycho.” Americana: The Journal of American Popular Culture 1.2 
(2002): n. pag. Web. 28 Mar. 2010. 
115 
 
Bloom, Clive. “The Ripper writing: a cream of a nightmare dream.” Warwick and Willis.  
91-109. 
Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1973. 
Brosman, Catherine Savage. Existential Fiction. Literary Topics: Volume 8. Farmington 
Hills, MI.: Gale Group, 2000. 
Butler, Judith. “Beauvoir on Sade: making sexuality into an ethic.” The Cambridge Companion 
to Simone de Beauvoir. Ed. Claudia Card. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003. 168-188. 
Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. 1942. Trans. Justin O’Brien. London: Penguin Books, 
2005. 
---. The Outsider. 1942. Trans. Joseph Laredo. London: Penguin Books, 2000. 
---. The Rebel. 1951. Trans. Anthony Beaver. London: Penguin Books, 1971. 
Clarke, Jaime, and Bret Easton Ellis. “Interview with Bret Easton Ellis.” Mississippi Review 
27.3 (1999): 66-102. 
Clemens, Valdine. The Return of the Repressed: Gothic Horror from The Castle of Otranto to 
Alien. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1999. 
Cobb, Kelton. The Blackwell Guide to Theology and Popular Culture. Malden, MA.: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005. 
Cohen, Roger. “Bret Easton Ellis Answers Critics of American Psycho.” New York Times 6 
Mar. 1991: C13+. 
Conley, John. “The Poverty of Bret Easton Ellis.” The Arizona Quarterly 65.3 (2009): 117-
137. 
Cooper, David E. Existentialism: A Reconstruction. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.  
116 
 
Crowell, Steven. “Existentialism.” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 
23 Aug. 2004. Revised 23 Jan 2010. 28 Apr. 2010. 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/>. 
Detmer, David. Sartre Explained: From Bad Faith to Authenticity. Chicago: Open Court, 2008. 
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. Notes from Underground. 1864. Trans. Ronald Wilks. London: Penguin 
Classics, 2009. 
Dryden, Linda. The Modern Gothic and Literary Doubles: Stevenson, Wilde and Wells. 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
Ellis, Bret Easton. American Psycho. London: Picador, 1991. 
---. Less Than Zero. 1985. London: Picador, 2006. 
---. “The Twentysomethings: Adrift in a Pop Landscape.” New York Times 2 Dec. 1990: 
H1+. 
Freccero, Carla. “Historical Violence, Censorship, and the Serial Killer: The Case of 
American Psycho.” Diacritics 27.2 (1997): 44-58. 
Garrett, Christopher E. “Dostoevsky’s Hell on Earth: Examining the Inner Torment of 
the Underground Man.” Literature and Belief 26.2 (2006): 53-68. 
Grayson, Erik M., ed. Stirrings Still: The International Journal of Existential Literature 2.2 (2005). 
Giles, James R. The Spaces of Violence. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 
2006. 
Ginsberg, Allen. “Howl.” 1956.  Howl, Kaddish and Other Poems. London: Penguin Classics, 
2009. 1-11. 
Giroux, Henry A. “Private Satisfactions and Public Disorders: Fight Club, Patriarchy, and 
the Politics of Masculine Violence.” JAC: A Journal of Composition Theory 21.1 
(2001): 1-31. 
117 
 
Glaister, Dan. ‘I dare you.’ The Guardian. Guardian News and Media Limited. 13 Mar. 
2004. 5 May 2010. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2004/mar/13/fiction.chuckpalahniuk>. 
Göҫ, Murat. “Palahniuk’s Desperate Men and the Gender Angst.” Interactions: Ege University 
Journal of British and American Studies 17.1 (2008): 49-60. 
Helyer, Ruth. “Parodied to Death: The Postmodern Gothic of American Psycho.” Modern 
Fiction Studies 46.3 (2000): 725-746. 
Hennelly, Mark M. “Melmoth the Wanderer and Gothic Existentialism.” Studies in English 
Literature 21.4 (1981): 665-679. 
Iannone, Carol. “PC and the Ellis Affair.” Commentary 92.1 (1991): 52-54. 
Johnson, Patricia. “Art against Art: The Cinema and Sartre’s La Nausée.” The French Review 
58.1 (1984): 68-76. 
Kavadlo, Jesse. “The Fiction of Self-Destruction: Chuck Palahniuk, Closet Moralist.” 
Grayson 3-24. 
Kavanagh, Matt. “Of Failed Romance, Writer’s Malpractice, and Prose for the Nose: A 
Conversation with Chuck Palahniuk.” Sacred and Immoral: On the Writings of Chuck 
Palahniuk. Ed. Jeffery A. Sartain. Newcastle, U.K.: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2009. 178-192. 
Kennett, Paul. “Fight Club and the Dangers of Oedipal Obsession.” Grayson 48-64. 
Kuhn, Cynthia. “I Am Marla’s Monstrous Wound: Fight Club and The Gothic.” Kuhn and 
Rubin 36-48. 
Kuhn, Cynthia, and Lance Rubin, eds. Reading Chuck Palahniuk: American Monsters and 
Literary Mayhem. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Mathews, Peter. “Diagnosing Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club.” Grayson 81-104. 
Milton, John. Paradise Lost. 1667. Ed. Christopher Ricks. London: Penguin Books, 2000. 
118 
 
Murphet, Julian. Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho: A Reader’s Guide. New York: 
Continuum, 2002. 
Murphy, Peter. “Interview: Bret Easton Ellis.” The New Review. Laura Hird. 2006. 15 Apr. 
2010. <http://www.laurahird.com/newreview/breteastonellis.html>. 
Ng, Andrew. “Destruction and the Discourse of Deformity: Invisible Monsters and the 
Ethics of Atrocity.” Kuhn and Rubin 24-35.  
---. “Muscular Existentialism in Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club.” Grayson 116-138. 
Nietzsche, Freidrich. The Gay Science. 1887. Ed. Bernard Williams. Trans. Josefine 
Nauckhoff. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
---. “Homer’s Contest”. 1872. Trans. Carol Diethe. Pearson and Large 95-100. 
---. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 1883-5. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Pearson and Large 254-292. 
Palahniuk, Chuck. Afterword. Fight Club. By Palahniuk. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005. 
209-218. 
---. Fight Club. 1996. Sydney: Random House, 1997. 
---. Survivor. 1999. London: Vintage, 2003.  
Pearson, Keith Ansell, and Duncan Large, eds. The Nietzsche Reader. Malden, MA.: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006. 
Peele, Thomas. “Fight Club’s Queer Representations.” JAC: A Journal of Composition Theory 
21.4 (2001): 862-869. 
Robinson, Tasha. “Interview: Chuck Palahniuk.” The A.V. Club. The Onion. 13 Nov. 
2002. 4 Mar. 2011. <http://www.avclub.com/articles/chuck-palahniuk,13791/>. 
Sahlin, Nicki. “‘But This Road Doesn’t Go Anywhere’: The Existential Dilemma in Less 
Than Zero.” Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 33.1 (1991): 23-42. 
Sartain, Jeffery A. “‘Even the Mona Lisa’s Falling Apart’: the Cultural Assimilation of 
Scientific Epistemologies in Palahniuk’s Fiction.” Grayson 25-47. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Baudelaire. 1947. London: Horizon, 1949. 
119 
 
---. Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology. 1943. Ed. and trans. Hazel E. 
Barnes. London: Routledge Classics, 2003. 
---. Existentialism Is a Humanism. 1946. Trans. Carol Macomber. Ed. John Kulka. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 
---. Nausea. 1938. Trans. Robert Baldick. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973. 
---. No Exit, and Three Other Plays. Trans. Stuart Gilbert and Lionel Abel. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1955. 
Scanlan, James P. Dostoevsky the Thinker. New York: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
Schneider, Steven. “Reconciling Remorse in Thérèse Raquin and American Psycho.” Excavatio: 
Emile Zola and Naturalism 17.1-2 (2002): 421-432. 
Schoene, Berthold. “Serial Masculinity: Psychopathology and Oedipal Violence in Bret 
Easton Ellis’s American Psycho.” Modern Fiction Studies 54.2 (2008): 278-397. 
Schur, Anna. “From Turgenev to Bitov: Superfluous Men and Postmodern Selves.” Slavic 
and East European Journal 53.2 (2009): 561-578. 
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. The Coherence of Gothic Conventions. New York: Methuen, 1986. 
Shelly, Percy. “Ozymandias.” 1818. Shelley’s Poetry and Prose. Ed. Donald H. Reiman and 
Sharon B. Powers. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977. 103. 
Slade, Andrew. “On Mutilation: The Sublime Body of Chuck Palahniuk’s Fiction.” Kuhn 
and Rubin 62-72. 
Solomon, Robert C. Living With Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” Has to Teach Us. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Spinks, Lee. Friedrich Nietzsche. London: Routledge, 2003. 
Stevenson, Robert Louis. “Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde.” 1886. Dr Jekyll and Mr 
Hyde and Other Stories. Everyman’s Library. London: David Campbell, 1992. 1-78. 
120 
 
Storey, Mark. “‘And as things fell apart’: The Crisis of Postmodern Masculinity in Bret 
Easton Ellis’s American Psycho and Dennis Cooper’s Frisk.” Critique: Studies in 
Contemporary Fiction 47.1 (2005): 57-72. 
Taylor, Robert E. “The SEXpressive S in Sade and Sartre.” Yale French Studies 11 (1953): 
18-24. 
Thompson, G. R. The Gothic Imagination: Essays in Dark Romanticism. Pullman, Washington: 
Washington State University Press, 1974. 
Warwick, Alexandra, and Martin Willis, eds. Jack the Ripper: Media, Culture, History. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007. 
Warwick, Dionne. “Do You Know the Way to San Jose?” By Burt Bacharach and Hal 
David. Dionne Warwick in Valley of the Dolls. Scepter, 1968. LP. 
Waxman, Barbara. “Postexistentialism in the Neo-Gothic Mode: Anne Rice’s Interview with 
the Vampire.” Mosaic 25.3 (1992): 79-97. 
Weich, Dave. “Author Interviews: Bret Easton Ellis Does an Awfully Good Impression of 
Himself.” Powell’s Books. Powell’s City of Books. 7 Sept. 2005. 16 Apr. 2010. 
<http://www.powells.com/authors/ellis.html>. 
Wilde, Oscar. The Picture of Dorian Gray. 1891. Ed. Joseph Bristow. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
Young, Elizabeth, and Graham Caveney. Shopping in Space: Essays on America’s Blank 
Generation Fiction. New York: Grove Press, 1994. 
Young, Elizabeth. “The beast in the jungle, the figure in the carpet: Bret Easton Ellis’s 
American Psycho.” Shopping in Space. 85-122. 
---. “Vacant Possession.” Shopping in Space. 21-42. 
